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Abstract
This research presents a methodology for the ontological formalisation of
vague spatial concepts from natural language, with an application to the
automatic recognition of event occurrences on video data. The main is-
sue faced when defining concepts sourced from language is vagueness,
related to the presence of ambiguities and borderline cases even in sim-
ple concepts such as ‘near’, ‘fast’, ‘big’, etc. Other issues specific to this
semantic domain are saliency, granularity and uncertainty.
In this work, the issue of vagueness in formal semantics is discussed
and a methodology based on supervaluation semantics is proposed. This
constitutes the basis for the formalisation of an ontology of vague spa-
tial concepts based on classical logic, Event Calculus and supervaluation
semantics. This ontology is structured in layers where high-level con-
cepts, corresponding to complex actions and events, are inferred through
mid-level concepts, corresponding to simple processes and properties of
objects, and low-level primitive concepts, representing the most essential
spatio-temporal characteristics of the real world.
The development of ProVision, an event recognition system based on a
logic-programming implementation of the ontology, demonstrates a prac-
tical application of the methodology. ProVision grounds the ontology on
data representing the content of simple video scenes, leading to the infer-
ence of event occurrences and other high-level concepts.
The contribution of this research is a methodology for the semantic
characterisation of vague and qualitative concepts. This methodology ad-
dresses the issue of vagueness in ontologies and demonstrates the appli-
cability of a supervaluationist approach to the formalisation of vague con-
cepts. It is also proven to be effective towards solving a practical reasoning
task, such as the event recognition on which this work focuses.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ontologies have become popular in the field of information and cognitive
science as a general means for specifying the semantics of the terminology
used to represent data. The development of an ontology for the formali-
sation of concepts describing the physical world is often problematic due
to the semantic complexity of most terms sourced from natural language.
What does it mean for a man to be ‘tall’? Or for a house to be ‘near’ the
railway station? And how can one formally characterise the occurrence
of an event where a person is ‘picking up’ something? Many words have
multiple meanings, many others are vague and, often, their applicability
in describing a particular object, situation or event is subject to an inter-
pretation by the observer speaking or thinking the word. People indeed
hold different beliefs and opinions on the meanings of concepts shaped by
their cultural background and prior experience. People also choose and
adapt the interpretation of a particular concept according to the specific
context surrounding the utterance of the term.
The aim of this work is to develop a methodology for the character-
isation of vague concepts in formal ontologies in order to develop an
ontology-based automatic reasoning system for the recognition of event
occurrences. In particular, this methodology focuses on a specific set of
vague spatial concepts and motion verbs and culminates with the imple-
mentation of the Prolog-based event recognition system ProVision. This
system implements the ontological formalism for the characterisation of
vague motion verbs and logically infers the occurrence of certain events in
real-world situations, represented by data obtained through the processing
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of video scenes. Although the ontology and event recognition system have
been developed within the context of motion verbs, the resulting method-
ology should be general enough for its extension and application to other
reasoning tasks.
Motivation for this work stems from interest in formal ontologies,
vagueness in natural language and the general aim of combining depth
and breadth in an ontology for describing the physical world. This has
generated a quest for a logic-based formalism for the representation and
reasoning on vague concepts that could also find a practical application in
Artificial Intelligence, the results of which are presented here. Motivation
also stems from the aim of bridging the gap between the deep and narrow
approach to ontology formalisation, involving strong axioms and a small
number of primitives, and the broad and shallow approach, leading to large
vocabularies and weak axioms. The approach followed by this research to
ontology formalisation is based on the identification of mid-level concepts,
defined in terms of basic primitives and also well-suited for facilitating
easy definition of a wide range of higher level terminology.
1.1 Domain, Application and Methodology
The specific purpose of developing an ontology for the formalisation of
vague motion verbs and their recognition from video through an auto-
matic inference system has stemmed from involvement in the Mind’s Eye
challenge by DARPA [33, 34]. This project aims to automatically recognise
occurrences of actions in video sequences described by the 48 verbs listed
in Table 1.1, hereafter referred to as motion verbs:
Approach Arrive Attach Bounce Bury
Carry Catch Chase Close Collide
Dig Drop Enter Exchange Exit
Fall Flee Fly Follow Get
Give Go Hand Haul Have
Hit Hold Jump Kick Leave
Lift Move Open Pass PickUp
Push PutDown Raise Receive Replace
Run Snatch Stop Take Throw
Touch Turn Walk
Table 1.1: Motion verbs list
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DARPA also provided an extensive collection of videos, each of which
contain occurrences of one or more actions described by the verbs in the
table above and involving different subjects.
The Mind’s Eye challenge is composed of sub-tasks, namely recognition,
gap filling and anomaly detection. The recognition task, aimed at recognising
any occurrence of a motion verb in the videos, has been the inspiration for
this work. Gap filling and anomaly detection tasks, outside the scope of
the work presented here, respectively aim at inferring event occurrences
over the gaps of an incomplete video sequence, and at detecting uncon-
ventional or singular occurrences of events.
Most attempts at performing event recognition tasks of this kind are to
be found in Artificial Intelligence within the Vision and Machine Learn-
ing research areas. This task has been attempted, for example, through a
combination of Machine Learning and Inductive Logic Programming tech-
niques where event models are learnt through the analysis of qualitative
spatio-temporal relations between objects [42, 41, 99]. An overview on
these approaches can be found in Sec. 2.5.
The approach to event recognition presented in this work is centred
around the development of an ontology of vague spatial concepts based
on supervaluation semantics [61, 97], and the modelling of each motion
verb through the analysis of its most relevant semantic characteristics that
can be defined in terms of observable properties. The issue of vagueness
arises from the fact that understanding and defining motion verbs in terms
of observable properties involves the formalisation of qualitative vague
concepts.
For example, verbs such as Chase or Run refer to the concept of an
object’s motion being fast, Pass and Arrive refer to the notion of an object
being near a boundary expressing the vicinity to another object, Fly and Fall
may refer to the notion of a trajectory being mostly horizontal or vertical,
and so on.
Further ambiguities arise from terms that have multiple meanings,
such as Pass that may refer to a person giving an item to another per-
son, or crossing a boundary between two areas. Some motion instances
may smoothly transition from constituting an occurrence of one verb, for
example Walk, into an occurrence of another verb, for example Run. Addi-
tionally, the same observed situation may be described by concepts similar
3
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in meaning but different in saliency. This is mainly due to a greater speci-
ficity of one concept compared to another (e.g. Kick compared to the more
general Hit) or a greater emphasis given by a certain concept to a pecu-
liar feature of the action (e.g. the different intentionality in occurrences of
Collide or Hit).
The ontology-based approach to event recognition should allow for
greater specification and understanding of each verb semantic characteris-
tics, which may not be completely grasped by learning techniques exposed
to a finite set of examples. Ideally, a comprehensive formal ontology of
motion verbs would require an extensive and systematic analysis of the
semantic properties of each verb, drawing for example from studies in
linguistics [107, 69]. However, such an extensive analysis is likely to for-
malise concepts in terms of semantic characteristics that are not definable
in terms of observable properties. Some semantic characteristics, in fact,
may refer to contextual information or fine-grained and highly detailed
properties of objects not detectable in practical applications. Some can be
so abstract to be almost impossible to ground on observable facts.
In other words, humans may achieve a deep, thorough understanding
of a particular meaning and applicability of a word, but a computer is
unlikely to achieve the same understanding, given the limitations of the
current state of the art in automated image and video interpretation. In
the context of event recognition, this means that machines simply can-
not reason on the same set of semantic properties referred to by humans
while attempting to describe a situation or event occurrence with qualita-
tive concepts from natural language. This limitation is essentially caused
by the fact that machines can only operate on a limited, finite and coarse-
grained representation of the world and possess very limited, if any, in-
built knowledge and prior experience able to guide their judgements.
For this reason, the goal of this research is not to achieve a seman-
tically exhaustive characterisation of motion verbs, but rather to develop
a methodology for an effective characterisation of concepts that would ad-
vance an ontological framework from an analytical abstraction of the phys-
ical world to a practical, usable reasoning device. In fact, the methodology
developed here has led to the implementation of the ontology of motion
verbs into the Prolog-based event recognition system ProVision, which
grounds objects’ primitive properties from the data, and infers mid-level
4
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and higher-level concepts expressing occurrences of events in the video
scenes.
Our research also contributes to analysis and considerations on issues
of vagueness, saliency, uncertainty and relevancy of context in formal on-
tologies. Although video processing falls outside the scope of this re-
search, as it lies in within the Vision for Artificial Intelligence area, it con-
stitutes a closely related field. In fact, advances in algorithms and tech-
niques for object detection and classification from video would allow to
augment the level of detail with which verbs and semantic properties are
formalised in the ontology, allowing ProVision to perform more accurate
and/or specific recognition tasks.
Although the specific application domain of motion verbs and the
video dataset have an influence on the ontology design and the verb mod-
els, efforts have been made to maintain enough generality in the principles
and methodology for them to be deployed in reasoning tasks involving
other domains.
1.2 Thesis Outline
A formal ontology of motion verbs involves the definition of concepts that
may hold at specific time points, occur over certain temporal intervals or
refer to particular spatial characteristics of objects and the environment.
Most of the related work on formalisms for spatio-temporal reasoning
and for the representation of actions and events is reviewed in Chapter 2.
This chapter also overviews issues of linguistic studies and classification
of verbs. Studies on the nature and characteristics of vagueness are intro-
duced, with an overview of the most prominent logical formalisms that
have been proposed for the definition of vague concepts in formal lan-
guages.
The specific issues involving the formalisation of an ontology of vague
motion verbs are analysed and discussed in Chapter 3. This discussion
examines the issue of vagueness and its impact on the formalisation of
spatial concepts, followed by an overview of the most relevant semantic
characteristics of motion verbs to be formalised as concepts in the ontol-
ogy. The chapter also analyses issues particularly relevant to the task of
event recognition, such as saliency, context, granularity and uncertainty.
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The formal ontology of motion verbs is introduced in Chapter 4. The
spatio-temporal framework is formalised, followed by the specification of
objects in their types and sub-types. The formalism for expressing that
propositional expressions hold at a particular time or over a particular
interval is established, followed by the definition of primitive and mid-
level properties of objects that express their most spatial characteristics.
These properties are the bricks building higher-level concepts and the verb
models. The chapter closes with considerations on how the appearance of
objects expressed by primitive properties can be augmented with a Theory
of Appearances.
The analysis of the most relevant characteristics of motion verbs is pre-
sented in Chapter 5, where a subset of motion verbs among the ones listed
in Table 1.1 is extensively analysed and formalised within the ontological
framework defined in Chapter 4. The verbs being modelled broadly in-
volve concepts describing simple motion, such as Move or Walk, proximity,
such as Approach or Arrive, relations between objects, such as Follow, or
contact, such as Touch or Hit.
Finally, Chapter 6 describes the development of ProVision, the event
recognition system based on the ontology resulting from the previous two
chapters. The chapter starts with an analysis of the video scenes and the
nature and quality of the data available to ProVision to ground the on-
tology, continues with details about the implementation of parts of the
ontology definition and closes with some experimental results and con-
siderations on the evaluation of the system for the recognition of events
Approach and Hold.
1.3 Issues Addressed and Contribution
Although there has been work on ontology based definitions of event
types, this has hardly been applied to event recognition from video [96], in
which, instead, techniques based on Machine Learning dominate. These
techniques aim to understand and recognise observable features through
the analysis of a large set of training examples. This approach may in-
volve concept semantics, but it is mostly based on a statistical analysis
aimed at identifying correlations across training examples. The advantage
of such data-driven approach is that it provides an established method-
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ology to build an event recognition system relatively quickly, whilst an
ontology-based approach requires an extended formalisation and analysis
stage before its implementation can be built.
This is a possible cause of the absence of substantial research into de-
signing an ontological framework and corresponding implementation for
the task of event recognition. It is believed that ontology-based systems
can demonstrate advantages in terms of their generality and greater spec-
ification of the meaning of particular features to be recognised, whilst
Machine Learning approaches tend to shape their deductions according
to the specific set of examples they have been trained on. Ontology-based
systems also have the advantage of providing an explanation justifying the
reasoning process leading to a particular inference.
The main contribution of this research is a methodology for develop-
ing such a framework, and in general for the characterisation of vague
concepts in formal ontologies, with the aim of solving practical reasoning
tasks such as the Mind’s Eye Challenge. Specific contributions are listed
below:
• Analysis and discussion of issues regarding vagueness in natural
language and the framing of the epistemic stance as an effective
model of vagueness for ontology reasoning (Sec. 3.1);
• Development of a method for the formalisation of vague concepts
based on supervaluation semantics, leading to the precisification of
vague concepts with borderline cases through precisification thresh-
olds;
• Illustration of a methodology for the semantic characterisation of
motion verbs (and, more generally, vague concepts) that focuses on
observable properties of objects;
• Demonstration of the applicability of the above strategies in Pro-
Vision, a Prolog-based implementation of the ontology formalism
which performs event recognition from video by inferring high-level
qualitative concepts through the grounding of ontology primitives
on real data.
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Related work
This chapter summarises the most relevant work related to formal ontolo-
gies and the characterisation of concepts from natural language. Several
spatio-temporal formalisms, reviewed in Sec. 2.1, constitute a basis for log-
ical languages for the representation of action and events, introduced in
Sec. 2.2. Linguistic studies, outlined in Sec. 2.3, contribute to the analysis
of the characteristics of words representing states, actions and events in
natural language. Vagueness as a linguistic phenomenon has been a mat-
ter of study in the philosophical and logical communities and different
characterisations and formalisms have been proposed as a result, reviewed
in Sec. 2.4. This discussion also continues in Sec. 3.1 with a focus on the
specific domain of motion verbs. Finally, Sec. 2.5 outlines how Machine
Learning techniques for logic programming may contribute to building a
logic-based event recognition system.
2.1 Spatio-temporal reasoning
One of the aims of this project is to develop an ontology for the repre-
sentation of objects and their interactions in space over a particular time
interval. Therefore formalisms of interest to the issues addressed in this
work are frameworks with the capability of reasoning about time and space.
2.1.1 Temporal Reasoning formalisms
Formalisms for temporal reasoning generally define a set of ordered time
points or instants T = {t1, t2, t3 . . .} and a set of intervals ranging over
9
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Figure 2.1: Allen temporal intervals
instants in T , for example [ts, te] is a closed interval containing the time
points between ts and te. Specific formalisms further specify the structure
of T , which could be based on a discrete or dense model of time, and the
nature of intervals, for example some formalisms admit both closed and
open intervals.
Early work on temporal reasoning includes Allen’s classical results on
temporal intervals [8, 9]. Allen’s interval calculus is a reasoning formalism
on the relation between intervals. A set of 13 jointly exhaustive and pair-
wise disjoint relations is defined, such that one and only one particular
relation holds between two given intervals [t1s , t1e ] and [t2s , t2e ], for example
meet([t1s , t1e ], [t2s , t2e ]) or overlap([t1s , t1e ], [t2s , t2e ]). This is illustrated in figure
2.1.
Some frameworks introduce modal operators 2 and 3 of modal log-
ics [22] for reasoning about time points and intervals in possible worlds
that can be represented. Early work on modal logics for temporal reason-
ing is based on the relations defined in Allen’s interval calculus [54, 109].
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Other works focus on temporal structures and the possibility of reasoning
about logical propositions holding at some time instant in the past or at
some time instant in the future, either with linear models of time, such
as Linear Time Logics LTL, or branching models of time, such as Com-
puter Time Logics CTL and CTL∗ [43, 44]. Further work focuses on issues
of complexity and decidability of some of these modal logics of time, as
their expressive power often results in the logic being undecidable. Most
of these approaches attempt to define decidable logics of time by restrict-
ing their expressive power, in particular the range of admissible relations
allowed in the logic [72, 24, 23].
2.1.2 Spatial Reasoning frameworks
Formalisms for spatial reasoning generally define a set of points in space
Sp and/or a set of spatial regions Sa and focus on defining relations hold-
ing between points and regions. Contrarily to the models of time appear-
ing in logical systems for temporal reasoning, in general there is a wider
variety of models of points and areas in systems for spatial reasoning.
Qualitative spatial reasoning is an area of research whose focus is on iden-
tifying qualitative models of space and relations holding between points
and regions.
A classic example of a qualitative spatial reasoning formalism is Region
Connection Calculus (RCC, [87]), in some ways a counterpart to Allen’s
temporal calculus applied to spatial regions. RCC examines the topologi-
cal relations that hold between closed regions of space and identifies two
sets of disjoint and exhaustive relations holding between them: a fine-
grained set of 8 relations (RCC8) and a coarser set of 5 relations (RCC5),
illustrated in figure Fig. 2.2.
RCC has been extended in order to specify relations holding between 2-
dimensional concave regions, in particular with calculi RCC23 [30], which
treats these regions as one whole part and focuses on the relations be-
tween concave regions and their convex hull, and the more expressive
RCC62 [114], where concave regions are decomposed into 4 constituent
parts (outside, boundary, interior and inside).
Studies on the extensibility of RCC to 3-dimensional regions also exist.
The calculus RCC3D [7] defines 13 relations based on the intersection of the
3D interior, exterior and boundary of regions and the intersection of their
11
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Figure 2.2: Relations in Region Connection Calculus
2-dimensional projection on a reference plane. The calculus VRCC3D+
[92] extends the previous by introducing further relations addressing the
ambiguous cases in RCC3D which may arise due to region obscuration in
a 3-dimensional space.
A number of studies on Region Connection Calculus has followed,
such as completeness and tractability of sets of relations [90, 73] and ap-
plications of modal logics to the calculus [12]. This calculus has also been
integrated with temporal reasoning frameworks in order to define a modal
logic system describing changes in topological relations over time [17]. An
overview of modal logics for spatial reasoning is provided in [5, 6].
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These frameworks are based on an abstract model of time and space.
Our application aims to develop an ontology for spatio-temporal reason-
ing that can be used to extract and process information from real data. For
this reason, calculi based on such abstract temporal and spatial models of-
ten need an adaptation in order to deal with issues such as uncertainty
and vagueness (see Chapter 3). Spatial and temporal logical formalisms
have inspired the spatial and temporal aspects of the ontology defined in
Chapter 4, and some particular relations of these calculi have been incor-
porated, namely Region Connection Calculus.
2.2 Reasoning about Actions and Events
Two important formalisms for reasoning about actions and events are Sit-
uation Calculus [75, 89] and Event Calculus [64, 76].
Situation Calculus is a formalism without an explicit model of time
instants, but where the changes in a dynamic world are modelled by a
sequence of states. The domain of Situation Calculus comprises actions,
situations and objects. The world being modelled is thought of as pro-
gressing through several situations, each of which result from some per-
formed action. There are two different interpretations of situations: in [75]
a situation represents a state of the world, whilst in [89] a situation repre-
sents a sequence of occurrences in the form of a history. Respectively, the
initial state of the world or initial sequence prior to any actions is repre-
sented by S0. Actions represent an event which induces a change in the
state of the world, altering the current situation. Fluents are temporal en-
tities represented by propositional expressions that may be true or false
given a particular situation, and in some ways they model when a particu-
lar property of the world, or of specific objects, holds. Within the calculus,
an action may have conditions that limit the situations in which it can be
executed, and effects of its execution on the fluents.
Event calculus is a formalism where time points are explicit, and makes
it possible to state whether a particular proposition is true at a particular
time point. Propositions of this kind, whose truth-value can be linked to a
specific time point, are called fluents. The basic construct of the language
is the predicate HoldsAt(p, t) which is true if fluent p holds at time point t.
The calculus also allows for the representation of actions whose execution
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may have an effect on the truth-value of certain fluents given a particular
time point.
Versatile Event Logic (VEL) is a highly expressive language with a se-
mantics for the representation of spatio-temporal relations, elements of
Situation Calculus and Event Calculus for the representation of action and
events, and a modal operator to describe alternative histories [18]. VEL de-
fines a spatio-temporal ontology of individuals, times, temporal intervals,
states, observable values and events.
The ontology formalised in Chapter 4 and the logical analysis of mo-
tion verbs in Chapter 5 have been strongly influenced by characteristics
of Event Calculus and Versatile Event Logic. This is particularly true in
respect to the definition of an explicit temporal model constituted by time
points, the HoldsAt expression expressing truth of a particular fluent at a
particular time point and the Occurs construct expressing that a certain
event occurs over a time interval.
Ontologies of Processes and Events
Building a logical formalism for reasoning about time and events often
involves distinguishing between different classes of temporal entitites that
occur over at a particular time or at a particular interval. Operating such
a classification has been and still is a matter of debate among the KRR
community, Galton [49] provides a summary suggesting a classification of
temporal entities in processes and events:
• Processes represent complex activities, happening over a time inter-
val and generally, but not necessarily, directed towards reaching a
goal or intended state. Processes are structured, and may be com-
posed of sub-processes. An example is the process ‘cycling from
home to work’.
• Events represent simpler activities, generally happening at a time
point and generally not directed towards a goal or reaching an in-
tended state. An event can be considered as a ‘bounded instantiation
of a process’ or as a chunk of a process. An example is given by a
chunk of the process ‘cycling from home to work’ which represents
a person cycling without the context and additional significance car-
ried by the fact that the person is cycling from home to work.
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Galton also describes the ways in which events can be described in
terms of other events, and how the repetition of an event can be combined
in order to form a process. There is a further ontological classification of
temporal entities into types and tokens
• A process- or event-type is a temporal entity of which there may
exist many temporal instances, for example ‘I catch the train to Ed-
inburgh’.
• A process- or event-token is a particular temporal occurrence of a
process- or event-type, for example ‘I catch the train to Edinburgh at
9.50am today’.
The ontology described in Chapter 4 operates the above distinction be-
tween event-types and event-tokens.
A process occurring over a particular interval i may or may not occur
over sub-intervals of i. Processes for which these sub-intervals can be
unboundedly narrow are said to be homogeneous (e.g. falling, approaching,
drying) whilst processes that do not occur over unboundedly narrow sub-
intervals are said to be granular (e.g. walking, jumping, picking up). This is
because if an homogeneous process such as “falling” occurs over temporal
interval i, it is generally possible to describe the situation over interval
i′ ⊂ i as an occurrence of the same process. On the other hand, a granular
event such as “walking” occurring over interval i is not homogeneous as
it is generally the result of a sequence of sub-processes occurring over
sub-intervals of i. In other words, if “walking” occurs over i, the process
occurring over a very small interval i′ ⊂ i is described, for example, by the
constituent sub-process of “a person raising his/her foot”.
Processes that have the potential to continue indefinitely (e.g. cycling)
are called open-ended, and they are often homogeneous. Instances of such
processes may still specify a termination (e.g. cycling to the station). Pro-
cesses which are neither homogeneous nor open-ended are called closed
(e.g. baking a cake) [49].
2.3 Linguistics
Investigations about the meaning and semantic characterisations of words
occurring in natural language are often found in the field of linguistics.
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An established classification of verbs and the actions or states they rep-
resent is given by Vendler [107, 108], where verbs are classified according
to the following categories:
• Atelic
These expressions describe actions or situations not associated with
a goal or target. They are further characterised as:
– States
Static actions or expressions not involving or determining any
change in the world, for example ‘be tall’, ‘own a bicycle’, ‘be
alive’. . .
– Activities
Dynamic actions involving or determining change, for example
‘walk’, ‘move’, ‘approach’. . .
• Telic
These expressions describe actions or situations associated with a
goal or target, which is a desired or intended result that an occur-
rence of this kind is leading to. They are further characterised as:
– Achievements
Punctual actions whose occurrences happen at a single time
instant, for example ‘touch’, ‘win (a game)’, ‘reach (the bus
stop)’. . .
– Accomplishments
Durative actions whose occurrences extend over a time interval,
for example ‘approach Leeds’, ‘carry a box’, ‘lift a weight’. . .
The verb models in Chapter 5 relate to the classification above, es-
pecially regarding the distinction between verbs describing static events,
whose temporal duration is punctual or near-punctual, and verbs describ-
ing dynamic events or complex processes constituted by a particular se-
quence of events. The process of verb modelling has shown that the clas-
sification above is not entirely rigid, as certain expressions may be inter-
preted in more than one sense.
For example, according to the classification above, the verb ‘to touch’
represents a punctual action occurring at a time instant. A rigorous anal-
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ysis would lead to the formal characterisation of Touch as an event hap-
pening at a single time point t. However, some people may interpret the
semantics of the verb ‘to touch’ in a more relaxed way, assigning a duration
to the event Touch which encompasses some temporal interval surround-
ing t and may include, for example, some action prior to Touch which
resulted in the event occurrence.
A further study in linguistics about the semantics of verbs is Levin’s
work on verb classes and alternations [69]. This work analyses the differ-
ent ways verbs can occur in language sentences, and contributed to the
formal characterisation of verb models by clarifying the circumstances un-
der which an expression may occur, or the kinds of objects and contextual
information relevant to the interpretation of a particular verb.
Another resource about the semantics of tense and aspect and the treat-
ment of events is [65], which provides an overview on the most philo-
sophical and linguistic aspects of the matter and studies on formal and
computational approaches that deal with time and events.
2.4 Vagueness
Vagueness is a phenomenon which manifests itself when attempting a
formal definition of natural language concepts, and it is different from
uncertainty, arising from insufficient or imprecise knowledge, or general-
ity, arising from lack of specificity. It can be seen as a form of ambiguity,
although ambiguity tends to refer to the possibility for a word to have
different interpretations, whilst vagueness is concerned with the ways the
interpretation of a word can be made precise [103, pag. 110–115].
A classic example of vagueness is given by the Sorites paradox about
establishing what constitutes a heap of sand [58, 111]. One may argue that,
given a heap, the heap obtained by removing a grain from the original
heap would still be considered a heap. However, most would agree on the
fact that a single grain of sand does not constitute a heap. If one decides
to progressively remove grains from a heap of sand until there is just one
grain left, the paradox is shown by the fact such an amount of sand would
be considered a heap according to the first observation, and not a heap
according to the second.
This example demonstrates a common trait of vague concepts central
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to the analysis of most lingusitic forms of vagueness, which is the lack of a
crisp applicability boundary separating positive and negative instances of a
certain concept, i.e. what constitutes a heap and what does not. The exam-
ple also demonstrates the fact that establishing a precise interpretation of
a vague concept is problematic. In fact, one could fix a minimum number
n of grains of sand constituting a heap, however this would result in the
counterintuitive consequence that the concept ‘heap’ would apply to a pile
of n grains but not to a pile of n− 1 grains.
A linguistic expression or proposition is vague if it contains one or
more constituent parts which are vague. Different syntactic categories of
vague terms appearing in language sentences can be identified [15]:
• Adjectives, for example rich, heavy, red, tall, elongated, steep. . .
Vagueness in adjectives correponds to a blurred boundary for the
applicability of the term. Generally, this is due to an underspeci-
fication of criteria drawing a clear separation between positive and
negative instances of a certain thing characterised with the adjective.
For example, it is not very clear how to precisely separate a group of
people with very similar heights between tall and not tall ones.
• Count nouns, for example lake, river, mountain,. . .
As for adjectives, vagueness in count nouns is also due to a blurred
applicability boundary . However, count nouns tend to be more com-
plex as there are many observable properties defining the criteria for
the applicability of a term [56]. For example, a count noun such as
lake could be defined in terms of its size, shape, extension, water vol-
ume, tributary, emissary, surrounding environment and many more.
• Relational Expressions: for example near, far, beside,. . .
These expressions also show blurred applicability boundaries due
to unspecified applicability criteria. For example, the distance sep-
arating a school and a station in the sentence ‘the school is near the
station’.
The case of adjectives is interesting, with vagueness being particularly
pervasive in this category. In general, adjectives are vague if they show
borderline cases. A proposed suggestion for the individuation of such
adjectives is based on two principles: whether the word can be modified
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by the adjective ‘very’ and whether it allows comparisons (e.g. ‘Hardknott
Pass is steeper than Wrynose Pass’). If an adjectives matches these two
criteria, it is called a degree adjective [84]. Statistics on the most frequently
used adjectives in the British National Corpus [3] show that the most fre-
quent include many degree adjectives, such as ‘new’, ‘good’, ‘old’, ‘great’,
‘high’, ‘small’, ‘large’, etc. [103, Ch. 6].
Most of the foundational characterisations on origins and nature of
vagueness can be found among the philosophical and logic communities
[47, 111, 113, 62]. More recently, interest has been growing within the
computing and geography communities too [106, 19, 50, 29]. There is
an ongoing debate on the nature and characterisation of vagueness, with
three accounts emerging from the literature:
• De dicto vagueness.
This is the characterisation most agreed on within the philosophical
community, and explains vagueness in terms of linguistic indeter-
minacy of representation [70, 106]. Given a vague term denoting an
object (e.g. ‘mountain’, for which a demarcation is ambiguous), this
view maintains that ambiguity is generated by an indeterminacy in
the language expression, and any other type of ambiguity can ulti-
mately be explained in terms of the former. In other words, de dicto
vagueness states that there is no such thing as a vague object, but
only linguistic expressions that vaguely identify objects. Because of
this, vagueness can be addressed by addressing the linguistic am-
biguity, thus making the linguistic expressions more precise. For
example, one could introduce a new precise noun ‘mountain’ which
refers to a precisely and uniquely determined spatial volume sur-
rounding a terrain prominence.
• De re or ontic vagueness.
This characterisation maintains that there exist intrinsically vague
objects in the world [102]. In the example noun ‘Mount Everest’, it is
argued that its boundaries are necessarily blurred as there is no fact
of the matter about some of its constituent molecules being inside
or outside these boundaries. De re vagueness tends to reject the
suggestion by de dicto theories that vague concepts are, essentially,
concepts that can be made more precise, and argues that doing so
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would be more akin to characterising a new, sharper concept rather
than precisifying a vague one.
• Epistemic vagueness.
This characterisation argues that there is an objectively correct set of
criteria for precisely determining the applicability of a vague con-
cept; however, this set of criteria is unknown, due to the uncertain
and inconsistent meaning of words and terms in natural language
[98, 110, 111].
There is no general agreement on which of the above characterisations
identifies exactly the nature and characteristics of vagueness, and it is pos-
sible for different views to be applicable at the same time in a particular
context. The main focus of this work is concerned with indeterminacy of
linguistic expressions, hence adopting the de dicto vagueness as the main
characterisation. This does not exclude the possibility that some objects
may be considered as inherently vague, therefore allowing for elements of
ontic vagueness.
Whilst this work rejects purely epistemic views of vagueness, an epis-
temic approach in disambiguating vagueness in linguistic expressions can
be pragmatically convenient in developing an automated reasoning sys-
tem. In this respect, an interesting conceptualisation is the epistemic stance
[68], where an artificial agent is modelled to behave as if the epistemic
view was correct. This is further discussed in Sec. 3.1.
The ontology of vague motion verbs of Chapters 4 and 5 involves the
definition and formalisation of vague concepts. As “the apparatus of clas-
sical logic, within which ontologies have traditionally been defined, cannot
by itself account for the meanings of the conceptual terms of natural lan-
guage”, there is the need for a superstructure aimed at mediating between
the natural language concepts and their vagueness and a precise classifi-
cation of these in a formal ontology [13]. The most prominent formalisms
proposed in the literature are reviewed below:
• Egg-Yolk model [31]
This is a model for possible interpretation for an axiomatic theory of
vague regions, which are viewed as vague objects (de re vagueness).
This model is based on the axiomatisation of a theory for crisp and
blurred regions [15, Sec. 4.1].
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A vague region is interpreted by the egg-yolk model as a pair of
nested crisp regions representing its maximal (the egg) and minimal
(the yolk) possible extensions. A region is itself crisp if and only if
the yolk is equal to the egg.
The egg-yolk semantics suits spatial domains, as it provides a very
simple model of indeterminate spatial objects. When a spatial re-
gion is interpreted as an egg-yolk pair, this means that the region
definitely includes the yolk and is definitely included in the egg.
• Fuzzy Logic [116]
This is a variation on the semantics of classical logics which origi-
nated from the theory of fuzzy sets [51]. It has become popular in
AI for modelling uncertainty and, also, vagueness.
Fuzzy logic is an adjustment of classical logic aimed at overcom-
ing the dichotomy between pure truth or pure falsehood. Its inter-
pretation is based on a range of degrees of truth, where truth-value
predicate p is generally expressed as a value pv ∈ [0, 1]. It can be
considered as a statistical approach to logic, where connectives are
interpreted according to statistic functions. There have been spatial
applications of fuzzy logic, for example a fuzzified formalisation of
RCC [93].
• Supervaluation Semantics [47, 61, 111, 97]
According to supervaluation semantics, a vague language admits
a range of different referents for terms, and different truth-values
for predicates and sentences. It is based on the principles of classi-
cal logic, and it is generally regarded as opposing statistical truth-
functional approaches such as fuzzy logic.
A formula admits multiple models, each obtainable via some form
of assignment of referents to terms and truth-values to predicates.
Each of these assignments is called a precisification and allows one
to obtain a precise interpretation of a logical symbol, and there may
be admissibility constraints on precisifications. Propositions true in
all precisifications are said to be supertrue, and partial assignments
leading to imprecise interpretations are also possible. The interpre-
tation of the entire language is given by a supervaluation, which is a
collection of all assignments for all the precisifications.
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Supervaluation semantics has applications in a linguistic context, for
instance the meaning of vague adjectives can be mapped by a func-
tion to a precise meaning [56].
• Standpoint Semantics [11, 14]
Standpoint Semantics refines and extends supervaluation semantics
with the aim of modelling specific vague concepts within a specific
application domain. It is based on the fundamental notion of stand-
point, which is taken every time an assertion is made. A standpoint
is partly made of the observer’s beliefs about the situation under
consideration, and partly of his judgements about the applicability
of certain concepts. A precisification then corresponds to a particular
standpoint that describes the precisification via a finite set of param-
eters, specifying thresholds on the value of observable properties
characterising vague concepts. This is represented in the syntax in
the form of parameterised propositional expressions (Sec. 4.5).
Several other formalisms for vagueness in logics have been proposed,
such as a set-theoretical formalisation of granular partitions [20] with an
application to spatial concepts [21], comparison classes to account for ad-
jectives’ context-sensitivity [48], modal logics of vagueness with a focus on
the sorites paradox [53] and an algorithmic attempt to disambiguate con-
cepts by measuring the appropriateness of labels attached to terms [67].
The egg-yolk model, although well axiomatisable, appears to be too
general, for instance it cannot account for any constraint to be applied on
the egg’s and/or yolk’s shape or extension. For a geographic feature or
other real world entities, it would be desirable to have a more structured
model.
Fuzzy logic has the potential to model the blurred applicability bound-
ary of a vague concept in terms of degrees of truth of a logical term. How-
ever, its semantics disrupts the entailment rules of classical logic, in par-
ticular the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. In fact, fuzzy
models may assign a certain degree of truth to fundamentally false ex-
pressions such as p ∧ ¬p, rather than interpreting them as definitely false.
Similarly, expressions such as p ∨ ¬p may be interpreted as true to some
degree rather than definitely true [103, pag. 189–203]. Theories of degrees
of truth and their relations to vagueness are also discussed in [60].
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Supervaluation semantics rejects the principle of bivalence. In fact,
predicates with borderline cases are indeed neither true nor false, as they
are true in some precisifications and false in others. On the other hand,
classical logic entailment rules are preserved; indeed, the law of excluded
middle and the principle of non-contradiction hold. Propositions such as
‘either Ryan is tall or not tall’ and ‘Ryan is tall and not tall’ are respec-
tively definitely true and definitely false, regardless of Ryan’s height or any
interpretation or precisification of the concept ‘tall’.
A supervaluationist approach to the sorites paradox, mentioned at the
beginning of this section, results in its premise being falsified, thus elimi-
nating the contradiction. Given a series of sorites individuals, for example
a series of people x1, x2, . . . , xn, whose heights range from 2.0 to 1.5 metres,
arranged in descending order and with a difference of 1mm between any
xi and xi+1’s height, the premise of the sorites paradox states:
∀ i [ tall(xi)→ tall(xi+1) ]
In supervaluation semantics, for any possible precisification of tall, it will
always be the case that ∃ i [ tall(xi) ∧ ¬tall(xi+1) ]. It follows that the
premise of the sorites paradox above is definitely false precisely because
it is false on all admissible precisifications.
Supervaluation semantics can be affected by Second-Order vagueness
[112], a form of ‘vagueness of vagueness of predicates’. This happens
when borderline cases for a certain predicate do not have crisp bound-
aries themselves, i.e. it is not possible to draw a crisp line between a
non-borderline instance of a predicate and a borderline one. Formally,
if a predicate p is denoted to be definitely true with notation D(p), a
borderline case is simply ¬D(p) ∧ ¬D(¬p), in other words ‘it is not def-
initely true that p, and it is not definitely true that ¬p’. An instance of
second-order vagueness can be formalised by ¬D(D(p)) ∧ ¬D(¬D(p))
and higher-order instances follow recursively. Keefe suggests that “any
theory of vagueness must recognise and accommodate this phenomenon,
and not simply avoid problems with the boundary between p and ¬p
by postulating a precise category of in-between cases. Many theories of
vagueness have been thought to fail at this hurdle” [61].
Despite higher-order vagueness, the representation of borderline con-
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cepts by means of precisifications, together with the preservation of classi-
cal logic principles and entailment rules, make supervaluation semantics a
prime choice for the development of an ontology of vague concepts. Still, a
formalism based on this semantics introduces an additional element, con-
stituted by precisifications, which has to be formalised and represented in
the language in order to establish the truth value of borderline predicates.
Standpoint semantics explicitly represents precisifications in the form
of threshold parameters embedded in the language syntax, and it is our
choice for developing the ontology described in Chapter 4 and model the
concepts in Chapter 5.
2.5 Machine Learning and Logic-based Event Recog-
nition
The work presented in this thesis fits within the class of logic-based event
recognition systems. A system of this kind processes input in the form of
a large set of low-level time-indexed events and aims to infer occurrences
of high-level events of interest. Within the domain of this work, the input
stream is constituted by the data resulting from the algorithmic processing
of images captured by a camera, and the high-level events are the motion
verbs aimed to be recognised.
Logic-based event recognition systems present a defined and explicit
declarative semantics; it is argued that this provides advantages in terms
of traceability of events, validation and extensibility to different settings
and domains [81], in contrast to non-logic based event recognition system
based on more procedural approaches which are prevalent in industrial
applications.
The declarative semantics of a logic-based event recognition system
is required to provide capabilities for spatio-temporal representation and
reasoning to allow for the definition of high-level events in terms of prop-
erties and constraints on the low-level input stream [10]. However, in a
purely logic-based system, such as ProVision, the definition of such events
is still a manual process which can be time-consuming and lead to er-
rors, lack of specificity and/or lack of generality. The definitions also
need constant maintenance in order to reflect changes in the application,
or respond to variations in the quality and granularity of the low-level
24
2.5. Machine Learning and Logic-based Event Recognition
events extracted from the input stream. For this reason, the most attrac-
tive systems in the literature employ Machine Learning techniques for the
automatic extraction and refinement of high-level definitions. As these
definitions and their underlying formalism often assume the shape of a
logic program, most learning-based approaches focus on Inductive Logic
Programming (ILP [77, 27, 26]).
2.5.1 Inductive Logic Programming
Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) is a technique for supervised learning
of high-level definitions, where a system is trained on a set of positive
and negative examples providing the basis on which logical definitions
are learned. The reasoning system resulting from this learning process is
then tested on a separate set of examples to measure its accuracy.
The aim of ILP is to induce a general theory about the set of train-
ing examples in the form of a set of hypothesis expressed within a first-
order logic program. First-order logic allows for more expressive power
than classical machine learning approaches which induce propositional
hypotheses. The learning process of an ILP-based learning system can
be also guided by the specification of background knowledge coming, for
example, from human expertise [63].
The principal elments of an ILP-based learning system are the follow-
ing:
• A set of positive and negative examples, respectively E+ and E−, in
the form of ground facts.
• A hypothesis language LH from which hypotheses are defined.
• Background knowledge B, in the form of a set of Prolog-style clauses
such as p ← l1, . . . , ln (where p is the head of the clause and li are
literals).
The search for hypotheses during the ILP induction phase aims to con-
struct clauses H ⊆ LH such that each rule H is complete and consistent.
Completeness signifies that all positive examples can be deduced from H
and the background knowledge, or B ∧ H  E+, and consistency signifies
that no negative example can be deduced from H, or B∧ H ∧ E−   [80].
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A general strategy for learning hypotheses starts by choosing a partic-
ular example e+ ∈ E+, constructing a first-order clause h ∈ LH that entails
e+ and does not entail any e− ∈ E− and eliminating all examples in E+
covered by h. The process is then iterated over the remaining examples in
E+ to learn a new hypothesis H′ refining clause H.
The space of all possible clauses H that entail example e+ with respect
to B is called version space, which has the empty clause as the most general
clause at its top and the most specific clause entailing e+ at its bottom.
Several strategies may be employed to explore this space: the search may
be general-to-specific, i.e. starting at the empty clause and proceeding by
specialisation, or specific-to-general, i.e. starting at the bottom clause and
proceeding by generalisation. Exhaustive searches of the version space
are often impossible due to the exponential complexity of the set of all
possible clauses, therefore most ILP systems design search algorithms for
pruning the version space and guiding the search. The design of such
algorithms constitutes the main challenge of ILP and several have been
proposed in the literature, such as FOIL [83], Progol [79] and Aleph [1].
ILP and Event Recognition from Video
An example of a logic-based event recognition system for the detection of
events in video scenes using ILP can be found in [42, 41]. The origin of
the low-level set of events for this system is constituted by videos filmed
by 8 static cameras situated in an airport apron area, providing differ-
ent views of a same scene where aircraft movement and operations take
place (e.g. loading, unloading, refuelling etc.). The videos are processed
by tracking algorithms to extract three-dimensional data for objects mov-
ing on a ground plane, and the actual set of low-level events constituting
the input of the event recognition system results from the conversion of
the tracking data into relational data defining spatio-temporal relations
holding among objects in the video scene, namely Allen’s temporal rela-
tions (Sec. 2.1.1) and spatial relations surrounds, touches and disconnected,
generalisations of RCC (Sec. 2.1.2).
Most of the challenges in learning event models from this kind of data
using ILP are similar to the ones faced by the system presented in this the-
sis. These are essentially the very large size of the dataset, which results in
a very large hypotheses search space, and the noise and uncertainty from
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the tracking, which results in hypotheses triggering many false positives.
The authors tackle this problem by using a learning from interpretations set-
ting, which views each positive example as a set of spatio-temporal facts
constituting an interpretation [85], and considering a tree-structured type
hierarchy of objects involved in each event with the introduction of a type-
refinement operator in order to extract efficient models for ILP learning.
The search strategy of this event recognition system is based on Progol
refinement operator which finds the most specific clause from the training
examples, background knowledge and user-defined syntactic biases in the
form of mode declarations specifying which predicates from the background
knowledge are expected in the hypothesis [78]. Hypotheses in the space
surrounding this most specific clause are assigned a score (based on the
number of positive and negative examples covered, length of the clause
etc.) and this space is searched with an A*-based algorithm to identify the
hypothesis with a maximum score. The hypothesis thus found can then
be augmented with an explicit temporal representation of when the event
occurs in the clause head.
Given the large size of the dataset in this system, hypothesis evaluation
in this search process can be too time-consuming, and the nosiy charac-
ter of the data tends to make hypothesis too general and entail many
false positives. The authors introduce an object type hieararchy and type-
refinement operators which allow to specify the type of arguments in the
hypothesis, and conclude that such a typed ILP system allows for efficient
learning of event models from video due to the acceleration of the hypoth-
esis evaluation stage and the reduction in the number of false positives
entailed by each hypothesis.
Event Calculus and ILP
The Event calculus formalism introduced in Sec. 2.2, and further specified
in the formalisation of the ontology presented in this thesis in Sec. 4.4,
expresses high-level event definitions as first-order logic predicates which
can be directly expressed in a logic programming language such as Prolog.
Thus, ILP methods are a very good candidate for the automatic learning
of such definitions.
For example, in order to learn the fact that event e occurs over tem-
poral interval [t1, t2], corresponding to the definition Occurs(e, [t1, t2]), one
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would have to provide positive examples E+ and negative examples E−
using the Occurs predicate and a background knowledge B including the
stream of low-level events expressed in the form of HoldsAt( f , t) predi-
cates. Hypotheses learnt by the system will mostly be clauses of the form
Occurs(e, [t1, t2])← HoldsAt( fi, ti), . . . ,HoldsAt( f j, tj).
However, the automatic inference of an Event Calculus logic program
involves learning hypotheses for which training examples are not avail-
able, which means that induction cannot be directly applied to produce
the hypotheses [10]. In such cases, abductive logic programming [4, 35, 36]
may be used to learn intermediate groud rules using the examples pro-
vided in terms of HoldsAt predicates and other Event Calculus rules in
the background knowledge B, and inductive logic programming may then
generalise the outcome of abduction. An example of a system combining
abduction with induction for learning EC programs is the XHAIL sys-
tem [88]. Briefly this system is based on the construction of preliminary
ground hypotheses in a Kernel Set. A three-stage process then follows, in
which abduction is first used to produce the head of the hypothesis clause,
deduction is used to produce the literals in the body of the clause and in-
duction is used to generalise the clauses thus produced in the Kernel Set.
A sample application of XHAIL to a transport system network scenario
can be found in [10, Sec. 3.3].
2.5.2 Markov Logic Networks
In the context of event recognition from video scenes, the low-level stream
of events constituting the input of the recognition system often suffers
from quality issues, such as errors and noise in the data leading to in-
completeness and/or inconsistency in the representation of positive and
negative training examples for the automatic learning of event definitions.
This is particularly true when videos are processed automatically by track-
ing algorithms, but it can also happen for manually annotated data (see
Chapter 6).
Logic-based formalisms such as the one presented in this work have
the advantage of compactly representing complex definitions in a declar-
ative semantics, but do not naturally handle uncertainty as hypothesis
violating even a single formula in the knowledge base are automatically
discarded. A combination of the ILP techniques in the previous section
28
2.5. Machine Learning and Logic-based Event Recognition
and probabilistic models resulted in systems for Probabilistic ILP (see [86]
for an overview).
These evolved in Knowledge-Based Model Construction methods, in
which a logic-based language allows the generation of a propositional
graphical model on which probabilistic inference is applied. In particular,
Markov Logic Networks is a recently developed framework that considers
uncertainty in the representation, reasoning and learning of event models
[91, 40] and has been applied to the task of event recognition [101].
Essentially, in a Markov Logic Network (MLN), the probability of a
world expressed by a hypothesis increases as the number of violated for-
mulae decreases. It follows that a hypothesis violating certain formulae
becomes less probable but not impossible as in first-order logic. This is
represented in the formalism by associating each first-order logic formula
Fi with a weight wi, where higher values for wi yield the fact that Fi con-
stitutes a stronger constraint. A set of Markov formulae (Fi, wi) effectively
represents a probability distribution over possible worlds.
In order to produce a MLN graph, all formulas are translated into
clausal form, where the weight of each formula is distributed among its
clauses, and the clauses are grounded using a finite set of constants C.
Each node in the graph is represented by a Boolean variable and corre-
sponds to a possible grounding of a predicate. Ground predicates appear-
ing in the same ground clause Fi are connected to each other and form a
clique in the network. Each one of these cliques is associated with clause
weight wi. A ground MLN is composed of nodes corresponding to a set of
random variables (ground predicates) and a probability distribution over
states can be computed.
In event recognition, the low-level stream of input events provides the
set C of constants to ground the clauses for producing the network ex-
pressing the knowledge base on which to learn high-level event defini-
tions. Event recognition is performed by querying a ground MLN about
a particular high-level definition. The set of random variables of the net-
work is partitioned in sets of query variables, representing the definition
of interest, a set of evidence variables, representing the detected series of
low-level events, and a set of hidden variables, which correspond to the
remaining variables with unknown values. The query is resolved through
conditional inference that computes the probability of a query variable given
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some evidence, for which different algorithms can be employed. The com-
putation of these queries can be subject to enhancements by sampling
methods, such as Markov Chain Monte-Carlo algorithms which would
walk through the network and draw a set of sample states from the graph
of possible states.
The process of learning a Markov Logic Network involves the estima-
tion of the weights of the network and/or the first-order clauses which
shape the network structure from a set of training examples. Weight
learning involves establishing the weights of the clauses that represent
the definition of high-level events translated into clausal form, in which
different clauses derived from the same definition may be assigned differ-
ent weights. The actual weight is calculated by refinement of a likelihood
function, which measures how well the probablistic model of a MLN fits
the training data [40, Sec. 4.1]. The network structure of a MLN can be
learned from the training data through a preliminary Inductive Logic Pro-
gramming stage followed by weight learning stage [40, Sec. 4.2].
An application of the above principles from Markov Logic Networks
and Markov Chain Monte-Carlo algorithms to the task of automated task
of learning event classes from video for event recognition can be found in
[99]. This application is based on the same aircraft scenario mentioned in
Sec. 2.5.1, and event predicates are modelled within a graph of qualitative
spatio-temporal predicates representing the interactions between sets of
objects. Two events are said to be similar if their graphs are similar. Prob-
ablity distributions are then computed over the set of event classes and
within each event class as a distribution over the set of qualitative spatio-
temporal event graphs. Events are generated by sampling event graphs
from the distribution over the event classes and constructing a structure
called activity graph which combines all event graphs and specifies relation-
ships between objects across different graphs. Finally, this activity graph is
embedded with concrete objects, spatial positions and temporal intervals.
The model thus generated forms a probabilistic framework for finding the
most likely interpretation, i.e. the most likely event classes, event graphs
and activity graph that generated a particular observed occurrence of an
event.
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Issues in Event Classification
The formalisation of an ontology for the definition of vague spatial con-
cepts and motion verbs faces several issues, namely vagueness and the in-
dividuation of the most relevant semantic characteristics in the meaning of
each concept. The implementation of such an ontology into a system per-
forming automatic event recognition adds further complications, namely
uncertainty, saliency and granularity.
In Sec. 3.1 the issue of vagueness is examined in more detail starting
from the general overview of Sec. 2.4, and framed into a more spatial
context related to the specific set of concepts in our domain. In Sec. 3.2 the
most salient characteristics of the meaning of motion verbs are introduced
and informally discussed. These include the characterisation of concepts
such as distances, trajectories, speed, forces, contact and others. Most of
these semantic characteristics and related concepts are analysed formally
in Chapter 5. In Sec. 3.3 the issue of saliency of event occurrences and how
it is influenced by context and semantics is discussed. Sec. 3.4 introduces
the importance of contextual information and how an ontology could be
structured in order to incorporate it. The issues of granularity (Sec. 3.5)
and uncertainty (Sec. 3.6) bear more relation with the practical task of the
implementation of the event recognition system. Respectively, they refer
to issues around the level of detail in which things can be looked at and
issues with errors, noise or inaccurate representations in real data.
The discussion and considerations involving the issues presented in
this chapter have a substantial impact on the methodology guiding the
formalisation of the ontology in Chapter 4 and the modelling of verbs
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in Chapter 5. The issue at stake, and the purpose of this work, is not the
achievement of a semantically exhaustive characterisation of vague motion
verbs. It is rather the possibility to achieve an effective one focusing on
properties that can be inferred given the issues presented here, especially
considering the granularity and uncertainty of the kind of data that the
system can realistically expect to operate on. Efforts have been made to
maintain the formalism at a general enough level such that one could
extend its definitions to take advantage of more detailed or accurate data.
3.1 Vagueness
The main challenge in developing an ontology of vague motion verbs for
event recognition is vagueness. Defining the meaning of the verbs listed in
Table 1.1 involves the characterisation of spatial concepts, several of which
are vague.
For example, recognising the ocurrence of an event such as ‘a is arriv-
ing at b’ with a reasoning system involves the definition of the concept
‘arrive’ and establishing whether it is applicable to the description of the
event being observed. This can be done by characterising the meaning of
‘arrive’ as ‘a is arriving at b if a is moving towards b, a finds itself near b
and eventually stops at b’. Such a formalisation unfolds in the introduc-
tion of further vague concepts such as ‘moving towards’, ‘near’, ‘stop’ and
a being ‘at’ b. This simple example demonstrates how quickly the issue of
vagueness can escalate even within a narrow domain.
Vagueness is distinct from generality, which has to do with the range
of conditions under which a sentence holds or the range of individuals
over which it is applicable. A proposition such as ‘I earn less than premier
league footballer Smith’ is general, as it does not go to great lengths in
specifying my income, but not vague as it is possible to precisely establish
whether my income is less than Smith’s. Vagueness is also distinct from
uncertainty, which has to do with limited or insufficient knowledge about
some thing in the world. Vagueness arises from an intrinsic indeterminacy
which cannot be made less indeterminate by simply augmenting the preci-
sion or obtaining more data [50]. The previous example may represent an
uncertain statement if Smith’s income were to be undisclosed, neverthe-
less it is a fact that such information exists, making it possible to establish
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whether the proposition ‘I earn less than Smith’ is true or false.
In its de dicto characterisation, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon
due to the lack of precise criteria for the applicability of concepts, and
arises from several classes of linguistic terms. There exist different theo-
ries of vagueness with different emphasis on which among objects, lan-
guage or knowledge is the source of vagueness (see Sec. 2.4), however this
work does not aim to enter the debate by reinforcing one particular theory.
Instead, a pragmatic approach has been followed, guided by the practical
purpose of establishing a reasonably appropriate characterisation of vague
concepts, given our specific ontology reasoning task within the domain of
motion verbs.
It is possible to identify different kinds of vagueness which affect the
precise demarcation of the applicability of a concept [13]:
• Simple ambiguity
Certain concepts admit multiple, and different, meanings or inter-
pretations. For example the verb ‘Pass’ may mean ‘to cross a bound-
ary’ but also ‘to hand an item to somebody’.
• Sorites or Threshold vagueness
A concept’s applicability boundary is blurred and depends on the
continuous variation of some observable property of the sample to
which the concept applies. For example the applicability of the con-
cept ‘near’ may be decided on the basis of the distance separating
a and b. However, establishing a fixed threshold for crisping the
boundary has counterintuitive consequences sharply separating very
similar instances (see also Sec. 2.4).
• Deep Ambiguity
A concept not only presents a blurred applicability boundary, but
there are clusters of different and overlapping observable properties
on which this boundary depends, yet it is unclear as to which ones
are necessary or relevant. In the previous example, the applicability
of ‘near’ may depend on linear distance between a and b, the viable
routes between a and b, the time needed to travel on each one, the
type of terrain involved and, often, on a combination of all these.
The problem affects our ontology especially when qualitative concepts
are involved. An ontology based on classical logic does not allow for
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Figure 3.1: Instances and definitions of ‘near’
degrees of truth, and each logical proposition can only be evaluated as
being true or false. The process of individuating criteria that establish
an applicability boundary for vague concepts would clearly lead to the
demarcation of true and false instances. The problem lies in the fact that,
often, there is no such objective set of criteria as these too often depend on
several factors. For example the type of objects involved, characteristics of
the environment or the occurrence of certain actions in the past or in the
future.
Let us consider the concept ‘near’ again. This can be formalised with
the time-indexed logical predicate HoldsAt(near(b, x), t), which holds if
and only if x is near b at time t. Figure 3.1(a) shows an illustration of
the blurred applicability boundary of near, represented by the shaded area
around x. In some ways, we could say the predicate near holds more in
the immediate proximity of x (for example for point d6), and less as one
moves away from x (for example for point d1). If we consider the linear
distance between b and x to be the observable property determining the
applicability of near, one may define a threshold md such that the pred-
icate near(b, x) holds if and only if the linear distance between b and x
is less than md. Such a crisp boundary is represented by the dashed cir-
cle surrounding x. However, this process causes the separation of points
d1, . . . , d6 between instances for which the predicate near holds, such as d6,
and instances for which the predicate does not hold, such as d1. This is
somehow conterintuitive as points d1, . . . , d6 are very close to each other,
and it would appear strange for some of them to be near x and for some
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others not to be.
Figure 3.1(b) illustrates the same example under a slightly different
issue. We could imagine that a, b, x and c represent towns on a topo-
graphical map, and there is some mountainous terrain between x and c.
A precise interpretation of near based on linear distance thresholds, as in
the previous example represented by the dashed circle, would determine
the predicates near(b, x) and near(c, x) to be true and near(a, x) to be false.
Given the context, this is also counterintuitive because, despite c’s shorter
linear distance from x, the geographical features suggest a higher degree
of separation and a classification where a is nearer to x than c is.
The methodology that guided the development of the ontology of
vague concepts in Chapter 4 and the modelling of motion verbs in Chap-
ter 5 has followed a pragmatic approach similar to the epistemic stance of
Lawry and Tang [68], a weakened form of epistemic vagueness.
In epistemic vagueness there is an objectively correct set of criteria for
precisely determining the applicability of a vague concept, but this set of
criteria is unknowable due to the uncertain and inconsistent meaning of
words in natural language. For example, in the sentence ‘a is near b’, epis-
temicists would believe in the existence of criteria for precisely determin-
ing which objects are near b. The epistemic stance maintains that decision
problems regarding assertions can find it useful to assume an epistemic
view of vagueness and thus the existence of a clear dividing line between
concept demarcations, even though this dividing line is not necessarily an
objective fact. In other words, an artificial agent acting according to the
epistemic stance would behave as if the epistemic view was correct. In the
previous example, one may not believe in the existence of an objectively
determinable boundary for the concept near, nonetheless assume such a
fact due to the simplification of reasoning tasks involving the concept.
This model of linguistic vagueness — assuming the existence of precise
criteria determining the applicability boundary of concepts according to
observable properties of objects — essentially constitutes a negation of the
premise of the sorites paradox, hence transforming vague concepts into
crisp ones. The objectionability and controversy of this model of vague-
ness are balanced by the substantial simplification it brings to the formal
semantics of vague concepts [103, p. 139]. For this reason, an application
of supervaluation semantics appears particularly suitable to the model
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resulting from the epistemic stance. In this semantics, precise interpreta-
tions of vague predicates are expressed by precisifications (see Sec. 2.4). In
the ontology formalism introduced in Chapter 4, precisifications of vague
concepts are modelled with explicit thresholds linked to observable prop-
erties relevant to the demarcation of the concept applicability boundary
(see Sec. 4.5).
Despite not necessarily believing in an epistemic nature of vagueness,
we do believe in the practical utility of reasoning with vague concepts as
if they had a precise though indeterminate intepretation. This underlying
assumption coupled with a supervaluationist approach has been the guide
for the formalisation of vague concepts throughout the rest of this work.
3.2 Verb characterisation
Table. 1.1 includes concepts with varying complexity and difficulty, from
actions that appear relatively simple, such as Move or Touch, to actions
that unfold in the characterisation of more complex sub-concepts, such as
Exchange or Replace.
The inclusion of these concepts in a formal ontology involves the anal-
ysis and definition of several vague sub-concepts, for example the fact that
two objects are ‘near’ each other at a particular time, or that an action is
‘fast’. The main kinds of vagueness overviewed in the previous section
affect the motion verbs and related sub-concepts to be formalised in the
ontology.
Some concepts have simple ambiguity. For example Pass may mean ‘to
cross a boundary’ or ‘to hand an item to somebody’. Similarly, Exchange
may refer to either two people reciprocally giving and receiving an item to
and from each other, two people exchanging their respective position or a
single person replacing an item with another in a particular location (this
latter meaning would be synonymous to Replace).
Defining concepts such as ‘near’ or ‘fast’, involved in concepts such as
Approach or Run, is a classic example of sorites vagueness. The previous
section analysed the example of ‘near’ and the fact its applicability bound-
ary depends on a continuous variation of an observable property, namely
the distance between two objects, but can also depend on other elements
of the context in which the action is taking place.
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Most concepts not only show instances of sorites vagueness, but also
of deep ambiguity, as their characterisation depends on a cluster of ob-
servable properties and it is unclear as to which are relevant or necessary.
For example, defining the characteristics of an action such as Chase can be
done on the basis of the trajectory of the two objects, their distance, their
speed or the motivation that triggered one object chasing after the other.
Yet, certain aspects may be more or less relevant in particular situations.
Most of the time, all three types of vagueness mentioned above man-
ifest themselves when one tries to unravel a verb into its formal charac-
terisation. Below, the most salient semantic characteristics of objects and
actions constituting sources of vagueness are summarised, with a focus
on the ones more likely to be visibly observable and capable of being
formalised in term of their observable properties. They are examined in
greater detail in Chapter 5.
Speed of actions
Verbs such as Run, Chase, Flee, Snatch, Throw and, to some extent, Fall refer
to the notion of a particular motion action to be ‘fast’. However, given that
the type of objects involved and their manner of motion are different, there
are different thresholds on and different observable properties playing a
part in formalising ‘fast’.
For example, Run generally involves a person engaged in a particular
manner of motion (see below) which allows the person to move fast. The
threshold precisifying the concept ‘fast’ in the context of an action of type
Run is different from the threshold precisifying the fast movement of a
vehicle. Additionally, the speed of a runner is different and depends, for
instance, on whether the person is a child, adult or elder.
The verb Snatch is of a more subtle kind. In fact, most would agree it
is an action which happens ‘fast’, but this may not always be the case. For
example, if a man waiting at a busy station concourse is standing next to
its suitcase among a crowd of people and is looking the other way, another
person may grab hold of the suitcase and walk away, snatching it without
being particularly fast. This is an example of deep ambiguity, and also
of the fact that certain properties, such as ‘the unawareness of a person’,
appear extremely challenging to formalise.
37
Chapter 3. Issues in Event Classification
Manner of motion
Verbs such as Walk, Run, Dig and Bury refer to motions which are carried
out in a particular way, often following a specific pattern. For example,
Walk refers to the act of a person lifting one of his feet, moving it not too
far ahead, putting it back on the ground, repeating the action with the
other foot and periodically repeating this pattern over some time interval.
Run refers to a similar pattern where the legs bend differently, the distance
between each step is longer, and both feet may be off the ground at the
same time instant (the verbs are analysed in Sec. 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. Dig in-
volves a person holding a tool which is suitable for displacing material
(e.g. soil), lifting a certain amount of material, displacing it and dropping
it somewhere else, and carrying out this motion periodically. Bury involves
performing the same pattern of Dig and placing an object in the space re-
sulting by the effect of Dig, then performing an action following a manner
of motion opposite to Dig in order to cover the item.
Direction
Verbs such as Approach, Go, Jump, Bounce, Flee, Follow, and Chase refer to
the fact a particular motion is oriented towards a specific direction.
Approach denotes a motion where an object is moving in the direction
of another. This would involve defining the concept of direction, and a
formal way of establishing that the motion of an object is directed towards
another object. One possibility would be to measure whether the distance
between two objects is decreasing. However, there are examples in which
this criterion may not be the most appropriate. Fig. 3.2 shows the position
of an object o at time instants t1 and t2 approaching d. In Fig. 3.2(a), motion
happens along a straight line, hence the distance between o and d is lesser
at t2 than at t1. In this case, a distance-based criterion for directed motion
seem appropriate. In Fig. 3.2(b) instead, the obstacle represented by the
blue rectangle has the effect that o approaches d by increasing its distance
from d at time t2, still o is approaching d.
Other examples involve establishing whether a motion occurs towards
a pre-defined direction, such as Jump or Bounce, where generally objects
respectively move suddenly upwards, or periodically repeat an up-and-
down motion. However, there exist instances where this may not be the
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Figure 3.2: Verb Approach – Different routes
defining factor, as in the example where a man is bouncing a ball against
a wall in a horizontal direction.
In Flee, Follow and Chase the direction is defined in terms of another
object direction. In Follow, a second object is moving in the direction of a
first object. However, the second object may not be replicating exactly the
same movements of the first, as it may temporarily deviate from a directed
route to disguise itself. Flee represents the opposite scenario, where the
first object is moving to a direction which is opposed to the direction defined
by the second object chasing after it.
Distance and boundaries
Verbs such as Approach, Arrive and Leave refer to the observable property
of ‘distance’ and the qualitative concepts of ‘near’ and ‘far’.
The verb Approach refers to an object getting nearer to another over a
certain time interval. The concept of ‘near’ can be formalised by referring
to the observable property of distance between two objects. However, we
have already seen in the examples in Fig. 3.1(b) and 3.2(b) that there are
instances where this observable property may not be the most relevant
one. In Fig. 3.2(b), most would agree that o is approaching d over interval
[t1, t2] knowing that there is an obstacle which determines a particular
route that o has to follow.
This example shows that modelling a distance metric is akin to estab-
lishing an effort-space, a measure expressing how the actions of a subject
39
Chapter 3. Issues in Event Classification
would lead it to be closer to its target. In Fig. 3.2(b), such a measure would
establish that the effort needed for o to get closer to d at t2 is less than the
effort needed at t1; it follows that o’s motion over [t1, t2] has determined a
reduction in the effort-space thus constituting an occurence of Approach.
An effort-space measure takes into account the characteristics of the object
and surrounding environment. For Approach this would be a combination
of type of object, possible paths between the object and its target desti-
nation, type of terrain etc. For example, in map-based scenarios, certain
routes, such as motorways or off-road tracks, may only be applicable to
certain types, such as cars and 4x4s, and each has different costs. This
effort-based metric can be generalised and extended for other verbs too,
such as Arrive, below, or more complex actions such as Follow or Bury.
The verb Arrive and its opposite Leave refer to an object respectively
reaching and leaving another object or destination. Formalising this con-
cept for example, involves establishing some form of boundary around
such destination and formalising whether the object is approaching and
getting close to this boundary, again involving the concept of distance.
The individuation of such a boundary depends on different observable
properties of the destination.
These verbs are examined in detail in Sec. 5.2
Relations
Verbs such as Follow, Flee and Chase, and to some extent, Throw and Catch
refer to a particular relation being established between two objects.
Recognising an instance of Follow involves formalising the fact that
there is a relation between two objects such that the motion of the object
being followed determines a particular direction or trajectory on the ob-
ject that is following it. Chase is similar in this respect, with the additional
characterisation that the motion of the chaser is likely to be fast with the
intention of reaching the chased. The relation holding between the two
objects is even more prominent, as the type and actions performed by
the chased may have triggered this intention on part of the chaser (e.g. a
predator chasing its prey, or a victim of pickpocketing chasing the perpe-
trator of the theft). These verbs are analysed in Sec. 5.3.
The verbs Throw and Catch also suggest some close relation between a
person and the object being thrown or caught. For Throw, the object has
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to be in possession of the thrower, and this is accelerated and its motion
is directed according to the force and motion of the thrower. Similarly,
Catch involves an object moving towards the catcher and terminates with
it being in possession of the catcher.
Trajectories and routes
Verbs Fly and Fall involve the formalisation of the notion of trajectory. A
particular type of trajectory, in fact, can indicate the specific type of motion
and the causes underlying it. In fact, most interpretations would agree on
the fact that Fall refers to a primarily vertical motion of an object towards
the ground under gravitational force, whilst Fly refers to a primarily hori-
zontal motion of an object under some kind of inner force propelling the
object (e.g. an aeroplane) or an inertial force resulting from some previous
action or event (e.g. a ball that has been thrown in the air by a person).
However, establishing whether a motion is an example of an event of type
Fall rather than Fly in terms of its trajectory is vague. The examples in
Fig. 3.3 show different types of such motions (assuming they all represent
an observation from the same equivalent perspective):
• Fig. 3.3(a) shows a vertical motion, very likely to represent an occur-
rence of Fall.
• Fig. 3.3(b) shows a motion which is not exactly vertical, but most
would agree it is vertical enough for it to still represent an occurrence
of Fall.
• Fig. 3.3(c) shows a motion which starts mostly horizontal and ends
mostly vertical; overall, it still looks like it could represent an in-
stance of Fall.
• Fig. 3.3(d) shows a split motion. It starts as a diagonal motion away
from the ground, and probably caused by some force different from
gravity, thus constituting an occurrence of Fly. However, the second
part seems more akin to an occurrence of Fall. Overall, it would ap-
pear as if the objects moved under some inertial force that exhausted
itself at half-point hence leaving the object under the influence of
gravity. However, if this movement is generated by an inner force
of an object capable of flying (e.g. a bird, a helicopter), the entire
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 3.3: Verbs Fly and Fall – Trajectories
occurrence may be classified as Fly, with the second part part of the
motion being a controlled descent executed by the object. Still, if the
helicopter had broken down, or the bird had been shot, the descent
would cease to be controlled and would again be considered as an
occurrence of Fall.
• Fig. 3.3(e) shows an object moving away from the ground and even-
tually assuming a horizontal trajectory (e.g. an aeroplane taking off).
This particular motion seems to constitute evidence of the object be-
ing capable of an inner force, thus likely to constitute an occurrence
of Fly.
The examples above show the complexity of identifying trajectories
and associating an occurrence of a motion to its characteristic trajectory,
and of individuating the properties of an object that determine certain
kinds of motion.
Other verbs are slightly simpler in terms of the trajectory characterising
their motion. For example, verbs such as Lift, Raise, PickUp, PutDown and
Drop refer to a motion whose trajectory is vertical and is either directed
away or towards the the ground. Throw is ambiguous in this respect, as one
may throw an item vertically in the air, horizontally or vertically towards
the ground.
Contact
Verbs such as Touch and Push and most of the ones listed under the Posses-
sion section below refer to the fact that two objects are in contact with each
other, or the fact such a contact is being established. Contact can be estab-
lished in different ways. For example Push involves a kind of contact that
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allows an object to exert a force on another object in order for the latter to
move forward. For example a person pushing something generally places
his/her hands flat on the object’s most vertical edge, even though some-
times feet may be used instead. A person may be pushing an object even if
this results in no movement whatsoever (e.g. pushing a locked door). The
verb is analysed in Sec. 5.4.2.
Verbs Hit and Collide also refer to two objects coming into contact in
a more disruptive and less controlled manner. They also may involve
specific contact parts, for example a person generally participates in an
occurrence of Hit by a quick and forceful movement of the hands. Kick, in
some ways, is a specialisation of Hit where the contact part involved is the
foot. The verbs are discussed in Sec. 5.4.4 and 5.4.5.
Possession
Verbs such as Have, Get, Receive, Give, Hand, PickUp, PutDown, Snatch,
Take and Drop refer to the fact that an object (generally a person) is acquir-
ing or relinquishing possession of an object. This is a high-level concept
and there are many observable properties that could form part of the for-
malisation of the concept of possession.
For example, a person may Have an object by holding it in his/her
hand. It would follow that an occurrence of Hold would also determine
that the event Have is occurring at the same time. An occurrence of Hold
may be formalised by specifying that the two objects are in contact by
means of the person’s hands. However, a person may Have an object by
keeping it in a pocket, in which case a more complicated relation has to
be formalised.
Similarly, the verbs Give, Receive and Get involve a transfer of posses-
sion from one person to another. An event such as Give can be relatively
straightforward, for example a person is holding an object and then drops
it onto another person’s hands, or introduce layers of complexity such as
carriers, for example a person gives a document to another person by post.
Size of objects
Verbs such as Catch, Lift, Take, Hold, Throw, Hand, PickUp, Carry and Haul
refer to an action involving objects whose size or weight is within certain
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ranges.
For example, PickUp refers to some person or, more rarely, some ma-
chine lifting an object from the ground or other kind of surface by holding
it with hands or other suitable tool (e.g. litter pickers’ tongs) in order to
gain contact or possession of the object. The object needs to be of a rela-
tively small size compared to the agent performing the pick up action. For
example, an adult is able to pick up objects that a child may not. Similarly,
a port container shifter will pick up objects with size and weight way out
of league of many other agents. Most of the other verbs listed also under
the possession section above refer to some contraints in the size of objects
being possessed or relinquished.
Carry and Haul represent an example of two verbs describing essen-
tially the same type of action with the difference between them being the
size and/or weight of the objects being transported. A person performing
an action of type Carry is likely to be transporting an object that can be
lifted and moved by the person’s strength and ability, although some aid-
ing may be involved (e.g. wheels, a trolley). Haul generally refers to some
moving object shifting a substantial load for which great effort and expen-
diture of energy are required. Sometimes the verb can be used figuratively
when applied to people, denoting the struggling efforts of a person in try-
ing to carry a too big item.
Force
Verbs such as Hit, Kick, Fly, Fall, Throw and Push refer to some kind of
force that is being exerted from an object towards another and determine
motion consequences on the object on the receiving side of this force. One
of the ways this force can be exerted is through contact which determines
movement or deformation (verbs Push and Hit, see also Sec. 5.4.2 and 5.4.4).
As mentioned earlier during the discussion of trajectories of move-
ment, one can distinguish three main kinds of forces driving a motion:
• Inner force, produced by the agent itself. Such an agent would be
capable of sustaining a self-propelled motion, such as Walk, or Fly.
An agent capable of producing a force of this kind can also transfer
it onto other objects, generating an inertial force.
• Inertial force, describing a movement originated by an initial impulse
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generated by another moving object. The object moving under iner-
tial force is subject to the momentum transferred during such initial
impulse. This state lasts for some time until the inertial force is
exhausted, mostly by being counteracted by some other force. For
example, an agent may throw a ball in the air and the item will be
moving under inertial force until gravitational force surpasses it, or a
person may kick a box on the floor which will start to slide until the
counter-action performed by the resistance between the box and the
ground surface will cancel the inertial force effects. The visible tran-
sition between a movement driven by inertial force to a movement
driven by gravitational force is generally smooth, for example the
trajectory of an object may change from predominantly horizontal
or oriented upwards to predominantly vertical and oriented down-
wards.
• Gravitational force, describing the way objects are attracted to the
ground and is generally observed by a predominantly vertical trajec-
tory with the object accelerating towards the downwards direction.
• Disruptive force, this force does not drive movement but is rather in-
tended as causing a deformation or other form of change in the state
of the object it is applied to. It is applied by an agent by transferring
an inner force as a result of an event where forces involved are of
relatively high intensity. For example, an occurence of Hit or Push in-
volves an agent exerting a force onto another object. This force could
either determine the motion of the object through inertial force, or
act as a disruptive force altering the shape of the object (or, worse,
its agent) if this is not capable of moving or is otherwise opposing
resistance. This force is discussed for contact verbs in Sec 5.4.3 and
5.4.4.
Objects may be subject to a combination of the forces above, the challenge
is to be able to characterise them in terms of the observable characteristics
of a certain motion. The motion trajectory is a prime candidate, however
the type of objects and events which occurred prior to that particular in-
stance of motion are also relevant (e.g. a ball will be subject to inertial force
if somebody has thrown it).
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Intentionality
Verbs such as Hit, Collide, Jump seem to recall some kind of intentional-
ity of motion. For example Hit and Collide describe actions which are in
essence very similar, as they describe a generally forceful motion leading
to two objects establishing contact in a disruptive or violent way. However,
language use seems to hint that the subject of Hit is somehow more active
in performing the action, conveying the idea that it is somehow responsi-
ble for the action which would have been avoidable. On the other hand,
Collide seems to refer to some event that happened with no responsibility,
or a contact that would have been unavoidable (e.g. ‘the asteroid collided
with planet Earth’). See Sec. 5.4.3 for a more detailed discussion.
Space and accessibility
Verbs such as Open, Close, Enter and Exit refer to certain characteristics of
the space on which the action is being performed.
Enter and Exit, discussed in detail in Sec. 5.2.5 and 5.2.6, describe a
motion that leads an object from being outside to being inside a space or
vice versa. Such a space could be an open space as a field or a closed space
such as a building. Closed spaces have particular accessibility relations
describing the ways one can enter or exit them, i.e. most of the time, a
person enters a house through a door. Identifying an occurrence of Enter
involves recognising whether a subject is performing certain actions on the
object allowing access to a space, for example opening a door and walking
through it.
Verbs Open and Close determine a change in the accessibility of a space
by an agent. Identifying an occurrence of Open involves defining how the
accessibility of a space can be altered. For example, a door delimiting a
space with a conventional handle can be opened by pushing down on the
handle while at the same time pushing the door to swing it open.
Despite a certain triviality of the examples, recognising the occurrence
of these events, especially in the case of closed spaces, is challenging due
to the variety of ways and objects through which a space can be accessed
or an item can be opened.
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Duration
Verbs such as Stop, Touch, Arrive, Leave, Pass, Enter and Exit are vague
in their temporal extension or duration, especially because most of them
seem not to have any duration at all.
Recalling Vendler’s linguistic classification of motion verbs in Sec. 2.3,
this set of verbs corresponds to the category of Achievements, constituted of
actions that happen over a time instant. Nevertheless, some subtle gram-
matical devices can still assign a duration to events of this kind. Rigor-
ously, the utterance ‘The car stopped’ refers to the precise single instant in
which the car has ceased to move. However, the utterance ‘The car is stop-
ping’ suddenly extends the event over an interval. The vagueness in this
instance is what observable properties of the motion lead one to determine
when the car starts to stop.
This temporal extension issue, relevant to all the verbs listed above
and analysed in greater detail in the relevant sections of Chapter 5, is
related to the individuation of a suitable interval for event occurrences of
achievements. For example, for Arrive or Enter such an interval would
span some time before and after an object arrives at a destination or enters
a space.
Some of these verbs can also be interpreted as static states. For exam-
ple Touch, modelled in Sec. 5.4.1, can either describe the static occurrence
of two objects being in contact with one another, or the dynamic occur-
rence of one object moving towards and establishing contact with another.
An event of the static kind occurs over an interval lasting as long as the
two objects are in a state of connection. Conversely, an event of the dy-
namic kind occurs over a narrow interval preceding and terminating on
the connection.
3.3 Saliency
Event occurrences are not described by a single verb, as language allows
for varied and sometimes colourful expressions. Expressions describing a
particular action generally revolve around a central part of their meaning,
and a speaker may wish to highlight details that are salient and hide others
that are less relevant.
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For example, most observers would agree on the fact that an event
in which a person is repeatedly impressing motion on a ball using the
foot is an occurrence of Kick. At the same time, the person is also per-
forming the action of hitting the ball, thus a description by the verb Hit is
acceptable too. Neither description is right or wrong, they simply high-
light a different characteristic of the motion. Hit focuses on a fast, forceful
force being impressed by contact, Kick focuses on the particular body part
through which the force is transmitted. Essentially, events like these can
be described by verbs at different levels of granularity.
A different scenario is where, for example, there are multiple events
happening at the same time but some are more salient than others. The
variation in the degree of saliency attributed to such events by different
observers is often determined by the interest and motivation underlying
the observation process itself. Thus language users would describe a situ-
ation by filtering out events deemed irrelevant because overshadowed by
more relevant ones, either voluntarily or automatically.
For example, a scene may constitute of two vehicles approaching each
other in the background while another person is punching another in the
foreground. Even though the description of the scene as a co-occurrence of
the verb Approach with the verb Hit is correct, most people would almost
automatically remove the occurrence of Approach from their observation.
Their eyes are so concentrated on the occurrence of Hit some may not even
notice the other event.
A greater saliency of one event in respect to another is determined by a
mixture of the event semantic characteristics and the context in which the
action takes place. In fact, some events seem intrinsically more salient than
others. For example Move is the simplest way one could describe an occur-
rence of motion. A verb specifying a trajectory (Fly), direction (Approach)
or force (Fall) is almost guaranteed to be more salient than Move. The
context surrounding the event participants completes the picture, and this
can become complex very quickly. On a simple level, an action in the fore-
ground of a scene is likely to be more salient than one in the background.
But other elements come into play too. An action involving more partic-
ipants is more likely to attract more attention, as is a participant wearing
very bright clothes and a wig.
It seems relatively natural for humans to assess the saliency of events
48
3.4. Context
when uttering descriptions of observations. This is particularly striking
in our automated recognition system evaluation data, where there is a
marked under-reporting of low-salience events (see Sec. 6.4). One possi-
bility for an intelligent system to mimic a saliency assessment would be to
consult a hierarchy of verbs akin to a saliency relation network, describing
which verbs are overall more salient than others.. At the same time, the
system should recognise contextual elements which impact on the saliency
of a specific occurrence, such as position of objects. Still, it seems that, for
an automatic recognition system, deciding saliency of event occurrences is
not as easy a task as people’s innate ability to do so.
3.4 Context
Although many words are vague, this does not usually cause problems for
language users. In fact, judging an object as ‘fast’, two people as ‘close’
or an action as a ‘snatch’ rather than a ‘take’ seems a rather easy task for
humans. Sometimes this is due to partiality, as people are not necessarily
consistent in every judgement they make. At other times people ground
judgements on context, which consists of relevant information about an
observed situation and the observer’s prior knowledge and experience.
Context also plays a part in picking or disregarding certain parts of the
meaning of words, and plays a role in establishing saliency as seen in
the previous section. Additionally, while watching a particular scene, a
human observers’ mind experiences the construction of a narrative story,
so that judgement may be oriented towards the confirmation of particular
hypotheses on which such a narrative is based.
Earlier studies have attempted at modelling the semantics governing
judgements and assertions within dialogues. In particular, Lewis concen-
trates on sequences of statements and judgements that contribute to build-
ing a conversational score, which assesses consistency and acceptability of
dialogues and evolves according to presupposition and permissibility of
statements [52, 71]. Presuppositions are elements of a conversation that
participants take for granted. They dynamically evolve over time, as they
can be created and destroyed over the course of the dialogue, and gener-
ally depend on prior utterances and presuppositions. They need not be
explicit, as for example the statement “Even my grandmother could climb
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that mountain” generates the presuppositions that “I have a grandmother”
and “My grandmother is not particularly good at climbing mountains”,
and these remain valid until a participant argues against them. Lewis
draws a comparison with the score governing the evolution of games, stat-
ing that the conversational score of a language game evolves in an almost
rule-governed way, with the peculiarity that it also tends to “evolve in
such a way as is required in order to make whatever occurs count as cor-
rect play”.
A closely related concept is the commitment slate emerging from stud-
ies on mathematical models of dialogue by Hamblin [55], where dialogues,
participants and utterances (called locutions) are formalised in a semantics
aiming at estalibshing which dialogues are legal and which are not. The
commitment slate is the set of locutions to which a participant is com-
mitted at a particular step of a conversation. The utterance of a locution
by a participant is such that all other participants in the dialogue become
immediately commited to it. Hamblin’s semantics, for example, states
that a dialogue is bad if someone pronounces a locution already present
in a commitment slate, or that contradicts something in someone’s com-
mitment slate. The semantics also specifies conditions under which pro-
nounced locutions may cause commitments to be retracted.
All the above suggests that the applicability of concepts in describing
particular situations is determined both statically by established norms
and dynamically by a particular communication context.
The potential for such context-awareness is built into the ontology and
its application in the form of precisification thresholds: parameters de-
termining the truth-value of a particular predicate according to different
situations (see Sec. 4.5). This mechanism would make it possible to repro-
duce a form of partiality and context-dependency through the envisioned
automatic inference of precisification thresholds. For example, the sys-
tem should establish a different threshold for deciding whether a person
is near a destination according to the mode of transport. The threshold
value for a person that is driving a car will be different from the value for
a person that is walking. Taking the context of a particular vague adjective,
noun or verb can be difficult, as one needs to establish what the relevant
context is [103, Ch. 3]. As seen in the example in Fig. 3.1(b), establishing
whether an object is ‘near’ a place may involve examining the geographi-
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cal features of the environment, of which there may be many and not all
of them relevant.
A prerequisite for the above is to integrate the representation of con-
text into the ontology. This could resemble a form of knowledge base of
information guiding the judgements of vague concepts. This structure will
have a static part, essentially constituted by statements describing proper-
ties of objects (e.g. the average speed of a walking person, or the average
size of a ball) and a dynamic part, constituted by facts acquired by the
experience. Within our domain, this experience would be built through the
observation of scenes where the events of interest are taking place. The
experience may be constituted by events that happened in the past, for
example the fact that a certain person entered the scene in the foreground,
or inferences involving the environment, for example presence of obsta-
cles or routes faster than others. This approach is related to a sketch by
Galton on an ontology of history and experience [49]. Galton suggests a
dichotomic split between EXP and HIST, the former being the experiential
perspective representing by the world as it is being observed/experienced,
the latter being a form of historical record of events representing the past.
The link between the two perspectives is that the experience consolidates
into the past as time progresses.
Some kinds of contextual information have been mentioned in the
overview of semantic characteristics in Sec. 3.2. The most relevant types
of context are summarised below:
• Temporal context. The applicability of a concept may relate to some
event or property that occurred in the past, or that is going to occur
in the future. For example, establishing the starting instant of an
occurrence of Leave involves establishing whether an object will ‘not
be near’ the starting place at some instant in the future.
• Spatial context. Spatial characteristics of the environment influence
whether a particular event occurs given a particular motion (see
Sec. 3.2 and Fig. 3.2).
• Action related context. An event occurrence may occur if another event
occurrence is occurring at the same time. A prime example is Chase,
performed by a subject in the presence of another object performing
Flee. An event occurrence may also be directed towards a goal, and
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identifying progression towards the goal also depends on contextual
elements (see effort space on pag.39).
• Object context. Properties of objects determine different applicability
thresholds for vague predicates. In the example mentioned previ-
ously, inferring whether someone is moving near a place depends
on whether someone is driving or walking.
A contribution towards selecting and analysing the most relevant con-
textual information given a certain concept is found in studies in the field
of linguistics [107, 56, 57, 59, 105, 46].
3.5 Granularity
Granularity has to do with the level of detail in which one is looking
at things. Earlier it has been mentioned that an event such as a person
kicking a ball can be described at a coarse-grained level of detail as an
occurrence of Hit, or at a fine-grained level as an occurrence of Kick.
Granularity also relates to the amount and quality of the information
available to perform event recognition. As our system grounds the on-
tology of motion verbs on data resulting from processing video scenes,
such data will not reproduce the details found in the real world. Referring
to the example above, recognising an occurrence of Kick ideally requires
knowledge about the precise positioning of a person. If the data is very
coarse-grained, it most likely will not identify the position of this person’s
feet. Conversely, very fine-grained data is likely to identify this position
precisely. In the former instance, recognising an occurrence of Kick is prob-
lematic and the system may recognise such action as an occurrence of the
coarser event Hit. In the latter instance, recognising Kick should pose no
particular problem for the inference system. In this sense, granularity is
also related to uncertainty, discussed in the next section.
Another aspect of granularity refers to the way the system processes
the available information. For example the automatic system, in order to
infer an occurrence of the event Approach over a time interval, may process
the data by sampling an object’s position at specific time points within the
interval. Figure 3.4 shows a few rather bizarre motion trajectories in which
an object x may be approaching or moving away from y:
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• In Fig. 3.4(a) x is approaching y with an oscillating motion. The
distance between x and y decreases overall but does not decrease at
each subsequent time instant, as certain parts of the motion actually
increase this distance. If x’s position is sampled over a sufficiently
wide time interval, the system would infer that distance is decreas-
ing hence x is approaching y over the whole motion interval. If the
positions are sampled very closely, the system would detect a num-
ber of very short occurrences of Approach. In Sec. 6.2.4 a method to
overcome this problem is proposed.
• In Fig. 3.4(b) x is initially approaching y then moving away from it. A
fine-grained sampling would infer that Approach occurs for the first
part of the motion, an inference probably disregarded with a coarser
sampling. Although it is true that x is initially approaching y, an
observer looking at the bigger picture would probably disregard this
occurrence under saliency considerations.
• In Fig. 3.4(c) x is approaching y with an oscillating motion that, ul-
timately, brings x to be closer to y. However, if the system samples
position on the points marked in green, it will not recognise that
the distance between x and y is overall decreasing, hence will not
recognise Approach
• Finally, in Fig. 3.4(d) x is performing a similar motion through which
it is ultimately distancing itself from y. However, if the system
samples the positions in green, it will recognise an occurrence of
Approach. Such occurrence is not completely wrong as, in some
ways, x does get closer to y for some time. However, the general
motion pattern does not indicate a particulary strong will of x to get
closer to y.
The examples in Fig. 3.4 may seem too extreme and not representative
of the real world, and in a way this is true. However they demonstrate
that the level of detail has an impact on the inference and the decisions a
system or a person can make. Too much focus on fine details may cause
one to misjudge the bigger picture. On the other hand, a coarser approach
not paying attention to important details may misjudge appearances.
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Figure 3.4: Verb Approach – ‘Strange’ approaches
3.6 Uncertainty
Some verbs refer to very specific and fine-grained properties of objects,
characteristics of motion or the surrounding context which may not be at
all available to an automatic system grounding the ontology on real data.
Referring to the Hit and Kick example, if the position of a person’s feet is
not specified, recognising an occurrence of Kick will be a tricky task.
Data obtained from video processing carries a varying degree of uncer-
tainty, particularly high if the data is produced automatically, as it is very
unlikely that such a representation mirrors the amount and complexity of
the information that a human eye may gather from watching the vignette.
Referring to the data available to our system at this stage, the main
kinds of uncertainty are summarised below:
• Errors and noise. An object may be represented inaccurately in the
data. For example, its position may be misplaced by the tracking
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algorithm, and may disappear entirely if occluded by another object.
Spurious tracks (i.e. detection of objects in positions where there is
no actual object) are an undesirable but all too common feature of
data resulting from tracking algorithms.
• Missing objects. Some objects in the data may not be represented at
all. This often applies to static objects not playing an active part in
the scene but still relevant as context. This is of course an issue for
a verb whose formalisation involves these objects (e.g. an occurrence
of Flee will be harder to recognise if the element representing the
danger the person is fleeing from is not recognised, such as a fire).
• Background and Context. Scene background and other contextual ele-
ments, for example obstacles or environmental features determining
constraints on the movement of objects, are often unreported in the
data. On one hand, this simplifies the data allowing for faster pro-
cessing. On the other hand evidence from contextual information is
useful or even essential for the interpretation of some predicates.
• Granularity. As already mentioned, data may not show desired or
relevant details for the recognition of a certain occurrence.
• Spatial representation. Different algorithms detect and represent ob-
jects according to different spatial models. A sophisticated algorithm
may detect three-dimensional coordinates. Most traditional ones
represent objects as two-dimensional cartesian coordinates. Inferring
the fact that a movement is directed towards the third dimension is
an issue in this latter case (e.g. a movement towards the background
or the foreground for a frontal representation, or a movement to-
wards the sky or the ground for an aerial representation).
Some of the issues listed above may be corrected by the inference sys-
tem, and in Sec. 4.7 we explain how the ontology can be augmented with
such capabilities. For example, it is imaginable that an approximate three-
dimensional representation could be inferred from a two-dimensional one.
In this case, information about the observer’s position and perspective is
fundamental, and it would allow the system to improve the recognition
of verbs such ‘approach’ (see Sec. 5.2.1). Similarly, the details about the
position of a person’s limbs can be inferred by estimating where they are
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most likely to be located given the person’s position. Some other issues
are unavoidable: a system cannot simply infer that there exists an object in
the absence of any information or any background knowledge about it.
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Ontology of Motion Verbs
Our ontology builds upon Event Calculus [64, 95] and Versatile Event Logic
(VEL) [18], formalisms designed to reason about actions and events within
logic. Given an ordered set of time points T = (T,<), the most interest-
ing feature of these calculi is the possibility to express that propositional
expression p holds at a particular time point t ∈ T , through the construct
HoldsAt(p, t).
The purpose of our formalism is to describe real world situations,
namely objects, their properties and event occurrences. However, the task
of automated event detection in which this ontology will be employed
presents a few peculiar aspects bearing an influence to some of the design
choices outlined in the remainder of this chapter.
Firstly, a computer system can only operate on a representation of the
real world and not on the real world itself. In some ways, such a repre-
sentation constitutes the knowledge grounding the ontology at its lowest-
level. This aspect is examined in more detail in Sec. 4.7.
Secondly, higher-level concepts, representing what can be understood
about the world from the above knowledge, show different levels of com-
plexity. This determined the structuring of the ontology in broadly three
layers: a primitve layer, representing the grounding knowledge, a mid-
level layer, concerned with objects’ description, and a high-level layer,
aimed at understanding complex situations such as processes and events.
However, this distinction is not always clear-cut and some predicates may
straddle across layers.
Some details of the formalism have been influenced and shaped by the
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particular task of event recognition it is going to be applied to, as men-
tioned in Sec. 1.1, and partly also by the specific characteristics of the data
grounding the ontology, described in detail in Sec. 6.1, especially regard-
ing the spatio-temporal model and primitive properties of objects. How-
ever, the methodology and general principles allow for the generalisation
of this approach to different domains.
For the convenience of the reader, an index detailing the concepts and
symbols defined in the ontology is provided at the end of the volume.
The vocabulary of the logical language can be specified by the tuple:
V = 〈T , I ,Sp,Sr,O,Ot,PT ,F , E ,Σ〉
where:
• T is the set of ordered time points (e.g. T = {t1, t2 . . .});
• I is the set of time intervals (e.g. i = [t1, t2]);
• Sp is the set of spatial points;
• Sr is the set of spatial regions;
• O is the set of objects;
• Ot is the set of object types;
• PT is the set of precisification thresholds;
• F is a set of fluents;
• E and Σ are sets of event-types and event-tokens.
The formalism employs the connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔ and the exis-
tential and universal quantifiers ∃ and ∀ with the semantics of classical
first-order logic.
4.1 Temporal Model
The set T in the vocabulary representes time points or instants. Given that
the ontology is going to be implemented and applied to event recognition
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tasks from video, this chapter and the following assume that T = (T,<)
is a finite and discrete set of time points ordered by function <.
The set I of time intervals contains sets of time points. In the notation,
each set I ∈ I is represented as the closed interval I = [t1, t2], where t1
and t2 are respectively the start and end point of I.
The following expressions allow for comparison and manipulation of
time points and intervals:
• t1 = t2 if and only if t1 and t2 are the same time point.
• t1 < t2 if and only if time point t1 precedes time point t2 according
to the ordering function in T .
• t1 6 t2 if and only if t1 = t2 or t1 < t2.
• succ(t) is a function expressing the immediate successor of time point
t (assuming a discrete model of time).
• t ∈ I if and only if time point t belongs to interval I (for t ∈ T and
I ∈ I).
• begin(I, ts) ≡ ts ∈ I ∧ @ t ∈ I[t < ts], i.e. time point ts is the starting
instant of interval I, or alternatively I = [ts, t] for some t ∈ T .
• end(I, te) ≡ te ∈ I ∧ ∀ t ∈ I[t 6 te], i.e. time point te is the ending
instant of interval I, or alternatively I = [t, te] for some t ∈ T .
• I1 = I2 ≡ ∀t[t ∈ I1 ↔ t ∈ I2], i.e. I1 and I2 are equal.
• I1 ⊆ I2 ≡ ∀ t[t ∈ I1 → t ∈ I2], i.e. interval I1 is a subset of interval I2.
• I1 ( I2 ≡ I1 ⊆ I2 ∧ ∃ t[t ∈ I2 ∧ t 6∈ I1], i.e. I1 is a proper subset of I2.
• dur(I) = δ↔ δ = |I|, i.e. δ is the duration of interval I, expressed as
the number of time instants in I.
• t2 − t1 = δ ≡ dur([t1, t2]) = δ (given t1 6 t2), an alternative form to
calculate the duration of the interval between time points t1 and t2.
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4.2 Spatial Model
The sets Sp and Sr are respectively the sets of spatial points and spatial
regions. These sets represent the spatial model of the ontology and deter-
mine how objects are located in space. In many ways, the exact nature and
structure of this spatial representation is influenced by the application do-
main, as it may orient the ontology towards adopting a particular model
of space, and by the data, as it determines how the ontology is grounded.
There are several of these possible configurations: space could be repre-
sented with two or three dimensions, the set of spatial points could be
discrete or dense and different kinds of spatial regions can be considered,
such as lines, rectangles, polygons, volumes, multi-polygons, etc. Most
aspects relating to the application, implementation and specific represen-
tation of space are examined in Chapter 6.
In Sec. 4.2.1 below, the domain-independent structure of the spatial
model of our ontology is introduced by specifying general properties and
primitives for sets Sp and Sr. This structure bears no particular bias to-
wards a specific spatial model that may be determined by the data ground-
ing the ontology. Such a specification is sufficient for the introduction of
spatial properties of objects in Sec. 4.6. In Sec. 4.2.2 and Sec. 4.2.3 two spec-
ifications of this spatial model are presented, respectively for a two- and a
three-dimensional representation of points and regions. Although such a
specification introduces a data-driven bias in the lower-level primitives of
the ontology, the development of the theory of appearances overviewed in
Sec. 4.7 would allow for a modular approach with a unified spatial model
abstracted from these two specific representations. For instance, the three-
dimensional model could be adopted as the model for sets Sp and Sr and,
if not explicit in the data grounding the ontology, a three-dimensional rep-
resentation could be inferred from a two-dimensional one by taking into
account the observer’s position.
4.2.1 Abstract spatial model
The set of spatial points Sp = {p1, p2, . . .} contains all spatial points in
the ontology. Characteristics of Sp such as ordering, dense or discrete, are
specified by a particular concrete model such as the ones exemplified in
the sub-sections to follow. The set of points Sp constitutes the basis for the
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representation of objects positions in the rest of the ontology.
The set of spatial regions Sr = {R1, R2} is a set of sets of connected
points in Sp, i.e. Sr ⊆ 2Sp , such that for each R ∈ Sr it holds that ∀p1, p2 ∈
R [conn(p1, p2)] where conn is a primitive relation expressing that points p1
and p2 are spatially connected. As for Sp, detailed characteristics of each
region R ∈ Sr are specified by the particular concrete model adopted,
such as whether R is a rectangle, polygon, volume etc. The set of regions
Sr constitutes the basis for the representation of the space occupied by
objects and their boundaries.
The following properties allow for comparison and manipulation of
spatial points and regions:
• p1 = p2 (given p1, p2 ∈ Sp) if and only if p1 and p2 represent the same
spatial position, with the relation being an equivalence (reflexive,
symmetric and transitive).
• dist(p1, p2) = d, where d represents the distance between points p1
and p2. The nature of this function is specified by the concrete spatial
model.
• p ∈ R (given p ∈ Sp and R ∈ Sr) if and only if point p belongs to
spatial region R.
• R1 = R2 ≡ ∀p[p ∈ R1 ↔ p ∈ R2], i.e. spatial regions R1 and R2 are
equal and represent the same set of points.
• R1 ⊆ R2 ≡ ∀ p[p ∈ R1 → p ∈ R2], i.e. region R1 is a subset of region
R2.
• R1 ( R2 ≡ R1 ⊆ R2 ∧ ∃ p[p ∈ R2 ∧ p 6∈ R1], i.e. region R1 is a proper
subset of region R2.
• R1 ∩ R2 = Ri ↔ ∀p[p ∈ Ri ↔ p ∈ R1 ∧ p ∈ R2], i.e. region Ri is the
intersection of regions R1 and R2.
• R1 ∪ R2 = Ri ↔ ∀p[p ∈ Ri ↔ p ∈ R1 ∨ p ∈ R2], i.e. region Ri is the
union of regions R1 and R2.
• boundary(R) = P if and only if P is the set of points representing the
boundary of region R.
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• interior(R) = P if and only if P is the set of points representing the
interior region of R.
• The topological constraint that boundary and interior of a region are
disjoint ∀R ∈ Sr [boundary(R) ∩ interior(R) = ∅].
• The topological constraint that the union of boundary and interior of
a region equal the whole region ∀R ∈ Sr [boundary(R)∪ interior(R) =
R].
The advantage of introducing such abstract model is that, in most
cases, the particular concrete model of space adopted in a particular do-
main only affects the definition of the primitive relations between points
and regions listed above, whilst most other properties and relations in our
ontology introduced in this and the following chapters may only refer to
the abstract model.
In the following paragraphs, two possible concrete instances of the ab-
stract model described so far are proposed for two- and three-dimensional
representations.
4.2.2 Two-dimensional spatial representation
A two-dimensional, discrete and finite spatial model for the representa-
tion of points and regions can be constructed by specifying that the set of
spatial points Sp is a set of ordered pairs of cartesian coordinates such that
Sp = {(x, y) ∈ X×Y} where X and Y are finite subsets of N.
The set of spatial regions Sr would then be constituted by the set of sets
of connected points in Sp, which would result in a set of lines and areas
(respectively one- and two-dimensional regions). For a set Sp ⊂N×N as
defined above, the primitive connection relation conn(p1, p2) between two
points p1 and p2 can be defined as follows:
conn(p1, p2) ≡ ∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y
[p1 = (x1, y1) ∧ p2 = (x2, y2) ∧ (|x2 − x1| = 1∨ |y2 − y1| = 1)]
Some of the primitive relations between points and regions can be de-
fined according to this model, for example the identity and distance be-
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tween points:
p1 = p2 ≡
∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y [p1 = (x1, y1) ∧ p2(x2, y2) ∧ x1 = x2 ∧ y1 = y2]
dist(p1, p2) = d↔
∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y
[
d =
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2
]
The remaining primitive spatial relations involving points and regions
from Sec. 4.2.1 can be defined in a similar fashion by specifying particular
constraints about the value of each point coordinates and the set of points
that are part of a particular region.
A concrete spatial model where points are ordered, such as the one
in this section, admits further primitives, for example the relative position
between two points:
• pos_x(p) = x ↔ ∃ x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z [p = (x, y, z)]
• pos_y(p) = y↔ ∃ x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z [p = (x, y, z)]
• pos_right(p1, p2)↔ [pos_x(p1) > pos_x(p2)]
• pos_left(p1, p2)↔ [pos_x(p1) < pos_x(p2)]
• pos_above(p1, p2)↔ [pos_y(p1) > pos_y(p2)]
• pos_below(p1, p2)↔ [pos_y(p1) < pos_y(p2)]
4.2.3 Three-dimensional spatial representation
A model for a three-dimensional representation of points and regions can
be constructed by specifying that the set Sp is a set of ordered tuples of
cartesian coordinates such that Sp = {(x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z} where, for
example X, Y and Z are finite subsets of N.
The set of spatial regions Sr would then be constituted by the set of sets
of connected points in Sp, which would result in a set of lines, areas and
volumes (respectively one-, two- and three-dimensional regions). For a set
Sp ⊂ N3 as defined above, the primitive connection relation conn(p1, p2)
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between two points p1 and p2 can be defined as follows:
conn(p1, p2) ≡
∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y, ∃ z1, z2 ∈ Z
[p1 = (x1, y1, z1) ∧ p2 = (x2, y2, z2) ∧
(|x2 − x1| = 1∨ |y2 − y1| = 1∨ |z2 − z1| = 1)]
The same primitive relations mentioned in the previous paragraphs
can be defined according to this model:
p1 = p2 ≡ ∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y, ∃z1, z2 ∈ Z
[p1 = (x1, y1, z1) ∧ p2(x2, y2, z2) ∧ x1 = x2 ∧ y1 = y2 ∧ z1 = z2]
dist(p1, p2) = d↔ ∃ x1, x2 ∈ X, ∃ y1, y2 ∈ Y, ∃z1, z2 ∈ Z[
d =
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2 + (z2 − z1)2
]
As for the two-dimensional model in the previous section, the remain-
ing primitive spatial relations for points and regions can be defined by
specifying particular constraints about the value of each point coordinates
and the set of points that are part of a particular region. Models with
ordered points may extend the primitives specifying the relative position
between two points by examining the z-coordinate:
• pos_z(p) = z↔ ∃ x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z [p = (x, y, z)]
• pos_front(p1, p2)↔ [pos_z(p1) > pos_z(p2)]
• pos_back(p1, p2)↔ [pos_z(p1) < pos_z(p2)]
4.3 Objects and Types
The sets O and Ot in the ontology vocabulary respectively represent ob-
jects and object types. Each object o ∈ O has a corresponding type in
Ot. For every object o, the predicate type(o, t) is defined, which holds if
and only if object o is of type t, for example type(o, Person). It is assumed
that object types are not time-dependent, i.e. the type of an object does not
change over time.
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Depending on the application and scope of the ontology, the set Ot can
be populated with many object types that can be structured in a variety of
hierarchies. The discussion to follow examines the kinds of objects most
relevant to the domain described in this work and their structure. The
classification is open to addition, modification and further specification as
different contexts may present different requirements.
At the top of the hierarchy there are object types AbstractObject and
ConcreteObject, forming a partition of Object. An abstract object is essen-
tially an instance with a spatial characterisation but not corresponding to
an agent or other entity existing in nature or, more specifically, in the scene
under consideration. It is generally time-invariant, i.e. it does not change
over time. Conversely, a concrete object is a physical entity relevant to the
context and scene under consideration, and instances of ConcreteObject
are generally time-dependent, as their properties change over time (for
example their position, extension, size,. . . ).
The type AbstractObject is the root of a sub-hierarchy of abstract objects
which essentially characterise the different forms of spatial extension. This
class is partitioned by subclasses Point, Line and Area. Each member of
Point represents a point in space from the set of spatial points Sp.
A member of Line is intended as a collection of objects of type Point
and represents a one-dimensional spatial entity. This class is itself spe-
cialised by subclasses SimpleLine and CompositeLine, representing respec-
tively segments and collections of consecutive segments.
A member of Area represents a closed spatial area, and it is specialised
by classes Rectangle and Circle. This classification is not exhaustive and
is open to further structuring to suit the need for the representation of
further kinds of spatial areas. For example one may introduce other types
of polygons or volumes.
The type ConcreteObject is the root of a sub-hierarchy of concrete ob-
jects which characterise the different kinds of agents and other physical en-
tities relevant to the domain under consideration. In general, each member
of ConcreteObject has spatial properties such as position, spatial extension,
size, etc. Each subclass may specify additional properties relevant to its
type. There are many instances of concrete objects in the physical world;
this classification includes the ones most relevant to this application.
The type Person and PersonBodyPart are subclasses of ConcreteObject,
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respectively representing people and people’s body parts. PersonBodyPart
may be further specialised by classes such as PersonHand and PersonFoot,
with the relation between the two being that a member of PersonBodyPart
is attached to a member of Person.
The type ConcreteObject is further specialised in classes Vehicle, Item
and Space. These classes admit numerous possibilities for subclassing, for
example one may distinguish between different vehicle types (car, bicycle,
train. . . ), item types (box, ball, chair,. . . ) and spaces (building, field, car
park,. . . ). Specialisations may be useful to group items according to rele-
vant properties, for example the accessibility of a particular space through
a door or aperture, or the ways in which an item can be carried.
The following list summarises the hierarchy of object types described
so far:
— AbstractObject
A spatial abstract object, generally time-invariant
– Point
A point in space, generally corresponding to a point p ∈ Sp
– Line
A one-dimensional line, consisting of a set of Point instances
- SimpleLine
A segment
- CompositeLine
A collection of consecutive segments as a set of SimpleLine
– Area
A two-dimensional spatial area, consisting of a set Point in-
stances, or delimited by a set of Line instances
- Rectangle
- Circle
— ConcreteObject
A physical entity. Most instances have properties such as position,
extension and size that may change over time
– Person
Most instances have properties relating each person to its body
parts
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– PersonBodyPart
- PersonHand
- PersonFoot
– Vehicle
– Item
– Space
Most instances have properties characterising the type of space
(open, closed) and relations of accessibility
Specific properties of the types of objects listed in this section are dis-
cussed in Section 4.6. However, it has been mentioned that most instances
of ConcreteObect are characterised by properties that vary over time. Be-
fore introducing any of these specific properties, the ontology requires a
device allowing one to state that a particular property or predicate holds
at a particular time or over a particular interval. This is explained in the
next section.
4.4 Fluents
The main aim of the formalism introduced in this chapter is to reason
about objects and spatial relations that change over time. Most properties
and relations between objects to be introduced in the following sections
are time-indexed, and they only hold at particular time instants or over
particular intervals.
In order to express this form of time-indexing, the construct HoldsAt is
introduced, derived from Event Calculus [64, 95] and Versatile Event Logic
(VEL) [18]. Given the ordered set of time points T , an instant t ∈ T
and a propositional expression p, the predicate HoldsAt(p, t) expresses that
proposition p holds at time t.
In vocabulary V there is a distinction between two types of time-
dependent formal expressions: propositional expressions whose validity
can be stated over time (set of fluents F ) and expressions referring to tem-
poral entitites occurring over some interval (set of event-types and event-
tokens E and Σ, discussed in section 4.8).
A fluent’s truth-value may be established at single time points. Flu-
ents describe either a state that may hold or not hold, or a process that
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may be active or inactive at each time point. Given fluent f and notation
HoldsAt( f , t), it is possible to define HoldsOver( f , i) to express the validity
of f over the interval i = [ts, te] ∈ I :
HoldsOver( f , [ts, te]) ≡
∀ t[(ts ≤ t ≤ te)→ HoldsAt( f , t)] (4.1)
If HoldsOver( f , [ts, te]) is true for some ts, te, from the definition above it
follows that HoldsOver( f , [t1, t2]) is also true, for every [t1, t2] ⊆ [ts, te].
A predicate holding only on the largest interval is HoldsOn( f , i), which
is true if and only if i is the greatest continuous temporal interval over
which f is true, i.e. there does not exist i′ ⊃ i such that HoldsOn( f , i′):
HoldsOn( f , [ts, te]) ≡ HoldsOver( f , [ts, te]) ∧
∧ ∃ t1
[
t1 < ts ∧ ∀ t
[
t1 6 t < ts → ¬HoldsAt( f , t)
]] ∧
∧ ∃ t2
[
te < t2 ∧ ∀ t
[
te < t 6 t2 → ¬HoldsAt( f , t)
]]
(4.2)
For clarity of notation, throughout the rest of this chapter and the
following, fluents are expressed with lowercase letters (such as position),
with capitalised notation reserved for events (such as Approach, see also
Sec. 4.8). Additionally, in order to reduce and simplify the structure of
definitions, the notations HoldsAt(p, t) and HoldsOn(p, [ts, te]) have been
shortened respectively to p@t and p@[ts,te].
A time-invariant propositional expression p holds or does not hold
regardless of a specific time interval, for example property type(o, t) ex-
pressing that object o is of type t. These propositions could still be time-
indexed, with the assumption that p is true if and only if ∀ t ∈ T p@t.
4.5 Precisifications
In addition to time-dependent propositions, most concepts to be intro-
duced in the ontology are vague. Their applicability boundaries are not
crisp, as their extension and crispness depends on particular interpreta-
tions or the context in which the concepts appear.
A formal method to establish whether a vague concept holds can be ob-
tained through the ideas in Supervaluation Semantics [47, 61], introduced
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in greater detail in Sec. 2.4. In this theory, a formula may admit multiple
models, each obtainable via an assignment of referents to terms and truth-
values to predicates. Such an assignment is called a precisification, and
allows to obtain a precise interpretation of a vague term. This approach
preserves classical logic inference rules, hence it is preferred over multi-
valued logics such as Fuzzy Logic [116] for the task of ontology reasoning
presented here.
Supervaluation Semantics and the epistemic stance lead to Standpoint
semantics [16], an elaboration of supervaluation semantics where the pre-
cisification is explicitly embedded in the language syntax. Specifically,
the precise criteria governing the extension of a concept’s applicability
boundary are modelled in terms of applicability thresholds for one or more
observable properties.
The set of precisification thresholds PT is constituted of ordered pairs
(t, Vt), where Vt is the range of admissible values for threshold t. A
precisification P is an assignment of values to precisification thresholds,
i.e. P ⊆ {(t, vt) | (t, Vt) ∈ PT ∧ vt ∈ Vt} (assuming that, for any P,
@ (t, v1), (t, v2) ∈ P ∧ v1 6= v2).
Given a generic predicate p, a precisification P is made explicit in the
language syntax as a parameter enclosed in square brackets as in p[P]. Defi-
nitions of vague predicates parameterised in this manner can explicitly re-
fer to the precisification thresholds embedded in P, therefore establishing
a crisp applicability boundary for p. This is demonstrated in the follow-
ing example. The vague concept point p1 is near p2 can be made precise
by specifying a threshold on an observable property, such as the linear
distance between points p1 and p2. The fluent near can be defined by
parameterising its definition with precisification P containing threshold
(minNear, n), with (minNear, V) ∈ PT and n ∈ V:
near[P](p1, p2)@t ≡
∃(minNear, δ) ∈ P ∃d [dist(p1, p2)@t = d ∧ d < δ] (4.3)
The simple definition above states that property near(p1, p2) holds between
spatial points p1 and p2 if their distance is smaller than the minNear thresh-
old specified by precisification P.
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4.6 Object Properties
Section 4.4 introduced the construct to express that a proposition holds at
a particular time or over a particular interval, and Section 4.5 introduced
the possiblity to specify threshold parameters in order to establish whether
a vague predicate holds. It is now possible to introduce several properties
and relations between objects that form the basis for building the verb
models extensively described in Chapter 5.
The organisation of most concepts listed in this section has partly been
shaped according to the specific application domain of recognising occur-
rences of motion verbs. Therefore, the formalisation of verb models, the
methodologies followed in the implementation stage and the data avail-
able for testing and evaluation (see Chapter 6) had an influence on the
ontology structure, and this is particularly true for primitive concepts, the
ones most closely related to the implementation and data. However, ef-
forts have been made to preserve generality so that the ontology and verb
models can be extended and/or adapted to different spatio-temporal do-
mains and datasets.
The set of concepts in the ontology is structured in three layers:
• The lowest level, or primitives layer, is constituted by simple prop-
erties of objects which express their most essential spatio-temporal
nature, and bear an intimate connection to the nature of the data
available to ground the ontology. In fact, the initial grounding of the
ontology happens on this very layer. A prime example is the position
of objects.
• The middle level of the ontology is constituted by predicates express-
ing properties and relations of objects that can be inferred and ab-
stracted from primitives. Within this layer, there is a fluid transition
from a lower sub-level expressing mostly quantitative concepts (such
as size, extension or distance between objects) and a higher sub-
level expressing mostly qualitative concepts often inferred through
the quantitave ones (for example proximity or topological relations).
• The highest level of the ontology is constituted by fluents and events
describing objects interactions and behaviour, from simple events
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such as Move to complex ones such as Exchange. Most of these are
introduced and modelled in Chapter 5.
4.6.1 Primitives
As outlined above, the primitives layer is concerned with the most basic
properties of objects of type AbstractObject, and properties of instances
of ConcreteObject that stem from the data grounding the ontology. For
clarity of notation, primitive predicates are prefixed with p_.
Concrete objects
The most prominent primitive properties of concrete objects are posi-
tion and extension, as this is the most likely way that objects are repre-
sented in the data grounding the ontology. Given object o instance of
ConcreteObject, the following primitives are defined:
• p_position(o, p)@t, with type(p, Point). This asserts that the position
of object o is point p at time t.
• p_extension(o, a)@t, with type(a,Area). This asserts that the spatial
extension of object o is area a at time t.
The idea is that the ontology will be grounded by populating the set of
instances of Point and Area, each of which is then linked to the objects,
whose position or extension is represented at particular instants by a set
of true time-indexed p_position or p_extension fluents.
It is perfectly plausible that only one of these fluents may be grounded
for a particular domain. For example, all objects may be represented by
points in space, in which case no object is such that p_extension(o, a)@t is
true for any o, a or t. Conversely, other application domains, such as the
one this work is concerned with, see objects represented by their extension,
and there is no predicate p_position(o, p)@t for any o, a or t.
Subclasses of ConcreteObject can admit additional primitives, specify-
ing characteristics specific to the subclass. For example, given an object o
with type(o, Person), the following primitives associate o with the instances
of its body parts:
• p_hands(o, (hl , hr)), with hl and hr instances of PersonHand and rep-
resenting respectively person o’s left and right hand.
71
Chapter 4. Ontology of Motion Verbs
• p_feet(o, ( fl , fr)), with fl and fr instances of PersonFoot and repre-
senting respectively person o’s left and right foot.
Abstract Objects
Despite their name, the primitives for instances of AbstractObject can also
be slightly influenced by the data grounding the ontology. Abstract ob-
jects and their primitives connect spatial entities to the spatial model rep-
resented by sets Sp and Sr in the ontology vocabulary. The structure of
these sets is not necessarily identical to the concrete spatial model emerg-
ing from a particular real world situation, but it is likely to be very similar.
Given object o of type Point, the following primitive is defined:
• p_point(o, p), which associates point o with spatial point p ∈ Sp.
Given object o of type Area or Line, the following primitive is defined:
• p_area(o, A), which associates area or line o with region R ∈ Sr.
Certain subclasses may be characterised by different primitives. For ex-
ample it is imaginable that if the grounding data contains sets of two-
dimensional rectangles, instances o of type Rectangle may define some or
all the following primitives:
• p_topleft(o, p), where p is the top left corner of rectangle o.
• p_width(o, w), where w is the width of rectangle o.
• p_height(o, h), where h is the height of rectangle o.
Other domains may define a different set. The above set is not coinciden-
tal as it bears a close relation to the spatial model arising from the data
grounding the ontology implementation, discussed in Chapter 6.
4.6.2 Middle layer
Within the middle layer of the ontology, one can define predicates express-
ing properties and relations of objects relevant to a particular domain. In
this section the ones relevant to the application and to the verbs modelled
in the next chapter are introduced.
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The lower level of this layer is mostly populated by quantitative rela-
tions expressing a precise measurement or property holding at a particular
time for a particular object (e.g. position as a point, speed as a value, eu-
clidean distance. . . ). The higher level predicates are an abstraction with a
more qualitative nature and with a certain degree of vagueness (e.g. speed
as slow or fast, relative orientation,. . . ).
In the predicates below, the notation property(o1 ∈ Class, o2 ∈ Class)
signifies that relation property has two participants which are both in-
stances of Class. The purpose of this notation is to have the participants’
type stand out. The logical formula corresponding to this notation is
property(o1, o2) ≡ type(o1,Class) ∧ type(o2,Class) ∧ . . . .
The set V denotes a set of values; in some applications this could corre-
spond to the actual setsN, R or a subset of these. The notationV abstracts
from the specific one being employed in a particular domain.
Abstract Objects
For instances of Point the following predicate can be defined:
• distance((o1 ∈ Point, o2 ∈ Point), d ∈ V).
This relation holds if and only if d is the distance between points
o1 and o2. Different metrics can be used. In Sec. 4.2 a function
expressing distance between points in Sp has been listed, hence this
relation could be defined according to function dist:
distance((o1, o2), d) ≡
type(o1, Point) ∧ type(o2, Point) ∧
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Sp[p_point(o1, p1) ∧ p_point(o2, p2) ∧ dist(p1, p2) = d]
(4.4)
• o1 = o2, with o1, o2 ∈ Point
This equality relation holds if and only if o1 and o2 are the same
point. It is generally defined by referring to the equality relation of
the spatial model on Sp (see Sec. 4.2):
o1 = o2 ≡
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Sp[p_point(o1, p1) ∧ p_point(o2, p2) ∧ p1 = p2] (4.5)
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• o1 6= o2, with o1, o2 ∈ Point
This equality relation holds if point o1 is different from point o2. This
can either be defined as above (by referring to the equality relation
of the spatial model) or by stating that their distance is greater than
zero:
o1 6= o2 ≡
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Sp[p_point(o1, p1) ∧ p_point(o2, p2) ∧ p1 6= p2] (4.6)
o1 6= o2 ≡ distance((o1, o2), d) ∧ d > 0 (4.7)
• position(p1 ∈ Point, p2 ∈ Point)
This is a trivial reflexive relation that expresses the position of a point
p1 as a point p2 equal to itself. It is useful for abstracting further
properties on the general class AbstractObject:
position(p1, p2) ≡ p1 = p2
Relevant properties for instances of Area are the following:
• centroid(a ∈ Area, p ∈ Point)
This relation holds if point p is the centroid of area a. This is a rather
low-level property useful for determining the position of an area. It
is also heavily dependent on the specific type of area considered, in
fact most sub-classes implement the property with a particular def-
inition (e.g. for a Circle point p is simply its center, for a Rectangle
point p is the intersection of the two diagonals, etc.). An implemen-
tation is described in Sec. 6.2.1.
• position(a ∈ Area, p ∈ Point)
This relation holds if point p expresses the position of area a. A triv-
ial definition would define position(a, p) ≡ centroid(a, p). However,
other implementations may abstract from the notion of centroid and
take other aspects of a into consideration.
• distance((a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area), d ∈ V)
This relation holds if d is the distance between areas a1 and a2. There
are many definitions specifying how to interpret the concept of dis-
tance between two areas. Trivially, one can refer to their position and
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the distance between the points:
distance((a1, a2), d) ≡
∃ p1, p2[type(p1, Point) ∧ type(p2, Point) ∧
position(a1, p1) ∧ position(a2, p2) ∧ distance((p1, p2), d)] (4.8)
The same properties could be defined for objects of type Line.
It is possible to abstract general properties applicable to instances of
abstract objects:
• relPosition((o1 ∈ AbstractObject, o2 ∈ AbstractObject), v ∈ relPos)
where relPos = {left, right, above, below, front, back}.
Holds if the relative position v of o1 in respect to o2 is among the
ones in relPos. This is a qualitative property dependent on the spatial
model, and may be prone to ambiguity in particular situations. It is
possible to define it by referring to the example spatial properties in
Sec. 4.2.2 and Sec. 4.2.3 (the front and back relative positions are only
available within a three-dimensional model):
relPosition((o1, o2), left) ≡
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Point, sp1, sp2 ∈ Sp[position(o1, p1) ∧ position(o2, p2) ∧
p_point(o1, sp1) ∧ p_point(o2, sp2) ∧ pos_left(sp1, sp2)] (4.9)
The relations for the remaining relative positionings can be defined
in a similar way.
• interior(o ∈ AbstractObject, ai ∈ Area)
This relation holds if ai is the interior area of object o, i.e. ai contains
all the points in o minus the points on o’s boundary. In the following
definition o is assumed to be an instance of Area as points and lines
do not have interior points (this could be changed under different
assumptions and spatial models):
interior(o, ai) ≡ type(o,Area) ∧
∃ R ∈ Sr[p_area(o, R) ∧ interior(R) = Ri ∧ p_area(ai, Ri)] (4.10)
The definition recalls the spatial area function interior (see Sec. 4.2.1).
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• boundary(o ∈ AbstractObect, l ∈ Line)
This relation holds if line l represents the line formed by the points
on the boundary of object o:
boundary(o, l) ≡ ∃ Rl ∈ Sr p_area(l, Rl) ∧
[ [type(o, Point) ∧ ∃ p ∈ Sp[p_point(o, p) ∧ Rl = {p}]] ∨
[type(o, Line) ∧ ∃ Ro ∈ Sr[p_area(o, Ro) ∧ Ro = Rl ]] ∨
[type(o,Area) ∧ ∃ Ro ∈ Sr[p_area(o, Ro) ∧ boundary(Ro) = Rl ]] ]
(4.11)
The definition recalls the spatial area function boundary (Sec. 4.2.1).
From the above it follows that the boundary of a point is a line con-
stituted by a single point.
• intersection((a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area), ai ∈ Area)
This relation holds if ai is the non empty intersection of a1 and a2 (can
be generalised by defining the relation intersection between different
objects, for example an area and a line, or two lines):
intersection((a1, a2), ai) ≡
type(a1,Area) ∧ type(a2,Area) ∧ type(ai,Area) ∧
∃R1, R2, RI ∈ Sr[p_area(a1, R1) ∧ p_area(a2, R2) ∧ p_area(ai, Ri) ∧
R1 ∩ R2 = Ri ∧ Ri 6= ∅] (4.12)
• pointInArea(p ∈ Point, a ∈ Area)
This relation holds if point p is part of area a:
pointInArea(p, a) ≡
type(p, Point) ∧ type(a,Area) ∧
∃ pp ∈ Sp, R ∈ Sr[p_point(p, pp) ∧ p_area(a, R) ∧ pp ∈ R] (4.13)
• pointInsideArea(p ∈ Point, a ∈ Area)
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This relation holds if point p is part of the interior of area a:
pointInsideArea(p, a) ≡ type(p, Point) ∧ type(a,Area) ∧
∃ ai[interior(a, ai) ∧ pointInArea(p, ai)] (4.14)
Given the low level properties above, higher-level properties involving
abstract objects can be defined. For example, the RCC calculus topological
relations, illustrated in Fig. 2.2:
• rcc_DC(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
@ ai ∈ Area[intersection((a1, a2), ai)] (4.15)
• rcc_EC(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
∃ l1, l2 ∈ Line[boundary(a1, l1) ∧ boundary(a2, l2)∧
∃ li ∈ Line[intersection((l1, l2), li)]]∧
∃ i1, i2 ∈ Area[interior(a1, i1) ∧ interior(a2, i2)∧
@ ii ∈ Area[intersection((i1, i2)ii)]] (4.16)
• rcc_PO(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
∃ i1, i2, ii ∈ Area[interior(a1, i1)∧interior(a2, i2)∧ intersection((i1, i2)ii)]∧
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Point[pointInArea(p1, a1) ∧ ¬pointInArea(p1, a2)∧
pointInArea(p2, a2) ∧ ¬pointInArea(p2, a1)] (4.17)
• rcc_TPP(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
∀ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, a1)→ pointInArea(p, a2)]∧
∃ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, a2) ∧ ¬pointInArea(p, a1)]∧
∃ l1, l2 ∈ Line[boundary(a1, l1) ∧ boundary(a2, l2)∧
∃ li ∈ Line[intersection((l1, l2), li)]] (4.18)
• rcc_NTPP(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
∀ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, a1)→ pointInArea(p, a2)]∧
∃ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, a2) ∧ ¬pointInArea(p, a1)]∧
∃ l1, l2 ∈ Line[boundary(a1, l1) ∧ boundary(a2, l2)∧
@ li ∈ Line[intersection((l1, l2), li)]] (4.19)
• rcc_EQ(a1 ∈ Area, a2 ∈ Area) ≡
∀ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, a1)↔ pointInArea(p, a2)] (4.20)
The above set can be augmented with the inverse relations rcc_TPP−1 and
rcc_NTPP−1. It has to be noted that the relation intersection needs a further
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refinement in order to address situations in which the intersection between
lines representing the boundaries of two regions results in a set of isolated
points rather than a contiguous line. Additionally, particular types of Area
may allow for alternative definitions; for example, the equality relation
rcc_EC between two rectangles may be inferred through the comparison
of their defining characteristics (for instance corner, width and height).
Concrete Objects
Concrete objects have properties that characterise their essential spatial
characteristics, such as position, extension or size, and more abstract prop-
erties such as the accessibility of a space or whether an object can be
moved. Most of these properties hold according to a specific time in-
stant, and vague concepts are precisified using a precisification containing
thresholds that allow for a precise interpretation (see Sec. 4.5).
In general, for most instances of ConcreteObject it is possible to define
the following properties:
• position(o ∈ ConcreteObject, p ∈ Point)@t
Holds if position of object o is represented by point p at time t. Prim-
itive properties establishing the spatial location of object o are either
p_position or p_extension, depending on the manner the ontology is
grounded (see Sec. 4.6.1):
position(o, p)@t ≡
p_position(o, p)@t ∨ ∃ a ∈ Area[p_extension(o, a)@t ∧ position(a, p)]
(4.21)
• extension(o ∈ ConcreteObject, a ∈ Area)@t
Holds if extension of object o corresponds to area a at time t. For
this property to hold, the primitive p_extension for object o has to be
grounded in the ontology.
extension(o, a)@t ≡ p_extension(o, a)@t (4.22)
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• distance((o1 ∈ ConcreteObject, o2 ∈ ConcreteObject), d ∈ V)@t
Holds if distance between objects o1 and o2 is d at time t
distance((o1, o2), d)@t ≡
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Point[position(o1, p1)@t ∧ position(o2, p2)@t ∧
distance((p1, p2), d)] (4.23)
The above definition simply recalls the distance relation between
points. However, it is imaginable that different metrics are appropri-
ate given specific domains or particular kind of objets. For example,
one may consider the distances between the objects’ boundaries or
more complex calculations.
• samePosition(o1 ∈ ConcreteObject, o2 ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
Holds if concrete objects o1 and o2 are at the same position at time t:
samePosition(o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ p1, p2 ∈ Point[position(o1, p1)@t ∧ position(o2, p2)@t ∧ p1 = p2]
(4.24)
• nearPosition[P](o1 ∈ ConcreteObject, o2 ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
Holds if position of object o1 is near position of object o2 at time t. It
is a vague concept, hence the parameterisation with precisification P
that specifies a suitable threshold for its precise interpretation. The
concept nearPosition can be defined by taking into account differ-
ent characteristics of the objects and the environment in which they
are located. The following is a simple definition that holds if their
distance at time t is smaller than threshold TnearPos in P:
nearPosition[P](o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ (TnearPos, tn) ∈ P[distance((o1, o2), d)@t ∧ d < tn] (4.25)
• relPosition((o1 ∈ ConcreteObject, o2 ∈ ConcreteObject), v ∈ relPos)@t
where relPos = {left, right, above, below, front, back}
Holds if position of object o1 in respect to object o2 at time t is among
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the ones listed in relPos. A simple definition would just refer to the
relative position of the points corresponding to the position of o1 and
o2 (eq. 4.9):
relPosition((o1, o2), v)@t ≡
∃p1, p2 ∈ Point [position(o1, p1)@t ∧ position(o2, p2)@t ∧
relPosition((p1, p2), v)] (4.26)
• onGround(o ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
Holds if object o is positioned on the ground at time t. The position
of the ground could be established as a primitive when grounding
the ontology, or could be inferred from other characteristics of the
space.
• boundary(o ∈ ConcreteObject, a ∈ Area)@t
This property associates object o with its spatial boundary repre-
sented by line l at time t, and it is established by looking at o’s ex-
tension:
boundary(o, a)@t ≡
extension(o, a)@t ∧ ∃ l ∈ Line[boundary(a, l)] (4.27)
• inViewField(o ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
This property establishes whether object o is present and visible in
the space currently under consideration. A very simple definition
would establish whether there exists a position for o at time t:
inViewField(o)@t ≡ ∃ p ∈ Point [position(o, p)@t]
This property is useful for some verb models in the following chap-
ter, however its definition and implementation are quite dependent
on the particular model of space resulting from grounding the on-
tology.
Our ontology allows for the expression of qualitative concepts. A con-
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cept which can have a qualitative or quantitative nature, for example, is
speed:
• speed(o ∈ ConcreteObject, s ∈ V)@t
Holds if the speed of object o is some value s at time t. As the speed
of an object is a characteristic that results from movement, in order
to evaluate the speed at a particular time instant, there is the need to
observe the positions of o over a temporal window surrounding t:
speed(o, s)@t ≡
∃ ε ∃t1, t2 ∈ T , p1, p2 ∈ Point [ t1 = t− ε2 ∧ t2 = t +
ε
2
∧
position(o, p1)@t1 ∧ position(o, p2)@t2 ∧
distance((p1, p2), d) ∧ s = dt2 − t1 ]
The definition above calculates speed as the ratio between the dis-
tance and time units over a particular temporal window. The mean-
ing of ε is for this temporal window to be reasonably small. As this is
essentially a vague concept, the definition can be reformulated with
precisifications:
speed[P](o, s)@t ≡
∃t1, t2 ∈ T , p1, p2 ∈ Point, (Wspeed, w) ∈ P
[ t1 = t− w2 ∧ t2 = t +
w
2
∧ position(o, p1)@t1 ∧ position(o, p2)@t2 ∧
distance((p1, p2), d) ∧ s = dt2 − t1 ] (4.28)
In the above, precisification P includes a threshold specifying a width
of exactly w for the window over which the speed of o is evaluated.
• speed(o ∈ ConcreteObject, v ∈ {slow, fast, walkPace, runPace, . . .})@t
This property characterises the speed of o at time t not as an abso-
lute value, but with a qualitative description. The concept of some
object’s speed being slow or fast is inherently vague, therefore the
definitions below are parameterised with precisification P in order
to precisely interpret the predicate. Given a speed value s ∈ V ob-
tained by the quantitative property speed above, qualitative notions
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of speed can be defined:
speed[P](o, slow)@t ≡
∃ s ∈ V, (Tslow, ts) ∈ P [speed[P](o, s)@t ∧ s < ts]
speed[P](o, fast)@t ≡
∃ s ∈ V, (Tfast, t f ) ∈ P [speed[P](o, s)@t ∧ s > t f ]
speed[P](o, walkPace)@t ≡
∃ s ∈ V, (Tminwalk, tminw )(Tmaxwalk, tmaxw )∈P[speed[P](o, s)@t ∧ tminw < s< tmaxw ]
speed[P](o, runPace)@t ≡
∃ s ∈ V, (Tminrun , tminr )(Tmaxrun , tmaxr )∈P[speed[P](o, s)@t ∧ tminr < s< tmaxr ]
For instances of AbstractObject the RCC topological relations have been
introduced. These relations can be applied to instances of ConcreteObject
as well, for example:
• rcc_DC(o1 ∈ ConcreteObject, o2 ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
This relation holds if objects o1 and o2 are disconnected at time t.
Such a relation can be inferred by examining the objects’ positions:
rcc_DC(o1, o2) ≡
type(o1,ConcreteObject) ∧ type(o2,ConcreteObject) ∧
∃ a1, a2 ∈ Area [extension(o1, a1)@t ∧ extension(o2, a2)@t ∧
rcc_DC(a1, a2)] (4.29)
In principle, the entire set of RCC relations can be formalised using the
same approach as in the example above. There may be occasions where
the abstract model of spatial areas linked to the space occupied by concrete
objects may not allow for such a straightforward application. For exam-
ple there may be uncertainty or errors in the data leading to imprecise
positioning, resulting in non clear-cut topological relations.
Certain subclasses of ConcreteObject define specific properties relevant
to the formalisation of certain situations or events, for example:
• RelOrientation(p ∈ Person, ro)@t
RelOrientation(v ∈ Vehicle, ro)@t
Holds if the relative orientation of person p or vehicle v is ro at time t.
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Relative orientation could be inferred by looking at certain features
of the objects, and it could be represented by ro in several ways, for
example as left/right, an angle relative to the horizon or a quadrant
of the space (this is relevant to the formalisation of verbs such as
MoveAhead, Walk and Run, see Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3). A
simple way to specify relative orientation would be to refer to the
possible relative positions between two objects in the set relPos for
the property relPosition (see eq. 4.26).
• sightDistance(p ∈ Person, d ∈ V)@t
Holds if person p can see objects up to distance d at time t (relevant
to the formalisation of Follow, Sec. 5.3.1).
• vehicleBrakesOn(v ∈ Vehicle)@t
Holds if vehicle v brake lights are on at time t (relevant to the for-
malisation of Stop, Sec. 5.1.5).
• movable(o ∈ Item, v ∈ {movable, partMovable, immovable})@t
Holds if a particular item o is deemed to be movable, immovable or
partially movable (relevant to the formalisation of Push, Sec. 5.4.2).
• holdable(o ∈ Item)@t
Holds if a particular item o can be held at time t (relevant to the
formalisation of Hold, Sec. 5.4.6).
• spaceType(s ∈ Space, v ∈ {open, closed})
Holds if a particular space s is open or closed, assuming this prop-
erty does not change over time. Open spaces have no particular
constraints on how the space can be accessed, whilst closed spaces
can only be accessed through specific parts and or in particular ways
(relevant to the formalisation of Enter, Sec. 5.2.5).
• partOf(s ∈ Space, o ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
Holds if object o constitutes a part of space s at time t (relevant to
the formalisation of Enter, Sec. 5.2.5).
• accessible(s ∈ Space, o ∈ ConcreteObject)@t
Holds if a space s can be accessed through object o, normally a part
of s, at time t (relevant to the formalisation of Enter, Sec. 5.2.5).
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The predicates listed above constitute only a brief example of how the on-
tology can grow to accommodate for a variety of properties and relations
between objects. It is imaginable that in some domains these concepts may
be grounded as primitives. This is the case if the data specifies exactly at
which time and for which objects a particular property holds. In other do-
mains these properties may have a definition which facilitates inferences
about whether they hold or do not hold at particular times by examining
whether other properties hold at that time.
4.7 Theory of Appearances
A computer system can only look at a representation of reality, for sim-
plicity hereafter called the appearance. Appearances may result from al-
gorithmic processing, such as a computer vision algorithm processing a
video scene or manual annotations by human observers. These are the
two data sources for grounding the ontology formalised in this chapter.
This process is explained in detail in Chapter 6.
Dissimilarities in granularity and precision among different sources of
appearances can be huge. In any case, they are always a partial, finite
and incomplete representation of the real world and constitute all that is
available for a computer system to ground the ontology. Thus the appear-
ance represents everything an ontological system knows about the world.
However, some details about the world not accounted for by the appear-
ance may be logically inferred from the appearance itself, and possibly
from some prior or acquired knowledge, such as the knowledge base aris-
ing from the context sketched in Sec. 3.4. Such augmented representation
is hereafter referred to as the inferred appearance.
The ontology formalised so far has the potential to incorporate a Theory
of Appearances layer performing an augmented representation of inferred
appearances. This layer is located between the primitives layer and mid-
level concepts and its general aim is to augment the knowledge stemming
from appearances and adding modularity to the ontology by separating
the low-level, data-dependent concepts from the mid- and high-level ob-
ject properties and event predicates. Further aims of this theory could
emerge in particular contexts. In fact, richer inferred appearances may be
produced depending on granularity and precision of the data, such as the
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inferred appearance of a person’s hands and feet if not even shape and
posture. Additionally, the Theory of Appearances may aid in correcting
errors and noise in the data by discarding ‘wrong’ appearances, such as
spurious tracks produced by a tracking algorithm.
Two specific examples of how a Theory of Appearances could be de-
veloped and its advantages are overviewed: the construction of a unified
spatial model for the ontology and the issue of occlusion.
A Unified Spatial Model
The spatial models introduced in Sec. 4.2 demonstrate that the definition
of ontological primitives concerning the position and relations between
spatial points and regions are dependent on the data grounding the ontol-
ogy. For example, in our domain, the data resulting from the processing of
video image data could represent points in space according to a two- or a
three-dimensional model, therefore the primitives defining position, con-
nection, distance and topological relations between between points and
regions have to be defined accordingly.
It is desirable for the ontology to provide a unified spatial model which
minimises the influence carried by the grounding data. Such a model can
be based on the three-dimensional model of Sec. 4.2.3 defining properties
of sets Sp and Sr, as this appears to be the most suitable for the represen-
tation of objects in space and their interactions. A Theory of Appearances
would define a layer within the ontology whose purpose is to infer a rep-
resentation of points and regions conforming with this unified model. The
definition of properties and concepts in layers collocated above it would
only have to refer to spatial properties within the unified model frame-
work, thus abstracting higher-level properties from lower-level details of
the implementation.
An example of how this could be achieved is demonstrated by assum-
ing that the spatial model in the implementation data is constituted by a fi-
nite set of discrete, two-dimensional points. This is the case for the data on
which the current implementation of ProVision grounds the ontology, (see
Sec. 6.1), and also for the data provided by the automatic video tracking
algorithms. Such a set of spatial data points DP would then be defined as
a set of two-dimensional cartesian coordinates such that DP = {(x, y) ∈
X×Y}, where X and Y are bounded by the number of pixels in each video
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frame. The unified ontological spatial model for the set Sp in the ontology
is based on the model in Sec. 4.2.3, i.e. Sp = {(x, y, z) ∈ X×Y× Z}. If the
position of the observer is known, given a point dp ∈ DP , it is possible to
infer its position in the unified model as a point p ∈ Sp with a transfor-
mation algorithm. For example, if the observer is a fixed video camera, an
algorithm can calculate three-dimensional coordinates based on the focal
length of the camera lens. Another possibility is given by homographic
transformations and ground plane estimation techniques [28, 32, 94].
The transformation function is defined as transformp : DP → Sp, such
that each data point dp ∈ DP is mapped to a corresponding point p ∈ Sp
in the unified ontological spatial model. It follows that the definition of
this function is likely to be the only implementation- and data-dependent
element of the ontology, as its definition varies according to the structure
and nature of the set of data pointsDP , the position of the observer (which
could be fixed or could change over time) and the particular algorithm
involved in the transformation.
In fact, the spatial primitives of the ontological model for Sp (Sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.3) such as identity, distance etc. need only be defined for
points in Sp. The definition of primitives for object types in AbstractObject
such as Point and Area would refer to points in Sp and primitives defined
on these points; a particular implementation providing the grounding data
would only have to ‘plug’ the transformation function transformp.
Detection of Occlusion
Another example of how a Theory of Appearances could augment the
knowledge given by the data grounding the ontology is given by the issue
of occlusion. This problem occurs if an object in space is hidden by an-
other object over some interval, generally due to movement of one or both
objects, and, as a consequence, the position of the occluded object is not
represented in the data over that interval.
Fig. 4.1 shows a person o walking in space over interval [ts, te] and
passing behind a brick wall during interval [t1, t2] ⊂ [ts, te]. A tracking al-
gorithm may represent the person’s position as spatial area a at each time
instant, represented by the thick rectangles. This representation should
ideally determine the grounding of ontology primitives p_extension(o, a)@t
for each t ∈ [ts, te]. From the figure it is evident that such appearance suf-
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Reality
Appearance
p_extension(o, a)
Inferred
Appearance
i_extension(o, a)
ts < t1 < . . . < . . . < t2 < te
Figure 4.1: Theory of Appearances
fers from occlusion, as the person’s extension is not represented between
t1 and t2. An inferred appearance, extracted via logical inferences based
on the p_extension primitives for t < t1 and t > t2, would augment the
representation by understanding the occlusion, thus inferring the position
of the wall, represented by the thin rectangle, and the position of the per-
son while occluded by the wall. In this example, such inferred appearance
would result in the grounding of predicates i_extension(o, a)@t for each
t ∈ [ts, te].
It has to be noted that the issue of occlusion also relates to knowing
or being able to estimate the position of the observer, as objects may ap-
pear hidden according to the perspective from which they are observed.
Combining an occlusion detection system with the inference of a unified
spatial model that takes the observer’s position into account would greatly
enhance the chances of successfully addressing this issue.
4.8 Events
An event represents a complex action and there is a distinction between
event-types and event-tokens [18]. An event-type e ∈ E is associated with a
set of instances of a particular event, for example: ‘John approaches Mary’,
formalised as Approach(John, Mary). An event-token σ ∈ Σ constitutes an
occurrence of a particular event-type over a temporal interval. To express
occurrence of event type e ∈ E over time interval I ∈ I , the construct
Occurs(e, I) is introduced. The definition of an event occurrence often
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involves specifying a particular sequence of fluents or sub-events that has
to hold for the event to occur. For clarity of notation in the formulae to
follow, event-types are capitalised as in Approach.
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Verb Models
This chapter illustrates some sample verb models applying the principles
outlined in the previous chapter. Definitions in this ontology are not in-
tended as exhaustive semantic characterisations of concepts, such as the
ones that would be produced following a systematic linguistic analysis.
Our formalisation needs to strike a compromise between the complexity
of meaning, the practical task of detecting occurrences of such concepts
on a coarse and imprecise representation of the real world and the imple-
mentability of these definitions in ProVision, the event recognition system
described in the next chapter. For this reason, one cannot formulate very
complex definitions, as they would either be too difficult to disambiguate,
or impractical to break down and ground on the Theory of Appearances.
The formalisations to follow are intended as a demonstration on how to
apply such methodology.
The verbs modelled in this chapter, a selection of the ones listed in
Table 1.1, are grouped according to their most prominent semantic char-
acteristic, namely: simple motion, proximity, relation and contact. For the
convenience of the reader, an index is provided at the end of the volume.
5.1 Simple motion
The verbs in this section concern the motion of objects in space: generic
events such as Move, particular modalities of the type of motion (Walk,
Run), directional or intentional movement (Go) and cessation of movement
(Stop).
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5.1.1 Move
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, [2]), the intransitive
form of the verb Move most commonly describes a person/thing going
from one place, position or state to another, a person/thing changing pos-
ture, position or disposition. There is also a transitive use, for which there
is no concern in this section, meaning “to change the place or position of
someone/something”.
The fact that object o ∈ O is moving at instant t can be formalised as
follows:
move(o)@t ≡
∃ ts, te ∈ T , ps, pe ∈ Point, ε [ts = t− ε2 ∧ te = t +
ε
2
∧ position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧ ps 6= pe] (5.1)
The definition above refers to the position of o at time instants pre-
ceding and following t, respectively ts and te, with the length ε of in-
terval [ts, te] being sufficiently small to avoid considering longer spans
over which an object may have moved despite the presence of subinter-
vals where the object remained static. The duration of such interval can
be made precise by parameterising the definition with precisification P
containing threshold (Wmove, w):
move[P](o)@t ≡
∃ (Wmove, w) ∈ P ∃ ts, te, ps, pe, pt[(ts < t < te) ∧ (te − ts = w) ∧
position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
position(o, pt)@t ∧ pt 6= ps ∧ pt 6= pe] (5.2)
An alternative definition may make use of the property speed of object
o (see Eq. 4.28, on page 81) and specifying a threshold in P:
move[P](o)@t ≡
∃ (TmoveSpeed, ts) ∈ P, s [speed[P](o, s)@t ∧ s > ts] (5.3)
The event Move can now be defined by specifying that it occurs over
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an interval if the fluent move holds on the same interval:
Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ move[P](o)@[ts,te] (5.4)
It is useful to specify a few specialised occurrences of Move relevant
to the formalisation of several other verbs in this chapter. Of interest are
the movements of an object towards a particular direction, for example
an object moving up or moving left. The following events are formalised
by examining the relative position of the object at the start and end of an
interval, given relation relPosition (see Eq. 4.9):
Occurs(MoveUp[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), above)] (5.5)
Occurs(MoveDown[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), below)] (5.6)
Occurs(MoveLeft[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), left)] (5.7)
Occurs(MoveRight[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), right)] (5.8)
Occurs(MoveToFront[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), front)] (5.9)
Occurs(MoveToBack[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
∃ ps, pe ∈ Point [position(o, ps)@ts ∧ position(o, pe)@te ∧
relPosition((pe, ps), back)] (5.10)
A further specialisation of Move involves a subject moving ahead, mean-
ing that it is moving towards the direction it is facing according to its rel-
ative orientation. This is of course relevant only for objects which can be
characterised with a relative orientation, for example people and vehicles.
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The ways a relative orientation can be expressed can vary. In the following
definition it is assumed that an object can face left, right, towards the front
or the back. This is expressed by object property relOrientation and the
event MoveAhead occurs over interval [ts, te] if object o moves towards the
direction it is facing:
Occurs(MoveAhead[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
[relOrientation(o, left)@[ts,te] ∧ Occurs(MoveLeft[P](o), [ts, te])] ∨
[relOrientation(o, right)@[ts,te] ∧ Occurs(MoveRight[P](o), [ts, te])] ∨
[relOrientation(o, front)@[ts,te] ∧ Occurs(MoveToFront[P](o), [ts, te])] ∨
[relOrientation(o, back)@[ts,te] ∧ Occurs(MoveToBack[P](o), [ts, te])] ∨
(5.11)
5.1.2 Walk
Instances of the verb Walk can be seen as specifications of the verb Move
which concern the motion of human beings walking in space from one
position to another at an appropriate pace. Such meaning is listed by the
OED as “to move or travel at a regular and fairly slow pace by lifting
and setting down each foot in turn, so that one of the feet is always on
the ground” [2]. Figurative or metaphorical meanings where the verb
describes the motion or behaviour of individuals other than people will
not be considered here.
Given object o ∈ O of type Person, the predicate footstepAheadL holds
on [ts, te] if o keeps the right foot on the ground throughout the interval
while moving the left foot up and down within the interval, and at the
same time moving it ahead according to o’s relative orientation:
footstepAheadL[P](o)@[ts,te] ≡
∃ fl , fr, t1[(ts < t1 < te) ∧ type(o, Person) ∧ p_feet(o, ( fl , fr)) ∧
onGround( fr)@[ts,te] ∧ onGround( fl)@ts ∧
Occurs(MoveUp[P]( fl), [ts, t1]) ∧ Occurs(MoveDown[P]( fl), [t1, te]) ∧
Occurs(MoveAhead[P]( fl), [ts, te]) ∧ onGround( fl)@te ] (5.12)
Similarly, the predicate footstepAheadR defines the same movement
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with the left foot on the ground and the right foot moving ahead:
footstepAheadR[P](o)@[ts,te] ≡
∃ fl , fr, t1[(ts < t1 < te) ∧ type(o, Person) ∧ p_feet(o, ( fl , fr)) ∧
onGround( fl)@[ts,te] ∧ onGround( fr)@ts ∧
Occurs(MoveUp[P]( fr), [ts, t1]) ∧ Occurs(MoveDown[P]( fr), [t1, te]) ∧
Occurs(MoveAhead[P]( fr), [ts, te]) ∧ onGround( fr)@te ] (5.13)
The predicate footstepAhead generalises the previous two and holds
on [ts, te] if any of footstepAheadL or footstepAheadR hold on the same
interval. It also specifies that the speed of o’s motion is walkPace:
footstepAhead[P](o)@[ts,te] ≡
∃ t1[ts < t1 < te ∧ speed[P](o, walkPace)@[ts,te] ∧
[ [footstepAheadL[P](o)@[ts,t1] ∧ footstepAheadR[P](o)@[t1,te]]
∨
[footstepAheadR[P](o)@[ts,t1] ∧ footstepAheadL[P](o)@[t1,te]] ]] (5.14)
It is now possible to define the occurrence of Walk(o) over [ts, te] by
expressing that there exists a set of ordered, adjacent and consecutive time
intervals (I,<) such that ts and te correspond respectively to the start
of the first interval and the end of the last interval, and the predicate
footstepAhead holds on each interval i ∈ I:
Occurs(Walk[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ type(o, Person) ∧
∃ (I,<) ∃ Is, Ie ∈ I [begin(Is, ts) ∧ end(Ie, te) ∧
∀ i ∈ I − {Is, Ie} [Is < i < Ie] ∧ ∀ i ∈ I [footstepAhead[P](o)@i] ∧
∀ i1, i2 ∈ I[(i1 < i2 ∧ ¬∃ i′ ∈ I [i1 < i′ < i2])→
(end(i1, te1) ∧ begin(i2, ts2) ∧ te1 = ts2)]] (5.15)
5.1.3 Run
Similarly to Walk, the verb Run can also be characterised as a specification
of Move which describes the fast motion of human beings. The OED de-
scribes it as “to go with quick steps on alternate feet, never having both
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feet on the ground at the same time; to make one’s way or cover the ground
in this manner” [2].
Given object o ∈ O of type person the fluent runstepAhead defined
below holds over the interval [ts, te] if o’s feet are moving:
runstepAhead[P](o)@[ts,te] ≡ ∃ fl , fr, t1, t2[(ts < t1 < t2 < te) ∧
type(o, Person) ∧ p_feet(o, ( fl , fr)) ∧ onGround( fr)@[ts,t1] ∧
MoveUp[P]( fl)@[ts,t1] ∧MoveDown[P]( fl)@[t1,t2] ∧
MoveAhead[P]( fl)@[ts,t2] ∧ onGround( fl)@[t2,te] ∧MoveUp[P]( fr)@[t1,t2] ∧
MoveDown[P]( fr)@[t2,te] ∧MoveAhead[P]( fr)@[t1,te]] ∧
speed[P](o, runPace)@[ts,te] (5.16)
It is now possible to define an occurrence of the event Run over interval
[ts, te] as a periodical occurrence of runstepAhead:
Occurs(Run[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ type(o, Person) ∧
∃ (I,<) ∃ Is, Ie ∈ I [begin(Is, ts) ∧ end(Ie, te) ∧
∀ i ∈ I − {Is, Ie} [Is < i < Ie] ∧ ∀ i ∈ I [runstepAhead[P](o)@i] ∧
∀ i1, i2 ∈ I[(i1 < i2 ∧ ¬∃ i′ ∈ I [i1 < i′ < i2])→
(end(i1, te1) ∧ begin(i2, ts2) ∧ te1 = ts2)]] (5.17)
So far the definitions of the events Walk and Run are rather similar,
their most prominent differentiation is the specification that the speed of
object o is walk_pace for Walk and run_pace for Run. More detailed char-
acterisations of the two verbs may be obtained by analysing the posture
of the human body and the way legs, knees and feet bend and lift. Typ-
ically, a walking person’s legs tend to be straight or slightly bent around
the knee, with the thigh directed towards the ground. This would suggest
that the angle between thigh and leg behind the knee is flat or slightly
narrower than flat, and the angle between the thigh and a line perpendic-
ular to the ground through the body would be smaller than 45°, with little
variation during the course of the walk. On the other hand, a running
person’s thighs, legs and knees show a more articulated positioning, the
angle between thigh and leg behind the knee can get narrower during the
run whilst the angle between the thigh and the body’s vertical line widens
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as the thigh projects itself forward.
5.1.4 Go
The verb Go also suggests a generic motion in space and it is very close to
Move. However, common usages of the verb seem to suggest some form
of directionality or intentionality to such motion, for example a direction
or position towards which the motion tends. The OED in fact lists three
main meanings:
1. motion irrespective of the point of departure or destination,
2. motion from a place (often the speaker’s position or “the point at
which he mentally places himself”)
3. motion towards a destination or direction (away from the speaker).
The meanings outlined above would suggest that one of the key features
peculiar to Go is the consistency of an object’s movement along a particular
direction, if not even towards a specific destination.
The meaning corresponding to the first item on the list (motion irre-
spective of point of departure or destination) is formalised below with
the event occurrence Go1. Given object o ∈ O, the event Go1(o) occurs
over the interval [ts, te] if o is moving and the direction of such movement
is constant throughout the interval. This latter aspect is what ultimately
differentiates an occurence of Go from an occurrence of the simpler verb
Move. The direction of movement could be expressed by stating that the
relative orientation of object o does not change through the interval.
Occurs(Go1[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧ ∃ ros relOrientation(o, ros)@ts ∧
∀ t [ts < t 6 te → ∃ rot (relOrientation(o, rot)@t ∧ ros = rot)] (5.18)
The second and third meanings previously listed have different for-
malisations according to whether the point of departure or destination is
explicitly or implicitly stated, a fact that has a direct effect on the arity of
the event predicate. The predicates Go2(o1, o2) and Go3(o1, o2) have both
arity 2 with o2 being the explicit object from which o1 is respectively mov-
ing towards or away from (fluents moveTowards and MoveAwayFrom are
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introduced in Sec. 5.2.1):
Occurs(Go2[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Move[P](o1), [ts, te]) ∧ Occurs(MoveAwayFrom(o1, o2), [ts, te])
(5.19)
Occurs(Go3[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Move[P](o1), [ts, te]) ∧moveTowards(o1, o2)@[ts,te] (5.20)
Given the above definitions for Go2 and Go3 with arity 2 it is possible to
formalise occurrences of the same predicates with arity 1. In this instance
o2 is assumed to exist as o′:
Occurs(Go2[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ o′ [Occurs(Go2[P](o, o′), [ts, te]] (5.21)
Occurs(Go3[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ o′ [Occurs(Go3[P](o, o′), [ts, te]] (5.22)
In addition to the definitions of Go2 and Go3 above, it is possible to
refer to the fact that the motion of o1 may be directed towards or away
from the position of the observer. Identifying such a position is heavily
context-dependent; within the application domain it would seem reason-
able to treat the observer as a virtual object positioned at the location of
the camera filming the scene. The predicates Gos2 and Go
s
3 formalise the
motion of o respectively from or towards the position of such observer:
Occurs(Gos2[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
∃ os[observer(os)@ts ∧ Occurs(Go2[P](o, os), [ts, te])] (5.23)
Occurs(Gos3[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
∃ os[observer(os)@ts ∧ Occurs(Go3[P](o, os), [ts, te])] (5.24)
The meanings formalised by the definitions of meanings Go1, Go2 and
Go3 (and relative sub-characterisations) all contribute to the definition of
the generic event predicate Go, which holds over an interval if any of the
events corresponding to either sub-meaning occur over the same interval:
Occurs(Go[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ Occurs(Go1[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨
Occurs(Gos2[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨ Occurs(Gos3[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨
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Occurs(Go2[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨ Occurs(Go3[P](o), [ts, te])∨ (5.25)
5.1.5 Stop
This verb can be used transitively or intransitively. The general meaning
of the intransitive form is “to come to a stand, cease to move or act”,
in particular “to cease from onward movement, to come to a stand or
position of rest” [2], and such action can be said of people or inanimate
things. The transitive form is associated with several meanings of which
the most relevant to the application domain is “to bring to a stand”, in
particular “to arrest the onward movement of a person/thing; to bring to
a stand or state of rest”.
The intransitive form is the most relevant to the domain, and its for-
malisation appears relatively straightforward to formalise, as it involves
identifying the fact that a particular object is ceasing its motion. The tran-
sitive form instead is more vague and complex, as it generally involves
identifying the different ways in which an object may be causing the ces-
sation of another object’s motion. For this reason this section is focused
on the intransitive form.
Nevertheless, whilst the fact that an object is ceasing motion may be
objectively identifiable, its temporal extension is vague. Opinions may
range from an interpretation where Stop is a punctual event happening
in the instant at which the object stops moving to interpretations where
the event spans an interval of variable length ending at such instant. The
issue is individuating a criterion that establishes where the interval be-
gins. In other words, it seems relatively objective to say that an object
has stopped; identifying when the object began stopping is not. A very
un-sophisticated criterion would formalise Stop as a fixed-duration event
(e.g. n seconds before the cessation of movement), more elaborate ones
would examine the object’s motion pattern (e.g. sharp monotonic decel-
eration, speed lower than a particular threshold or the object reaching a
particular position). Such criteria are very likely to depend on the type of
object being considered, for example the event “a car stopping” may begin
when its brake lights are activated, or “a person stopping” may begin on
his/her last footstep. However, there is plenty of scope for some objects
with random motion patterns to escape most of these criteria, for example
97
Chapter 5. Verb Models
a very fast animal jumping from one place to another.
Another aspect to consider is the fact that there may be object motion
patterns that exhibit short intervals of idleness between longer intervals
of movement, and it is essentially a matter of granularity to consider such
short intervals as occurrences of Stop or rather consider Stop to occur only
when the encompassing motion pattern actually ceases. For example, let
us consider a child playing on a swing, where the general pattern is for
the child and the swing to oscillate back and forth between two positions.
One could observe that between oscillations there is a very short interval in
which the objects appear not to move. A very fine-grained interpretation
of the meaning of Stop would assert that the event occurs over such short
intervals, a coarse-grained interpretation may assert that the event begins
when oscillations start covering a shorter distance (or even just on the last
oscillation, for an even more coarse-grained interpretation) and ends when
the swing and child are perpendicular to the ground. Another example is
given by a person transporting objects from one location to another with
short rests in between. A fine-grained view would have Stop occurring
just before each rest, whilst a coarse-grained view would have the event
occur only just before the last shuttle.
Capturing the peculiarities outlined so far in a logic formalisation, and
many others which may be relevant in specific situations, is a challenging
task. Below is a suggestion which is essentially based on the criterion
of monotonic deceleration, with two refinements concerning vehicles and
the stopping or walking motions of persons, and also provides a threshold
relevant to the granularity aspect outlined in the previous paragraph.
Given object o ∈ O, the event Stop occurs over the interval [ts, te] if o is
moving over [ts, te], stopping holds on [ts, te] and the object is idle (i.e. not
moving) for an interval starting at te and with a minimum length specified
by precisification threshold Tstopidle .
Occurs(Stop[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ (Tstopidle , ti) ∈ P ∃ t2 [te < t2 ∧
dur([te, t2]) > ti ∧ Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧
¬Occurs(Move[P](o), [te, t2]) ∧ stopping[P](o)@[ts,te]] (5.26)
Threshold Tstopidle represents a simple solution for the granularity problem
for periodical or oscillating motions, and provides a mechanism to allow
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for fine- or coarse-grained interpretations, respectively corresponding to
lower and higher values for the threshold.
The purpose of predicate stopping is to formalise the actual possible
ways in which an object may stop its motion. The following definition
refers to two specialised predicates for vehicle and persons and the generic
predicate monoDecel:
stopping[P](o)@t ≡
[type(o,Vehicle) ∧ stoppingVehicle(o)@t] ∨
[type(o, Person) ∧ stoppingPerson[P](o)@t] ∨monoDecel[P](o)@t (5.27)
The predicate stoppingVehicle holds at time t if there is an instant t1
prior to t, the vehicle brake lights are lit and the vehicle is also monotoni-
cally decelerating over the interval [t1, t]:
stoppingVehicle(o)@t ≡
∃ t1 [t1 < t ∧ vehicleBrakesOn(o)@[t1,t] ∧monoDecel[P](o)@[t1,t]] (5.28)
The above predicate is not concerned about whether the vehicle will
actually stop at some instant following t. In fact, it seems plausible to
affirm that a vehicle is stopping over a particular interval only because it
looks like it is stopping (i.e. slowing down and with its brakes lights on)
and not because of a firm belief that it will eventually stop.
The predicate stoppingPerson distinguishes between the fact that per-
son o may be walking or running in the interval [t1, t2] surrounding t. The
predicate holds at t if the walking or running step performed at [t1, t2] is
not followed by further steps for an interval whose minimum length is
specified by Tstopidle :
stoppingPerson[P](o)@t ≡ ∃ (Tstopidle , i) ∈ P ∃ t1, t2, t3
[(t1 < t < t2 ∧ footstepAhead[P](o)@[t1,t2]) ∧
(t2 < t3 ∧ dur([t2, t3]) > i ∧ ¬footstep_ahead[P](o)@[t2,t3]) ∨
(t1 < t < t2 ∧ runstepAhead[P](o)@[t1,t2]) ∧
(t2 < t3 ∧ dur([t2, t3]) > i ∧ ¬runstepAhead[P](o)@[t2,t3])] (5.29)
The predicate monoDecel holds true if a moving object o is monoton-
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ically decelerating. The following definition holds at time t if there is a
sufficiently large interval [t1, t2] around t (whose width is precisified by
threshold Tmd) such that the speed of o is monotonically decreasing at
every point.
monoDecel[P](o)@t ≡ ∃ t1, t2∃ (Tmd, tmd) ∈ P [t2 − t1 > tmd ∧ t1 < t < t2 ∧
∀ t′, t′′[t1 < t′ < t′′ < t2 ∧ (speed(o, s′)@t′ ∧ speed(o, s′′)@t′′ → s′′ < s′)]]
(5.30)
5.2 Proximity
This section formalises motion verbs which refer to the concept of proxim-
ity or nearness of one object to another object or position: Approach, Pass,
Arrive, Leave, Enter and Exit. Some of these verbs, particularly Enter and
Exit, allow a modelling through notions of topology.
One of the common issues across most verbs in this section is tempo-
ral extension, a problem already encountered in the formalisation of Stop
(see Sec. 5.1.5). In fact, drafting a formal model for these verbs involves
establishing the temporal interval over which such events occur. This pro-
cess is hampered by the ambiguity over the precise instant at which an
event starts or ends. It appears that the primary source of this ambigu-
ity stems from the notion of proximity between two objects which most
of these verbs refer to. Indeed, this is an intrinsecally vague concept, as
there are many criteria that can be employed to define the time instants
over which a predicate such as “a is near b” holds. This is particularly
true for the verbs Enter, Exit, Arrive and Leave; an approach based on the
individuation of object proximity boundaries has been followed.
5.2.1 Approach
The dictionary lists two main forms for the verb: an intransitive one mean-
ing “to come nearer [. . . ] in space” and a transitive one meaning “to come
near to”[2]. Most formalisations of this latter meaning are likely to analyse
the motion of subject and object in order to determine whether the subject
is getting closer to the object. Below, this transitive meaning is discussed
and Approach is formalised with arity 2. The intransitive meaning is con-
sidered as a specialised case of the transitive meaning at the end of this
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Figure 5.1: Verb Approach – Objects’ positions
section.
Let us consider two objects o1, o2 ∈ O moving in space over the interval
[ts, te] ∈ I . Fig. 5.1 shows some possible positions for o1 and o2 at ts and
te. An average observer would most likely assert the following:
• In Fig. 5.1(a), o1 is approaching o2, but o2 is not approaching o1 as o2
is moving in the opposite direction;
• In Fig. 5.1(b), despite o1 moving towards o2, o1 is not approaching o2
as their distance does not decrease;
• In Fig. 5.1(c), o1 is approaching o2 and o2 is approaching o1 as they
are both actively moving towards each other, and their distance de-
creases as well;
• In Fig. 5.1(d), clearly neither o1 is approaching o2 nor o2 is approach-
ing o1 as they are heading towards opposite directions.
This is a simplification of the relative movement for two generic objects in
space and does not take into account futher semantic properties that may
be relevant.
Given the observations above about objects o1, o2 ∈ O, the fact that o1 is
approaching o2 can be defined by specifying that o1 has to be both getting
closer and moving towards o2.
The fluent getCloserTo holds at time point t if and only if the distance
between two objects o1, o2 ∈ O over an interval surrounding t monotoni-
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cally decreases :
getCloserTo(o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ ts, te
[
(ts < t < te) ∧ ∀ t′, t′′
[
(ts ≤ t′ < t′′ ≤ te)→ ∃ ds, de[
distance((o1, o2), ds)@t′ ∧ distance((o1, o2), de)@t′′ ∧ de < ds
] ] ]
(5.31)
The fluent moveTowards holds at time point t if and only if the dis-
tance between o1 and the start point of o2 monotonically decreases over an
interval surrounding t, i.e. o1 is heading in the direction of o2 irrespective
of o2’s movements:
moveTowards(o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ ts, te, p2s
[
(ts < t < te) ∧ position(o2, p2s))@ts ∧
∀ t′, t′′[(ts ≤ t′ < t′′ ≤ te)→ ∃ ds, de, p1s, p1e[
position(o1, p1s)@t′ ∧ position(o1, p1e)@t′′ ∧ distance((p1s, p2s), ds) ∧
distance((p1e, p2s), de) ∧ ds > de
] ]]
(5.32)
It is now possible to define the event Approach:
Occurs(Approach(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
getCloserTo(o1, o2)@ts,te ∧moveTowards(o1, o2)@ts,te ] (5.33)
The definitions above have been implemented in the ontology with the
introduction of precisification thresholds in Sec. 6.2.2.
The event MoveAwayFrom(o1, o2), expressing the occurrence of an event
opposite in meaning to Approach and referred to by some verb definitions
in the rest of this chapter, can be defined in a similar fashion by reversing
the the definitions above and expressing that the distance between o1 and
o2 ought to increase over the temporal intervals.
The intransitive meaning of Approach refers to the the subject’s act of
“coming nearer”. Such a meaning may not necessarily refer to an expl-
cit reference object that the subject is moving towards or getting closer
to. However, a similarity with the verb Go (discussed in Sec. 5.1.4) can
be drawn; the intransitive meanings of Go often refer to the observer’s
position. A human observer need not actually exist, this could be a vir-
tual entity placed at the position where a human observer would be most
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likely to be located (in a video scene this often corresponds to the camera
location). For this reason, below is a formalisation of Approach with arity
1 as a particular case of the transitive form, where the implicit object refers
to the observer’s position:
Occurs(Approach(o), [ts, te]) ≡
∃ os[observer(os)@ts ∧ Occurs(Approach(o, os), [ts, te]] (5.34)
The above definitions refer to the rather simple concepts of distance
and position. Depending on the data grounding the ontology, one could
employ a finer characterisation taking into account, for example, the type
of objects involved, the terrain surrounding them, the different paths one
object could take, the presence of constraints blocking a particular path,
the effort required for each path etc.
5.2.2 Pass
The dictionary lists several meanings for the verb Pass, as it can be used in
a variety of contexts and applied to different types of objects in a number
of figurative ways, most of which loosely refer to an object’s transition
from a state to another. Several meanings do not refer directly to an act of
motion; for the ones that do Pass “differs from Move” as it “expresses the
effect [of the act of motion] rather than the cause” [2].
This section focuses on the meanings of the verb most closely related
to acts of motion. Specifically, two forms can be identified [2]:
1. transitive, meaning “to go by or move past [. . . ]; to go beyond (a
point or place) [. . . ]; to outrun or outdistance; (of a vehicle or its
driver) to drive past, overtake; to get through, across, or over”.
2. intransitive, meaning “to proceed, move forward, depart; to move
along under a force; to go by or past”.
There is also another motion-related meaning commonly used in natural
language, which is “to cause to go from one person to another; to hand
over, transfer”. This particular meaning is very close to the meaning of
Give and Hand, hence it is not discussed here.
In the application context, the most common example of the transitive
form of Pass(o1, o2) is given by an object o1 which moves towards an object
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o2 (not necessarily static) and goes beyond it, concept itself open to several
interpretations. A reasonable simple formalisation would specify that o1
is approaching o2 over an interval [t1, t] and moving away from o2 over the
adjacent interval [t, t2]. It would result that, at instant t, o1 is either at the
location of o2 or at the point where the distance between o1 and o2 over
interval [t1, t2] is minimum.
There are two main sources of ambiguity in the the formalisation of
Pass outlined above, namely temporal extension and directionality. The
temporal extension issue is a recurring theme of similar almost-punctual
events (such as Stop, see Sec 5.1.5), and has to do with the non-trivial task
of establishing when the event Pass(o1, o2) starts and ends. Essentially, the
interval [t1, t2] needs to be bounded such that the event occurs in the in-
stants immediately preceding and following the instant t identified in the
previous paragraph. For the verb Stop the monotonic deceleration crite-
rion has been employed; however, for the verb Pass, it appears more chal-
lenging to identify a similar meaningful, simple and measurable criterion.
One could argue that Pass(o1, o2) starts when o1 is near o2 and ends when
o1 is not near o2, thus refocusing the ambiguity on the formalisation of near.
Resolving this is very complex due to deep ambiguity, as there are many
observable properties concurring to establishing whether two objects are
near each other (distance, objects’ size, spatial extension. . . ) and most of
these properties generate instances of sorites vagueness (see Sec. 3.1). A
simple formalisation would formalise the predicate with precisification P
as nearPosition[P](o1, o2), holding when the linear distance between o1 and
o2 is below a threshold specified by P, as in Eq. 4.25 on page 79.
Such a definition of nearPosition presents several limitations as it does
not take contextual information into account, most importantly the type
of o1 and o2 and their size. The mode of travel is also relevant, as further
details such as transport links and terrain type may influence the degree
of nearness. However, the disambiguation of the sorites vagueness associ-
ated with the linear distance observable property in nearPosition by means
of a fixed threshold seems appropriate within the formalisation of Pass,
as it serves the purpose of delimiting its applicability boundary. The for-
malisation of Pass proposed below simplifies this issue by requiring that
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o1 has to reach the position of o2 before moving forward.
Occurs(Pass[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ t1, t2, t3, t4 [t1 < ts < t2 6 t3 < te < t4 ∧
Occurs(Approach(o1, o2), [t1, t2]) ∧ ¬nearPosition[P](o1, o2)@[t1,ts] ∧
nearPosition[P](o1, o2)@[ts,te] ∧ samePosition(o1, o2)@[t2,t3] ∧
Occurs(MoveAwayFrom(o1, o2), [t3, t4]) ∧ ¬nearPosition[P](o1, o2)@[te,t4]]
(5.35)
The directionality issue is related to the fact that most instances of
Pass(o1, o2) are likely to exhibit a motion pattern for o1 which is consistenly
directed towards a particular direction or path. The definition above, for
example, would hold if o1 were to move towards o2 till very near it but
without reaching its position, and then move away from o2 towards the
way it came from. Such an occurrence would be unlikely to be described as
an occurrence of Pass by the average observer. In other words, it has to be
that either o1 keeps moving along the same direction it approached o2, or
it follows a particular path on which o2 is situated. In practice, extending
definition (5.35) to formalise this aspect is difficult, as there may be many
admissible changes in direction over the course of o1’s motion which may
incorporate appropriate occurrences of Pass. For example if o1 is a train
and o2 a station on the line positioned on a sharp bend, o1’s direction
would change when passing o2, but this is appropriate and expected given
the particular path constraining o1’s motion.
The intransitive meaning of Pass(o) refers to the act of object o appear-
ing and moving through the scene under observation. A manifestation
of this motion over interval [ts, te] would have o enter the field of view at
ts, move forward with a consistent direction through the interval and exit
the field of view at te. The general assumption is that occurrences where
o does not enter and exit the field of view at the interval boundaries, or
where o does not move forward consistently (i.e. pauses or changes in
direction) would be unlikely to be described by Pass(o).
The previous example introduces the concept of a ‘field of view’ that
can be shaped in several ways. For instance, if the observed situation is
filmed by a fixed camera, the field of view may be defined as a rectangle
corresponding to the scene captured by the camera. More complex for-
malisations may define the field of view more precisely as the focal point
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of the scene, i.e. the area of the scene where an observer would be likely
to focus his/her attention. This can be determined by analysing object’s
positions and where most of the activity is taking place. In relation to the
meaning of Pass(o), a too specific formalisation may not be appropriate, as
it is imaginable that a situation where o enters, moves along and exits the
scene away from where most of the activity is taking place would still be
classified as an occurrence of Pass(o). The following definition formalises
such sense of Pass:
Occurs(Pass[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ t1, t2 [t1 < ts ∧ te < t2 ∧
¬inViewField(o)@[t1,ts] ∧ inViewField(o)@[ts,te] ∧
Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧ ¬inViewField(o)@[te,t2] (5.36)
The definition above does not specify the characteristics of o’s motion
while it is in the field of view. This is because there are many possible
motions exhibiting the consistency one would expect to see during an oc-
curence of Pass (for example o may move in a straight line, or on a big
loop which would take it out of the field of view on the direction it came
from), hence it is left unspecified at this stage.
5.2.3 Arrive
The dictionary lists several meanings for the verb Arrive, the most common
use within the application domain is generally for an object “to come to
the end of a journey, to a destination, or to some definite place; to come
upon the scene, make one’s appearance” [2].
This meaning suggests a directional motion, however the specific man-
ner of motion is not specified but is often dependent on the type of objects
involved [69]. For example, if object o is moving along a known path, one
could state that o has arrived when its motion has terminated at the end of
such path in the direction o has been travelling from. If o is an object of
type person, it is likely that o’s motion is an occurrence of verbs Walk or
Run, even though there are instances where o is transported on a vehicle
(car, train. . . ), in which case its motion would be described by the vehicle’s
motion.
The verb Arrive is intransitive, but often an indirect object or location
specifies the destination or place where motion terminates. An occurrence
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b
o d
Figure 5.2: Verb Arrive
of the verb where the indirect object d is specified, such as ‘the train ar-
rived at the station’ would be formalised with arity 2, as in Arrive(o, d). An-
other use of Arrive is not followed by an indirect object, such as ‘John has
arrived’, which would be formalised with arity 1, as in Arrive(o). How-
ever, an indirect object is almost always implicit and can be determined
by analysing contextual information. For example, John may have been
travelling on a particular route and come to its (known) terminus, or the
utterance may refer to a meeting and the fact that John has reached the
meeting location.
The verb shares the same issue of temporal extension already discussed
in the formalisation of Stop (Sec. 5.1.5) and Pass (Sec. 5.2.2), namely the
fact that events of this kind are punctual or near-punctual events, i.e. their
occurrences generally span a small temporal interval whose duration and
precise individuation is questionable. One could argue that, in general,
an occurrence of Arrive(o, d) starts when o is in the vicinity of d and ends
when o is at d’s position. In order to establish whether o is in the vicinity
of d, one could assume that there exists a spatial area surrounding d which
defines its proximity boundary; the event Arrive(o, d) would start when o
enters such area. For example, let us consider a train o arriving at a station
d, illustrated in Fig. 5.2. Most formalisations would agree on the fact
that the interval over which the event Arrive(o, d) occurs would terminate
on the instant the train stops at the station’s platform. A possibility to
establish the starting instant of the interval would be to draw a spatial
area constituting the proximity boundary around d and affirm that the
event Arrive(o, d) starts when the train enters such area (this is illustrated
in Fig. 5.2 by the dashed rectangle b).
A predicate expressing this is nearBoundary(d, b)@t, which holds if and
only if b is an instance of Area representing the proximity boundary of
object d at time t. There are many criteria and observable properties lead-
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ing to the demarcation of proximity boundaries for spatial objects, hence
such a concept is necessarily vague. In general, boundaries for concrete
and atomic objects with a precise spatial extension (e.g. people, vehicles,
small items) are less ambiguous than boundaries for abstract, complex
or extended objects (e.g. cities, stations, mountains). In the former kind
of objects, their spatial extension is often precisely known, and a simple
proximity boundary may include the region within a fixed distance d from
such spatial extension. The latter kind of objects, instead, have an inde-
terminate spatial extension which may vary according to different criteria
appropriate within the utterance context. For example, a city within a
large conurbation may have a precise boundary established by law (de iure
boundary, e.g. the local authority), nevertheless people in the conurbation
may refer to buildings and inhabitants in surrounding towns as being in
the city even if, legally, they are not (de facto boundary, not unique and
generally not precisely determined). In the train and station example, one
may consider the de iure boundary assigned to the railway station by the
land register, but other de facto boundaries may exist. For example one
could consider the line past which a train approaching the station can be
seen from the platform, and establishing such line is subject to a molti-
tude of criteria (there may be many platforms, different fields and angles
of view, etc.). Furthermore, other criteria for the proximity boundary may
be appropriate when considering different contexts, e.g. a person arriving
at a station, where one may choose to draw such boundary around the
station entrance.
It is likely that an ontology will incorporate many formalisations of
nearBoundary, each of them specialised to define the proximity boundary
of a particular type of object according to its specifities, as briefly demon-
strated in the examples above. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this work,
it is imaginable to formalise a very general and still usable definition of
the concept which establishes the boundary b as a crisp area around the
position of object o, according to the precisification threshold Tb:
nearBoundary[P](d, b)@t ≡
∃ (Tb, tb) ∈ P, b ∈ Area, pd ∈ Point, δ [position(d, pd)@t ∧
∀ p ∈ Point[pointInArea(p, b)→ distance((p, pd), δ) ∧ δ 6 tb] (5.37)
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The principles outlined above can be applied in the following formali-
sation of the concept Arrive(o, d), occurring when object o arrives at desti-
nation d (which can be another object or a spatial location):
Occurs(Arrive[P](o, d), [ts, te]) ≡
∃t1, t2, t3 ∈ T , b ∈ Area[t1 < ts < t2 6 t3 < te ∧
nearBoundary[P](d, b)@[t1,te] ∧moveTowards(o, b)@[t1,ts] ∧
Occurs(Enter(o, b), [ts, t2]) ∧ Occurs(Stop[P](o), [t3, te])] (5.38)
The above definition states that the event Arrive(o, d) holds over inter-
val [ts, te] if o is moving towards o’s boundary b in the preceeding interval
[t1, ts], o is entering boundary b over subinterval [ts, t2] (the verb Enter is
defined in Sec. 5.2.5) and stops at the end of the interval over [t3, te].
As discussed earlier in this section, an occurrence of Arrive with arity
1, i.e. not followed by the indirect object specifying the destination of mo-
tion, such as in “John has arrived”, may refer to an implicit indirect object
that can be determined by analysing the context in which the occurrence
takes place. This leads to the formalisation of Arrive(o), which occurs over
interval [ts, te] if there exists an object d constituting the destination for an
occurrence of Arrive(o, d) over the same interval:
Occurs(Arrive1[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ d ∈ O[Occurs(Arrive[P](o, d), [ts, te])
(5.39)
The above definition could be refined by individuating a link between d
and the route or path followed by object o.
However, at the beginning of this section a slightly particular sub-
meaning of Arrive has been listed: “to come upon the scene, make one’s
appearance”. This meaning also leads to a formalisation of Arrive(o) with
arity 1, which mirrors the formalisation of Pass(o) in eq. 5.36, except for
the fact that here o stops once it has entered the scene:
Occurs(Arrive2[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ t1, t2 [t1 < ts < t2 < te ∧
¬inViewField(o)@[t1,ts] ∧ InViewField(o)@[ts,te] ∧
Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧ Occurs(Stop[P](o), [t2, te]) (5.40)
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A general formalisation for Arrive(o) can then be defined as the dis-
junction of the two variants defined above:
Occurs(Arrive[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Arrive1[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨ Occurs(Arrive2[P](o), [ts, te]) (5.41)
5.2.4 Leave
Given the meanings listed by the dictionary, the most relevant to the ap-
plication domain is “To go away from, quit (a place, person or thing)”[2].
There is also a meaning close to this, which is “to deviate from (a line of
road, etc.)”, however the discussion is not concerned with this particular
sub-meaning. In this sense, the verb Leave can be framed as the opposite
of Arrive; it follows that most of the considerations on the pecularities of
Arrive exposed in the previous section apply to Leave as well. The main
difference between the two is that whilst Arrive is intransitive, with an op-
tional indirect object specifying the place the subject is arriving at, Leave
is transitive, with the optional direct object specifying the place the subject
is departing from.
The problem of establishing a duration for an occurrence of Leave can
be tackled in the same way, that is by establishing a proximity boundary
around the object or area the subject is departing from. Given objects
o, s ∈ O, the following definition formalises an occurrence of Leave(o, s)
over the interval [ts, te] by stating that o leaves object s if o is at the position
of s at instant ts, moves away from s over an interval extending beyond te
and exits the proximity boundary of s at the end of [ts, te] (the verb Exit is
defined in Sec. 5.2.6):
Occurs(Leave[P](o, s), [ts, te]) ≡
∃ t1, t2 ∈ T , b ∈ Area[ts < t1 < te < t2 ∧ nearBoundary[P](s, b)@[ts,te] ∧
samePosition(o, s)@ts ∧ Occurs(MoveAwayFrom(o, s), [ts, t2]) ∧
Occurs(Exit(o, b), [t1, te])] (5.42)
As for Arrive, the verb Leave may not necessarily be followed by a
direct object, as in the example ‘John left’. Such object is often implicit and
can be determined by analysing the context surrounding the occurrence
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of Leave, which may contain information about the fact that John is at a
particular place, or is supposed to start travelling along a definite route.
This can be formalised in the definition of Leave(o) with arity 1, which
occurs over interval [ts, te] if there exists an object s participating in an
occurrence of Leave(o, s) over the same interval:
Occurs(Leave1[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ s ∈ O[Occurs(Leave[P](o, s), [ts, te])
(5.43)
Given the fact that so far Leave has been considered as being the op-
posite of Arrive, it is conceivable that an occurrence of Leave with an un-
specified direct object could also refer to the subject’s departure or disap-
pearance from the scene, hence representing the opposite of the meaning
of Arrive2(o) formalised in eq. 5.40. The following definition formalises an
occurrence of Leave2(o) over interval [ts, te], by stating that o is within the
field of view and moves over interval [ts, te] and disappears from the field
of view in an interval following te:
Occurs(Leave2[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
∃ t1 [te < t1 ∧ inViewField(o)@[ts,te] ∧
Occurs(Move[P](o), [ts, te]) ∧ ¬inViewField(o)@[te,t1] (5.44)
A general formalisation for Leave(o) can then be defined as the dis-
junction of the two variants defined above:
Occurs(Leave[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Leave1[P](o), [ts, te]) ∨ Occurs(Leave2[P](o), [ts, te]) (5.45)
5.2.5 Enter
Among the meanings listed by the dictionary, the one that seems most
appropriate to the motion verbs domain is the transitive form of Enter
with the sense of “to go or come into (a closed space); to go within the
bounds of”[2].
It is possible to distinguish between two broad categories of objects or
areas that one can enter: open and closed spaces.
In general, open spaces are areas delimited by vague or crisp bound-
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aries which, most of the times, pose no particular constraints on the way in
which one can enter the area. For example, an area delimited by a vague
bondary such as a town centre can be accessed in a multitude of ways: a
pedestrian may be walking and step into the area over the course of his
walking motion, or a vehicle may be travelling on a road that crosses the
area. Accessibility constraints may still arise given the context and type
of objects involved (e.g. a vehicle generally is constrained to move along
roads, and only certain roads enter the town centre), but they are not im-
posed by the area itself.
On the other hand, most closed spaces carry an accessibility specifica-
tion of the objects that can enter such space and the ways in which they
are allowed to do so. For example, a house is normally entered only by
people, and they must do so through a door or some other designated
passage. There are occasions in which these constraints are violated, such
as ‘the lorry entered (into) the house kitchen’ in the context of an acci-
dent, or ‘Santa Claus entered through the chimney’, but these uses are less
frequent and imply some sense of anormality, in respect to the fact that
expected conventions have not been followed. Modelling an occurrence
of Enter in the context of a closed space carries additional steps, which
involve the individuation of such accessibility constraints and the verifica-
tion of whether they are met by the subject performing the action.
The distinction between the two modalities an object o1 can enter the
space of another object o2 is formalised in the following definition of Enter,
where if o2 is a closed space then o1 has to enter o2 through a sub-part s2
as specified by the relation accessible:
Occurs(Enter(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
[spaceType(o2, closed) ∧ ∃s2 ∈ ConcreteObject[partOf(o2, s2) ∧
accessible(o2, s2) ∧ Occurs(Enterarea(o1, s2), [ts, te])]] ∨
[spaceType(o2, open) ∧ Occurs(Enterarea(o1, o2), [ts, te])] (5.46)
The definition above introduces the sub-concept Enterarea, which repre-
sents the actual motion event that occurs when an object o1 enters the space
of another object o2. The verb Enter, and particularly this sub-concept of
the verb, suffers from the issue of temporal extension common across this
section. In order to tackle the problem, a formalisation of Enterarea based
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on the changes in the topological relations between objects is proposed;
this results in the decomposition of the event occurrence into stages, lead-
ing to the identification of start and end instants. The topological relations
between objects are introduced in Sec. 4.6 and are based on the RCC cal-
culus. Given objects o1 and o2 ∈ O, an event Enterarea(o1, o2) occurs over
[ts, te] if objects o1 and o2 are disconnected prior to ts, externally connected
in the first part of [ts, te], partially overlapping in the final part of [ts, te]
and o1 is a tangential proper part of o2 following te:
Occurs(Enterarea(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
∃t1, t2, t3 [t1 < ts < t2 < te < t3 ∧ rcc_DC(o1, o2)@[t1,ts] ∧
rcc_EC(o1, o2)@[ts,t2] ∧ rcc_PO(o1, o2)@[t2,te] ∧ rcc_TPP(o1, o2)@[te,t3]] (5.47)
The particular choice of topological relations in the definition above
implies the assumption that the space occupied by o2 is capable of fully
containing o1 by the time an occurrence of Enterarea(o1, o2) terminates. This
appears to be a reasonable assumption given that when an object enters
a space, a speaker generally means that the object will ultimately be fully
contained in such space. However, there may be instances where this is
not necessarily the case and for which the definition above is likely to fail.
The definitions above constitute an over-simplification of the complex-
ity of the verb Enter, particularly regarding the ways an object o1 may enter
a closed space o2. For instance, a house may be entered through a door
which has to be unlocked and opened with a set of defined motions, for
example by pushing down a handle and pressing against the frame, before
the subject is actually able to enter the interior of the area occupied by the
house. It is easy to see that there is a multitude of different kinds of closed
spaces, each with its on accessibility peculiarities. The approach followed
above assumes that, if o2 is a closed space, then it can be accessed by one
of its sub-parts s2 which o1 can enter as any other open space.
5.2.6 Exit
The general meaning of Exit is “to leave, to get out of (a building, road,
etc.)”[2]. As for Arrive and Leave, Enter and Exit are essentially opposites,
hence most of the aspects discussed for Enter in the previous section apply
to Exit as well.
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The following definition of Exit(o1, o2) distinguishes between open or
closed spaces:
Occurs(Exit(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
[spaceType(o2, closed)→ ∃s2 ∈ ConcreteObject[partOf(o2, s2) ∧
accessible(o2, s2) ∧ Occurs(Exitarea(o1, s2), [ts, te])]] ∨
[spaceType(o2, open)→ Occurs(Exitarea(o1, o2), [ts, te])] (5.48)
The definition of Exitarea mirrors the definition of Enterarea (eq. 5.47) by
specifying a reversed sequence of topological relation changes between o1
and o2. An instance of Exitarea(o1, o2) occurs over interval [ts, te] if o1 is a
non-tangential proper part of o2 in an interval preceeding ts, is a tangential
proper part over the start of [ts, te], is partially overlapping with o2 at the
end of [ts, te] and is externally connected to o2 in an interval following te:
Occurs(Exitarea(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
∃t1, t2, t3 [t1 < ts < t2 < te < t3 ∧ rcc_NTPP(o1, o2)@[t1,ts] ∧
rcc_TPP(o1, o2)@[ts,t2] ∧ rcc_PO(o1, o2)@[t2,te] ∧ rcc_EC(o1, o2)@[te,t3]] (5.49)
5.3 Relation
The verbs in this section identify a type of motion which is closely con-
nected to a relation or connection between two objects. The verb Follow
refers to an event occurrence where the motion of an object is causing an-
other object to move in a way so that the second object does not lose sight
of the first. Chase is a specification of this where the action is fast-paced,
and Flee characterises the motion of an object in a direction opposite to
something following, chasing or otherwise perceived as a danger.
5.3.1 Follow
The dictionary lists Follow as a transitive verb meaning “To go or come
after (a person or other object in motion); to move behind in the same
direction”[2]. There are several ways in which this can be formally char-
acterised.
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A good indication that an object is following another is the fact that
both objects are moving along the same trajectory. For example, if a car
is moving along a route, another vehicle may be following the former by
travelling on exactly the same roads at a slightly later time.
However, different characterisations may be appropriate, especially for
instances where the second object is not so explicitly or openly following
the first. Let us consider the case of a person a inconspicuously following
an unaware person b in an urban environment. Rather than passing on
exactly the same route walked by b at the same pace keeping a fixed dis-
tance between them, a is much more likely to disguise its movements by
stopping frequently, crossing the road, slowing down or even taking diver-
sions (e.g. side streets, parallel roads) whilst at the same time maintaining
an awareness of the position and movements of b. A way to characterise
such occurrences of Follow would be to affirm that b is moving along a
route or direction and a is moving within a boundary of b’s route, such
that the distance between a and b is approximately constant or within rea-
sonable bounds (not too close, not too far).
The above characterisation introduces three elements that have to be
formalised: the fact that a is moving along the same route of b, the fact that
a is moving within the boundaries of b’s route allowing for diversions, and
the fact that the a tries to keep its distance from b within certain bounds
(ideally, a desires to keep b within its line of sight).
Given objects o1 and o2, the predicate followRoute(o1, o2) holds on in-
terval [ts, te] if o1 is passing on the same route as o2, by stating that for
every instant t ∈ [ts, te], if o2 is at position p2 at instant t, then there exists
a later instant tp > t such that o1 is at p2 at tp. In general, tp is thought
to be both not too close and not too far in the future from t. The def-
nition below specifies two ways to delimit such bound: either there exist
thresholds TFollowmin_time and T
Follow
max_time respectively specifying the minimum and
maximum duration of the interval [t, tp], or there exist thresholds TFollowmin_dist
and TFollowmax_dist respectively specifying the minimum and maximum distance
between the positions of o1 and o2 at t and at tp:
followRoute[P](o1, o2)@[ts,te] ≡
∀ t ∈ T [ts 6 t 6 te ∧ position(o2, p2)@t →
∃ tp ∈ T , (Tfollowmin_time, δtmin), (Tfollowmax_time, δtmax) ∈ P [t < tp ∧
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δtmin 6 tp − t 6 δtmax ∧ position(o1, p1p)@tp ∧ p1p = p2] ∨
∃ tp ∈ T , (Tfollowmin_dist, δdmin), (Tfollowmax_dist, δdmax) ∈ P [t < tp ∧
position(o1, p1p)@tp ∧ p1p = p2 ∧
position(o1, p1)@t ∧ distance((p1, p2), d) ∧ δdmin 6 d 6 δdmax ∧
position(o2, p2p)@tp ∧ distance((p1p, p2p), dp) ∧ δdmin 6 dp 6 δdmax]]
(5.50)
The definition above is rigid in respect to the fact that o2 has to find it-
self at the precise position previously occupied by o1. This can suit the pre-
viously mentioned example where a vehicle is openly following another,
but does not allow for subtler instances of Follow where o2’s movements
do not strictly mirror o1’s.
A possibility would be to extend the definition of followRoute(o1, o2)
by specifying that if o2 is at a certain position p2 at t, then o1 will be within
a certain boundary of p2 at tp. The predicate followBoundary(o1, o2) below
introduces threshold Tfollowbdry to specify the maximum distance between o1’s
position at tp and the position occupied by o2 at t:
followBoundary[P](o1, o2)@[ts,te] ≡
Occurs(Move[P](o2), [ts, te]) ∧ ∀ t ∈ T [ts 6 t 6 te ∧ position(o2, p2)@t →
∃ tp ∈ T , (Tfollowmin_dist, δdmin), (Tfollowmax_dist, δdmax), (Tfollowbdry , δbdry) ∈ P, db, d, dp
[t < tp ∧ position(o1, p1p)@tp ∧ distance((p1p, p2), db) ∧ db < δbdry ∧
position(o1, p1)@t ∧ distance((p1, p2), d) ∧ δdmin 6 d 6 δdmax ∧
position(o2, p2p)@tp ∧ distance((p1p, p2p), dp) ∧ δdmin 6 dp 6 δdmax]]
(5.51)
The occurrence of the event Follow(o1, o2) over interval [ts, te] can now
be formalised by specifying that either fluent followRoute(o1, o2) or fluent
followBoundary(o1, o2) hold on the same interval. The definition below
also introduces the predicate sightDistance(o1, d), which holds if d is the
maximum distance for an object to be within the line of sight of o1, and
specifies that if such a value exists, the threshold Tfollowmax_dist in precisification
P will assume value d:
Occurs(Follow[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
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[∃ d sightDistance(o1, d)→ ∃ (Tfollowmax_dist, δ) ∈ P [δ = d]] ∧
[followRoute[P](o1, o2)@[ts,te] ∨ followBoundary[P](o1, o2)@[ts,te]] (5.52)
5.3.2 Chase
The dictionary lists Chase as a transitive verb meaning “To pursue with
a view to catching”[2]. In many ways, it can be seen as an occurrence of
Follow with a further specification that the object behind is actively trying
to reach the object in front. As for Follow, the object being chased may
or may not be aware of the object performing the chase, and similarly the
latter may be more or less conspicuous in the act of chasing.
Most of the considerations in the previous section about the ways in
which an object a can follow another object b apply to Chase as well. How-
ever, because the meaning of Chase suggests that a intends to ultimately
reach b’s position, and at the same time that b is fleeing or moving away
from a, there has to be a specific characterisation of this intention. Such
behaviour appears particularly difficult to identify through the analysis
of a and b’s motion patterns. For example, one may argue that a is ef-
fectively chasing b if a is following b and the distance separating them
progressively decreases through the interval over which the chase occurs.
However, there may be instances where such distance reduction does not
happen due to the chase being ineffective. In fact, if a is frantically fol-
lowing b and at the same time the distance between them increases, an
observer would probably understand that b manages to flee from a, but
also that a would still be chasing b. This consideration leads to the conclu-
sion that a reduction in the distance between a and b over the course of a
chase is too specific for the definition of Chase.
Another aspect that may characterise a’s intentional behaviour sug-
gested by the verb is that a is taking shortcuts or moving in such a way
in order to gain an advantage over b. Unfortunately, identifying such be-
haviour would require extensive knowledge of the environment in which
a and b are moving, and of the strategies that a may put in place to accom-
plish its goal of catching b.
The considerations above point out that the verb Chase has a strong
intentionality component which is not easily characterisable by analysing
the two objects’ motion. A compromise may be reached by defining an
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occurrence of Chase(o1, o2) over [ts, te] as an occurrence of Follow(o1, o2)
over the same interval where object o1 is moving fast:
Occurs(Chase[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Follow[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ∧ speed[P](o1, fast)@[ts,te] (5.53)
Of course the above definition is not particularly general or complete,
as there may be instances where o1 is chasing o2 by slowly and carefully
watching o2’s moves, or where o1 stops or slows down during the process.
Nevertheless, the fact that an occurrence of Follow is performed at a fast
speed is probably a good indication that such occurrence is in fact a Chase.
5.3.3 Flee
The dictionary lists Flee as a verb that can be used transitively to mean
“To run away from or as from danger; to take flight; to try to escape or
seek safety by flight”[2].
An occurrence of the transitive form of flee, formalised as Flee(o1, o2),
would be characterised by the fact that object o1 is trying to escape or
distance itself from object o2 perceived as a danger. A common example
would be given by the fact that o2 is chasing o1, or that o1 begins a fast
motion away from o2, at which point o2 may or may not initiate a chase.
Occurs(Flee[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(MoveAwayFrom(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ∧ speed[P](o1, fast)@[ts,te] (5.54)
There are occurrences in which the verb is used intransitively, as in
Flee(o). This is likely to refer to instances in which object o is fleeing from
something unspecified. The object perceived as danger may or may not
be present in the scene under consideration. A possible definition for this
occurrence is by stating that there exist an object od which o is fleeing from.
Occurs(Flee[P](o), [ts, te]) ≡ ∃ od(Occurs(Flee[P](o, od), [ts, te]) (5.55)
However, it is possible to conceive examples where o is fleeing a scene for
no apparent or observable reason or trigger.
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5.4 Contact
The verbs in this section describe events which involve objects being in or
establishing a static or dynamic form of contact with each other.
The section starts by examining Touch, the most generic of the set, and
moves forward by analysing Push, a specific type of occurrence where the
act of establishing contact with an object has the effect of causing a subse-
quent act of motion. For verbs Hit and Collide the contact is established in
a forceful and/or disruptive way, and for Kick contact involves a specific
body part. For Hold contact serves the purpose of supporting an object
and fixing its relative position.
The analysis of the events briefly listed above involves various factors,
such as identifying specific body parts, establishing when an act of con-
tact begins and ends, and also characterising the forces involved in the dy-
namic contact between two objects, and under which circumstances these
can be consider forceful or disruptive. This latter aspect is particularly
prevalent for verbs Hit and Collide. The formalisation of Hit also involves
the analysis of whether it is possible or sensible to identify one particular
object as performing an active or intentional role in the action.
5.4.1 Touch
The verb Touch can be used in many concrete and figurative instances to
express the fact that an object is in contact with another. The dictionary
lists it as a transitive verb with several specifications of such meaning, the
most relevant of which are “To put the hand or finger, or some other part
of the body, upon, or into contact with (something); to touch (a thing) with
the hand or other part, or with some instrument; to come into, or be in,
contact with; to be in contact with, or immediately adjacent to” [2]. From
this it follows that most of the concrete occurrences of Touch will involve
two objects being in contact with each other; with further specifications of
such manifestations when people are involved in the event.
There are two main interpretations shaping the temporal nature of
Touch. One of these considers an occurrence of Touch as a static event
or state, and the event-type Touch(o1, o2) occurring on a temporal interval
where objects o1 and o2 are in contact. For example, if two boxes are po-
sitioned in such a way that one of the boxes’ side is immediately above,
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below, to the left or to the right of the side of the other box, the event
would be occurring on the entire interval in which the boxes are in this
position. In general, the formalisation of this interpretation inolves indi-
viduating the edges or boundaries of the two objects and specifying that
the boundaries are in the same spatial location. Referring to the topology
of the two objects, this corresponds to establishing whether they are exter-
nally connected. This interpretation can be formalised as the fluent touch
that holds over an instant t if two objects o1 and o2 are connected. The
following simple definition specifies that touch(o1, o2) holds at time t if o1
and o2 are externally connected:
touch(o1, o2)@t ≡ rcc_EC(o1, o2)@t (5.56)
The other interpretation considers Touch as a dynamic event, with the
event-type Touch(o1, o2) occurring over an extended interval. An occur-
rence of Touch(o1, o2) generally has o1 playing the active role in the action
(meaning that subject o1 touches object o2 rather than vice versa). For ex-
ample, person o1 raises his hand and lays it on person o2’s shoulder, or
person o1 puts his hand against door o2. Often the active object can be
identified by analysing the degree of dynamicity of the two, with the triv-
ial case having o1 as dynamic and o2 static (more advanced measures are
imaginable, e.g. degree of intentionality). This may not always be the case,
for example in occurrences where both objects are equally dynamic with
no particular prominence on o1 or o2, such as two people o1 and o2 walking
towards each other placing each other’s hand on each other’s shoulder at
the same time. In this instance, it would be reasonable to have both event-
types Touch(o1, o2) and Touch(o2, o1) occurring on the same interval.
Another aspect of occurrences of Touch involves identifying specific
and predictable contact parts through which an object o1 comes into con-
tact with o2. This is particularly true for objects of type person; people tend
to touch things by using their hands or fingers. It follows that the formal-
isation of an instance of Touch(o1, o2) where o1 is a person will generally
specify the position and the motion of the person’s hands towards another
object. Instances in which these contact parts exist but the contact does not
happen through them, as one may predict, are generally un-characteristic
and it is likely that they may be classified as occurrences of other, more
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specific contact verbs. For example, if a person o1 is walking in space and
comes into contact with a lamp post through the body trunk, this is gen-
erally classified as an occurrence of Hit or Collide rather than Touch. Some
other instances may be more subtle, for example if a person o1 is putting
his/ her foot against an object o2, this may be classified as an occurrence
of Kick if the motion is fast and o2 moves away from o1 as a result of the
action (for example o2 being a ball), or as an occurrence of Touch if o1’s
motion is slow and/or o2 is static (for example o2 being a wall).
The temporal extension of the dynamic interpretation of Touch is hard
to establish. This issue has been encountered for many other verbs in this
chapter, and it relates to the lack of precise and objective criteria identi-
fying the instants in which the occurrence starts and ends. A very strict
physical interpretation of Touch(o1, o2) as a punctual event would have
the occurrence spanning an interval containing only the single instant in
which o1 and o2 become connected. Despite the advantage of clearing
any ambiguity, such an interpretation is rather unrealistic as an observer
would generally assign a duration to the event.
Some interpretations may regard an occurrence of Touch(o1, o2) as ter-
minating just on or very shortly after the instant in which o1 has estab-
lished contact with o2, regardless of the fact that the state of o1 being in
contact with o2 may persist after such instant. Other interpretations in-
stead may regard the occurrence as extending beyond that instant and
throughout the entire time in which o1 and o2 are in contact. Given that
the interpretation of Touch presented here focuses on the dynamic event in
which two objects come into contact, the formalisation will concentrate on
the former type, where the occurrence does not persist after the dynamic
part of the event.
Establishing a starting instant for an occurrence of Touch(o1, o2) is even
harder. A possibility would be to identify the start of the particular as-
pect of o1’s motion that results into o1 establishing contact with o2, which
should not occur too far in the past prior to the contact. For example, if
o1 and o2 are two people side by side and o1 lays a hand on o2’s shoul-
der, the event occurrence would start on the instant in which o1’s hand
initiates movement towards o2, and terminate when the hand is in contact
with the shoulder. Whilst this interpretation may work reasonably well
for objects which are static prior to the event, it may prove more diffi-
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cult to apply to more dynamic objects that are already performing acts of
motion prior to coming in contact with each other. For example, a ball
may have been rolling on the ground for a while and slowly come into
contact with another object. In this case, because of the impossibility of
establishing a clear start of the motion that led the ball to touch the object,
a punctual interpretation of Touch may seem appropriate. However, other
interpretations may still be reasonable. For example, Touch(o1, o2) may
start a predefined amount of time before the contact (e.g. 1 or 2 seconds),
or when o1 is very near o2.
The following definition is a disjunction between two formalisations of
an occurrence of Touch(o1, o2) over interval [ts, te]. The first disjunct states
that if object o1 is a person then one of his/her hands will move towards
o2 over [ts, te], the second disjunct instead limits the width of [ts, te] to a
reasonably small threshold TTouch in precisification P and specifies that o1
moves towards o2 over [ts, te]. In both cases, the definition states that o1
and o2 come into contact at te and such contact must persist for at least an
interval following te.
Occurs(Touch[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
[type(o1, Person) ∧ ∃ t1, t2 ∈ T [t1 = succ(te) ∧ t1 < t2 ∧
∃ hl , hr [p_hands(o1, (hl , hr)) ∧ ¬touch(o1, o2)@[ts,te] ∧
[[moveTowards(hl , o2)@[ts,te] ∧ touch(hl , o2)@[t1,t2]] ∨
[moveTowards(hr, o2)@[ts,te] ∧ touch(hr, o2)@[t1,t2]]] ] ∨
∃ (TTouch, ε) ∈ P [te − ts < ε ∧ ¬touch(o1, o2)@[ts,te] ∧
Occurs(Move[P](o1), [ts, te]) ∧ touch(o1, o2)@[t1,t2]]] (5.57)
5.4.2 Push
The meaning most likely to match the occurrences of Push observed within
the domain of this work is the transitive use of the verb meaning “to exert
force upon or against (a body) so as to move it away; to move along by
exerting a continuous force; to move forward or advance (a force) against
opposition or difficulty”[2]. The rest of this section ignores other more
or less figurative meanings of the verb, even though the characterisation
of a subject’s own behaviour, such as “to make one’s way with force or
persistence”, would look interesting to investigate.
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From the above it can be gathered that an occurrence of Push(o1, o2)
is characterised by a subject o1 exerting a force against another object o2,
with the expected outcome being the motion of o2 in a direction away from
o1. For example, a person may push a box by placing his/her hands on
the item and pressing against it, for the purpose of moving it towards a
particular position.
However, the above characterisation is slightly too specific, as there are
instances in which the action performed by o1 does not have the result
of causing o2 to move, or at least not in the way one would expect. For
example, if a box is anchored to the ground, the subject’s actions cause no
actual displacement, except for possibly a slight deformation of the box
edges. If a person is pushing against a door in order to cause it to swing
open and the door is locked, trivially the door will remain in position with
no observable movement.
Taking the above into account, a more general characterisation may
specify that o1 is exerting a force on o2 with the intention of causing o2
to move, even if the occurrence of Push is not followed by the expected
movement of o2. Identifying this is not trivial, as an object o1 exerting a
force against o2 may appear static to an observer. However, it generally
happens that o1 will move itself, or part of itself, towards o2 over an in-
terval preceding the instant in which the force starts being exerted (e.g. a
person pushing a door will lift his/her hand, move it towards the door
and place it on the door frame or handle). Moreover, the nature, type or
size of o2 could aid to establish whether o2 can be moved by being pushed.
In fact, objects can be classified in three broad categories in respect to this
capability:
• Immovable objects, whose size or type inhibit their transition to a state
of motion as a result of someone or something pushing on them
(e.g. a house, a wall, a lamp post. . . ).
• Movable objects, whose size, type and absence of physical constraints
allow them to start to move if subject to an external force (e.g. a ve-
hicle on wheels, an unanchored box, an unlocked door, a person. . . )
• Potentially movable objects. This category is constituted by almost all
movable objects which had constraints put on them to prevent move-
ment, which could nevertheless still happen under disproportionate
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force (e.g. a car with a handbrake on, an anchored box, a locked
door. . . )
There are further aspects to consider too. In some instances, o2 may
be a very small or particularly constrained object resulting in an almost
negligible movement following a push (e.g. a person pushing a button to
call a lift would result in the button slightly moving away from the person
given the groove it is sliding into). Also, most instances are likely to see
o1 exerting force on o2 through specific or predictable contact parts. As for
Touch, this is particularly true for people, which generally exert force onto
objects by placing their hands against the side of the object closer to them,
or another specific part of the object that is intended for pushing (e.g. a
door handle, or trolley’s arm). However, there may exist instances where
the force is exerted in an unconventional way, (e.g. using feet or the entire
body trunk). Finally, an effect that may follow an occurrence of o1 pushing
o2 is the deformation of o2’s shape. Identifying such deformation may
prove useful in instances where o2 does not move as a result, as it would
constitute evidence of the force exerted by o1 against o2. Immovable objects
are unlikely to change shape, and it is potentially movable objects that
are the most likely to show deformation, depending on their rigidity and
quality of their anchors or other constraints inhibiting their movement.
Regarding the temporal extension of an occurrence of Push(o1, o2), its
starting point can be established at the instant o1 begins to exert the force,
and its ending can be established at the instant o1 ceases to exert such
force. Given the considerations above about the ways in which such a
force can be exerted and the effects it may cause, a general formalisation
would state that the event occurs over [ts, te] if o2 is a movable or poten-
tially movable object, o1 is in contact with o2 at ts, this contact is maintained
throughout [ts, te] and either o2 moves away from o1 over [ts, te] (and pos-
sibly beyond te) or there is a deformation of o2’s shape over [ts, te].
Occurs(Push[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
∃, t1, t2, t3[t1 < ts 6 t2 ∧ te 6 t3 ∧
Occurs(Touch[P](o1, o2)[t1, ts]) ∧ touch(o1, o2)@[ts,te] ∧
[[movable(o2, movable)@[ts,t3] ∧ Occurs(MoveAwayFrom(o2, o1), [t2, t3])] ∨
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[movable(o2, partMovable)@[ts,t3]] ∨ [Occurs(deform(o2), [t2, te])]]]
(5.58)
The above definition introduces the event deform(o) which holds at any
time instant t at which object o is subject to a deformation of its shape.
This event is currently not defined and an implementation of its definition
would be likely to characterise the process of deformation by analysing
changes in the shape or area occupied by o.
Definition 5.58 lacks an actual characterisation of the fact that o1 is ex-
erting some form of force directed or impressed at o2. This is a rather
high-level concept which is hard to identify by observation, hence the def-
inition has focused on formalising Push by specifying a more observable
sequence of events.
5.4.3 Collide
The verb Collide is semantically very similar to the verb Hit, discussed in
the next section. In fact, it is listed by the dictionary as a transitive verb
meaning “to bring or come into collision or violent contact, strike or dash
together” [2]. In many ways, it is a specialisation of Touch where the
movement of the two objects is fast, sudden, forceful and/or the forces
involved have disruptive consequences. Force and speed are the main
characterising themes.
As opposed to the characterisation of Hit(o1, o2) of Sec. 5.4.4, where it
is argued that object o1 plays an active role in the action, occurrences of
Collide generally do not exhibit greater importance, effort or intentionality
on part of either of the objects participating in the action. From this it
follows that most occurrences of Collide are symmetrical; if an occurrence
of Collide(o1, o2) happens at a particular interval, then it is generally also
true that Collide(o2, o1) happens on the same interval.
The assumptions above seem to agree with the ways the words ‘col-
lide’ and ‘collision’ are generally used in natural language. They are for-
mal words referring to the abstract notion of a disruptive contact rather
than the particular way in which it happened or its consequences. This
semantics is not always clear and can be subtle. For example, police or
emergency services attending the scene of road accident often refer to the
event as a ‘road traffic collision’, referring to the fact that two or more
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vehicles collided. It is unlikely for such an occurrence of Collide to be
symmetrical with no greater blame or responsibility placed on any one
vehicle; accidents indeed involve some kind of wrongdoing however sub-
tle this may be (except in very rare cases, for example a bug in the traffic
light control system which gives simultaneous green lights to conflicting
traffic paths). The semantics of the words ‘collision’ and ‘collide’ deliber-
atly avoid the attribution of any form of active role or responsibility on
any one of the subjects involved in the event. This is often appropriate,
as it serves the purpose of focusing on the disruptive nature of the event
and its serious consequences that have to be dealt with by the emergency
services. At a later stage, investigations are aimed at individuating any
blame or responsibility, thus attributing a particularly active role on one
subject and allowing for a more specific utterance such as Hit.
In general, the formalisation of an occurrence of Collide(o1, o2) would
specify the existence of high and/or disruptive forces in the instants sur-
rounding the contact between the two objects:
Occurs(Collide[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Touch[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ∧
[speed[P](o1, fast)@[ts,te] ∨ speed[P](o2, fast)@[ts,te] ∨
disruptiveForce(o1)@te ∨ disruptiveForce(o2)@te ] (5.59)
The definition above states that Collide(o1, o2) occurs over interval [ts, te]
if Touch(o1, o2) occurs over the same interval and either of the two ob-
jects is fast or causes some disruptive force formalised by the predicate
disruptiveForce. This is a high level concept whose definition is hard to
formalise, especially by referring to observable properties. Some clues
may be given by changes in the state of o1, o2 or both: if a car collides with
a wall, the car will have an altered shape, and possibly the wall as well if
the impact force is great enough; however, if a person collides with a wall,
there are generally no noticeable changes in the shape or motion of the
wall.
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5.4.4 Hit
The dictionary lists Hit as a transitive verb meaning “to reach or get at
with a blow; to give a blow to (something aimed at); to strike with aim or
intent; (of a missile or moving body): to come upon with forcible impact;
to strike”[2]. An occurrence of the verb is generally characterised by the
presence of a moving subject coming into contact with a direct object at a
high force or speed.
In many ways, occurrences of Hit can be framed as specific instances of
the more general verbs Touch, describing the act of an object coming into
contact with another, and/or Push, itself a specification of Touch whose
effect is to cause movement or deformation in the object being touched. A
formalisation of Hit(o1, o2) is likely to describe it as specialising Touch with
a movement that could be described as fast, sudden and/or forceful.
In particular, this verb bears a very close similarity with the verb Collide
discussed in the previous section. Both verbs describe the forceful and
potentially disruptive act of an object clashing with another, however it
seems that an occurrence of Hit(o1, o2) conveys the fact that subject o1 has
more involvement or is more active than o2. For this reason, and given the
discussion and formalisation of Collide in Sec. 5.4.3, it seems appropriate
to consider Hit as a particular specialisation of Collide where the action is
not symmetric and o1 is the active subject.
Such active role of o1 in the action could be described by several char-
acteristics. One of the most trivial of these is the case in which object o2
is static, for example a ball or a missile hitting the ground, or a car hit-
ting a wall. In this instance, o1 is the only moving object and the act is
characterised by its movement directed towards o2 which suddenly stops
when o1 and o2 come into contact. In some instances, there may be an
effect or consequence causing changes in the state of o2. For example, if
the force generated by car o1 hitting wall o2 is very high, it could result in
a deformation of o2. Similarly, if o1 is the white ball that has just being set
in motion by a player on a pool table, and it comes into contact with ball
o2 in its path, the consequence of Hit(o1, o2) is for o2 to start moving in a
particular direction, and possibly o1 diverting its motion as well.
The active role played by o1 may also be conveyed by the fact that some
occurrences of Hit(o1, o2) involve specific contact parts. For example, if a
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person hits another person with his fist, the active subject would be the
one whom the hand that came in contact with the person belongs to.
Another characterisation of the active role played by o1 may refer to
a certain intentionality of o1 in causing a particular effect of o2, which is
particularly true for animate objects such as people, or items capable of
generating force and/or propelling themselves such as vehicles, many of
which are directly controlled by people anyway. For example: if car o1
runs a red light and subsequently clashes with car o2, it would be o1 (or,
rather, his driver) that deliberately caused the action by crossing o2’s path
despite not being allowed to do so. In this instance the occurrence would
be described by Hit(o1, o2) rather than Hit(o2, o1). The degree of intention-
ality of an object in the act of performing a particular action is a very high
level concept whose semantics are not easily captured by observation.
An occurrence of Hit(o1, o2) can now be formalised as a specific occur-
rence of Touch where motion is fast. Below, o1 is characterised as playing
the active role by stating that either o2 is static or o1 is moving faster than
o2 (predicate faster can be defined by comparing the two object’s speeds,
see pag. 81):
Occurs(Hit[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
Occurs(Collide[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ∧ speed[P](o1, fast)@[ts,te] ∧
[¬move[P](o2)@[ts,te] ∨ faster(o1, o2)@[ts,te]] (5.60)
The formalisation above simplifies and/or ignores several aspects regard-
ing contact parts, intentionality or consequences of the occurrence on the
state of o2 (such as movement, deformation, etc). A refined formalisation
should refer to the concept of force and characterise occurrences of Hit as
motions in which the force transferred from o1 towards o2 is a significant
amount and with specific consequences.
5.4.5 Kick
The verb Kick is listed by the dictionary as a transitive verb meaning “to
strike (anything) with the foot; to impel, drive, or move, by or as by
kicking”[2]. This meaning specifically identifies a person as the subject
performing the action, given that a foot is a body part that is only attached
to people.
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An occurrence of Kick can be characterised as a specific occurrence of
Hit, itself a specialisation of Touch. In fact, Kick(o1, o2) generally describes
the fact that subject o1 is actively and, often, intentionally touching or
pushing o2 with significant force by moving his/her foot towards o2.
In most instances, consequences of o1 kicking o2 are very similar to
the consequences described in the discussion and formalisation of Push in
Sec. 5.4.2. If o2 is a movable object then it is expected that o2 will move
away from o1 or alter his shape by deformation. However, it is conceivable
for an occurrence of Kick to describe o1 kicking an immovable object o2,
a situation not considered in the formalisation of Push. In this situation,
there is generally no deformation or other observable consequence in o2’s
state.
The following definition states that Kick(o1, o2) occurs over interval
[ts, te] if o1 is a person and it occurs that one of his feet hits object o2
over the same interval and, additionally, either it occurs that Push(o1, o2)
or o2 is an immovable object:
Occurs(Kick[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡
type(o1, Person) ∧ ∃ fl , fr[p_feet(o1, ( fl , fr)) ∧
[Occurs(Hit[P]( fl , o2), [ts, te]) ∨ Occurs(Hit[P]( fr, o2), [ts, te])] ∧
[Occurs(Push[P](o1, o2), [ts, te]) ∨movable(o2, immovable)@ts,te ] (5.61)
As already mentioned for Hit and Collide, a refined characterisation of
Kick would take the forces involved in the event into account, by specifying
the nature and characteristics of a forceful impact and the effects this has
on o2. However, there may be instances of Kick where the impact is not
regarded as particularly forceful, such as a person gently kicking a ball
with no particular energy expenditure.
5.4.6 Hold
The dictionary lists Hold as a transitive verb meaning “to keep from getting
away; to keep from falling, to uphold, sustain, support or maintain in or
with the hand, arms, etc.; to have or keep within it”[2].
From the above it follows that general occurrences of Hold(o1, o2) are
constituted by an object o1 whose actions or state prevent o2 from mov-
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ing away from o1. More specific occurrences would classify the active or
passive nature of o1 and/or o2.
In fact, o1 may be intentionally and actively holding o2 from moving
away from itself, or may be passively holding o2 due to its persistent state.
Similarly, o2 may be actively or passively moving away from o1, as o2 may
be capable of propelling itself in order to move away from o2, or may be
subject to an external force that would cause such movement (e.g. gravity).
For example, a picture hook attached to a wall holding a picture frame
in place is an example where the persistent state of the (passive) picture
hook is holding the frame in position, which would otherwise be subject
to gravity thus be drawn away from the hook. Conversely, a policeman
holding a thief after a chase is actively performing specific actions aimed
at keeping the other person in position, which would otherwise actively
propel itself in order to get away.
There are also situations where there is no immediate possibility for o2
to move away from o1 but still there is the potential for o2 to do so. For
example, let us consider a person o1 holding a ladder o2 set against a wall
on which another person o3 is standing on. If the ladder is reasonably
stable, o2 would not normally move away from o1 and/or o3, however the
context may indicate a relatively high probability for this to happen, hence
o1 is holding o2 to prevent that eventuality. This example also shows that
occurrences of Hold could be subject to a form of transitive relation. In
fact, person o1 is holding ladder o2 in place, and ladder o2 is holding o3
in place too. One could then argue that a reasonable interpretation of this
situation would also result in o1 holding o3 in place via o2.
Most passive occurrences of Hold are generally characerised as a static
event, where objects establish contact and maintain it throughout the event
occurrence, with an almost constant relative distance between them. Sub-
jects may be completely static, as in the picture frame example above, or
dynamic, for example a person walking and holding a set of keys in his
hand. The theme these occurrences have in common is that the relation
and relative positioning of the two objects is not subject to major variations
over the interval.
The discussion to follow focuses on static occurrences of Hold(o1, o2),
where o1 is a person holding another person or object o2 through specific
contact parts of o1, generally hands or fingers. Specific contact parts of o2
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may be also involved, such as an item handles or its outer edges, however
this may sometimes be difficult to identify for particular objects, such as
the ladder in the example above. The definition below formalises the flu-
ent hold(o1, o2) as holding at time t if o1 is a person, its left and right hands
are hl and hr, o2 is an object that can be held and it is either the case that
one of o1’s hands are touching o2 at time t:
hold(o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ hl , hr[type(o1, Person) ∧ p_hands(o1, (hl , hr)) ∧ holdable(o2)@t ∧
[touch(hl , o2)@t ∨ touch(hr, o2)@t] (5.62)
The predicate holdable(o) should specify whether an object o has certain
characteristics that allow it to be held by a person at a particular time.
These could be a combination of his size, shape and or the fact that o2 at
time t would actually or potentially move. Refined definitions would char-
acterise the specific ways in which a person’s hand or fingers hold particu-
lar objects, a challenging task given the variety of shapes and possibilities
for people to position their fingers on an object in order to establish effec-
tive contact. These issues are ignored in the formalisation of event-type
Hold(o1, o2) below, where it is simply specified that it occurs over interval
[ts, te] if fluent hold(o1, o2) holds throughout the interval:
Occurs(Hold(o1, o2), [ts, te]) ≡ hold(o1, o2)@[ts,te] (5.63)
In Sec. 6.2.3 an implementation of a definition of Hold in the logic-
programming system ProVision is proposed, where the occurrence of the
event is inferred by estimating a ‘holding position’ in which an object
being held is most likely to be located.
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Event Recognition
Our event detection system ProVision is a logic-programming implemen-
tation of the formal ontology emerging from Chapters 4 and 5. It is de-
signed as a module of a wider framework for event analysis and detection,
whose input is a video and whose output is a high-level description of the
events occurring in it. Within this framework, the initial processing of
video frames, not described in this paper, is performed by trackers and
classifiers that output a structured description of the relevant objects. The
resulting data represents the information grounding the ontology, and it
is described in Sec. 6.1. ProVision infers higher-level predicates defined
in the ontology and produces a list of event occurrences detailing which
events occur in each video. Certain technical implementative aspects are
presented in Sec. 6.2, where some spatio-temporal concepts are defined
and two sample verbs are modeled. Section 6.3 describes the result of
some experimental recognition tests, discussed in Sec. 6.4.
6.1 Source Data
The video sequences which constitute the data for the implementation
and evaluation of our formalism have been provided by DARPA as the
development video dataset. This dataset contains 1302 video sequences
in MPEG format, hereafter called vignettes, with a resolution of 1280x720
pixels and variable duration, generally between 5 and 20 seconds.
Portrayed subjects are mostly people, vehicles (cars, bicycles and mo-
torbikes) and other objects such as boxes, balls, small items and sometimes
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(a) Approach (b) Replace
(c) Flee (d) Chase
Figure 6.1: Vignettes and annotated objects
animals. The scene background is a generic urban or semi-urban outdoor
environment, such as streets, recreation parks or car parks. The camera
filming the scene is in a frontal, central position and is static throughout
the scene, recording 25 frames per second. Each vignette is meant to rep-
resent the occurrence of a specific motion verb, included in the video file
name, even though other motion verbs may be represented in the scene
as well. There are generally 10 to 30 vignettes per motion verb. Fig. 6.1
shows some example vignettes and the associated verb for each vignette.
The automatic event recognition system ProVision does not operate on
the actual video files, but on an annotation of the video. These annotations
are constituted by XML files in Viper format [39, 66, 74] called vignette
annotations, one per video file. Each annotation file is structured in a first
part containing general information about the video, a second part con-
taining information about the tracked objects in each video and a third part
containing event annotations.
Listing 6.1 on page 136 shows the relevant sections of the XML anno-
tation file in Viper format describing the vignette in Fig. 6.1(a):
• The first part of the file describes the number of frames in the vi-
134
6.1. Source Data
gnette (220), the width and height in pixels (1280 by 720) and other
information not reported in the example.
• The second part describes tracked objects, recognised by either a man-
ual or automatic annotator whose position is represented at each
video frame. In our annotations the position is represented as a rect-
angular bounding box, illustrated in Fig. 6.1 by the green rectangles.
The file shows two objects, each started by the tag <object> with the
following properties:
– The first object is present at frames 91 to 219, has id 0 and is of
type vehicle (attributes framespan, id and name). The position is
represented by a set of bounding boxes (tags data:bbox) each of
which is described at each frame with top left coordinate, width
and height (attributes framespan, x, y, width and height). For
example the position of this object at frame 91 is represented by
box with coordinates (1021, 325), width 259 and height 238.
– Similarly, the second object is present from frame 121 to 219,
has id 1 and is of type vehicle. Its position at frame 121 is
represented by bounding box with coordinates (1, 317), width
257, height 260
• The third part of the file describes event annotations, started by tag
<content ... name="Event">. These state which events occur in the
vignette and is referred as ground truth for evaluation purposes (see
also Sec. 6.3). For example, the file contains information about the
fact an event of type approach occurs between frames 121 and 219
with participants Vehicle:0 and Vehicle:1. An event participant is
represented by a string formed by its type, a colon and its id number.
The information shown in Listing 6.1 is parsed by the ProVision sys-
tem in order to produce an equivalent representation more suitable for
the Prolog language. Each vignette annotation is represented by the Pro-
log fact annotationset(+X) where X is an associative list such as the one
shown in Listing 6.2. This list characterises the file uniquely (property
input), specifies the framespan and each object with the term tracklet.
Each tracklet term is composed of a list specifying id, which also contains
the type of object, and a list of bounding boxes at each frame. The event
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<attribute name="NUMFRAMES">
<data:dvalue value="220"/>
</attribute>
<attribute name="H-FRAME-SIZE">
<data:dvalue value="1280"/>
</attribute>
<attribute name="V-FRAME-SIZE">
<data:dvalue value="720"/>
</attribute>
<object framespan="91:219" id="0" name="Vehicle">
<attribute name="bbox">
<data:bbox framespan="91:91" height="238" width="259" x="1021" y="325"/>
<data:bbox framespan="92:92" height="238" width="263" x="1017" y="325"/>
...
<data:bbox framespan="219:219" height="207" width="196" x="714" y="341"/>
</attribute>
</object>
<object framespan="121:219" id="1" name="Vehicle">
<attribute name="bbox">
<data:bbox framespan="121:121" height="260" width="257" x="1" y="317"/>
<data:bbox framespan="122:122" height="260" width="264" x="1" y="317"/>
...
<data:bbox framespan="219:219" height="260" width="694" x="-1" y="317"/>
</attribute>
</object>
<content framespan="122:219" id="0" name="Event">
<attribute name="name">
<data:svalue value="approach"/>
</attribute>
<attribute name="subjects">
<data:svalue value="Vehicle:0,Vehicle:1"/>
</attribute>
</content>
<content framespan="122:219" id="5" name="Event">
<attribute name="name">
<data:svalue value="approach"/>
</attribute>
<attribute name="subjects">
<data:svalue value="Vehicle:1,Vehicle:0"/>
</attribute>
</content>
<content framespan="214:219" id="1" name="Event">
<attribute name="name">
<data:svalue value="arrive"/>
</attribute>
<attribute name="subjects">
<data:svalue value="Vehicle:0"/>
</attribute>
</content>
Listing 6.1: Sample annotation file – XML
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annotationset(
[ stage = ’probase.pl’,
input = input([dataset=1,vignette_id=1,origin=ground_rev]),
framespan = span(1,220),
tracklet_list = [
tracklet( [ id = ’Vehicle’:0,
bounding_box_list = [ 91-91:[238,259,1021,325],
92-92:[238,263,1017,325],
...
219-219:[207,196,714,341] ] ] ),
tracklet( [ id = ’Vehicle’:1,
bounding_box_list = [ 121-121:[260,257,1,317],
122-122:[260,264,1,317],
...
219-219:[260,694,-1,317] ] ] )
],
event_list = [
event( [ type = approach / 2,
participants = [’Vehicle’:1,’Vehicle’:0],
framespan = span(122,219) ] ),
event( [ type = approach / 2,
participants = [’Vehicle’:0,’Vehicle’:1],
framespan = span(122,219) ] )
]
] ).
Listing 6.2: Sample annotation – Prolog
list is composed of event terms, each of which lists the type and arity
(e.g. approach/2), the participants and the frame interval over which the
event occurs.
For each vignette, there are essentially two classes of annotation files
available to the system:
• Hand-annotated data produced by several human annotators. Each
annotator received a set of vignettes for which he/she manually
specified the coordinates of each oject’s bounding box at each frame
and added the event occurrences believed to be occurring in the vi-
gnette.
• Tracked data automatically generated by tracking algorithms (whose
generation and analysis is outside the scope of this work).
Annotation files are subject to the issue of uncertainty discussed in
Sec. 3.6. Specifically, this data does not have any contextual or background
information, as the environment in which the objects act is not represented
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in any way. It is very coarse-grained, as each object is identified only by
a rectangular bounding box and parts of objects which may be of interest
are not represented, for example people’s hands and feet. Additionally,
objects are represented on a two-dimensional plane and information rela-
tive to the third dimension is not represented explicitly.
Regarding data reliability, there is a wide gap between hand-annotated
and tracked data. Hand-annotated data, despite its coarseness and exclu-
sion of contextual information, is mostly reliable as rectangles are drawn
around objects with overall good precision. On the other hand, tracked
data is not only coarse and lacking in any contextual information, but is
also subject to errors. In fact some objects in the annotation may not relate
to any real object in the video, similarly objects in the video may have a
partial or non-existent representation in the annotation, and the bounding
boxes may not represent the position accurately.
The current stage of the development of ProVision is not focused on the
detection and management of issues arising from the data such as the ones
briefly overviewed above, especially regarding the unreliability of tracked
data. This is within the scope of future work with the development of
the Theory of Appearances (see Sec. 4.7). Throughout of the rest of this
chapter, any reference to video annotations data is to be assumed to refer
to hand-annotated data.
6.2 Ontology Implementation
The temporal model resulting from this data is given by a finite set of or-
dered frames, each of which corresponds to a time instant in our ontology
(see Sec. 4.1). In the fragments of code to follow, each time instant corre-
sponds to a frame, usually denoted by a variable such as F. Intervals are
represented by the term span(Fs,Fe), where Fs and Fe are respectively
the first and last frame in the interval.
The spatial model resulting from this data is a cartesian coordinate sys-
tem of two-dimensional coordinates representing pixels within the video
image frame. The origin of this system is at point (0, 0) at the top-left
corner of the frame, increasing in the downward and rightward direction.
The maximum x- and y-coordinates are bounded by the video frame size.
In the code listings below, each point is represented as a list of coordi-
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nates [X,Y], and each spatial area corresponds to a rectangular bounding
box represented by the term bbox(H,W,X,Y), where H, W, X and Y are re-
spectively the height, width and x- and y-coordinate of its top-left corner.
This section will illustrate how the information from the vignette anno-
tations explained in the previous section is used by the ProVision system
to ground the ontology and infer whether mid-level predicates hold at a
particular time and the intervals over which events occur.
Temporally-indexed predicates
In order to express that a predicate p holds at time t, the ontology in
Chapter 4 and the verb models in Chapter 5 make use of the Event Cal-
culus constructs HoldsAt(p, t) and its abbreviation p@t. Event occurrences
are represented as Occurs(e, i).
In the Prolog code, these formalisations are wrapped inside the term
infer( Ha, Context), where Ha is an instance of a temporally indexed
predicate involving HoldsAt or Occurs. The following fragments of code
express that predicate Predicate holds at frame F, or that event Event
occurs over interval span(Fs,Fe):
infer( holds_at(Predicate, F), Context).
infer( occurs(Event, span(Fs, Fe), Context).
The construct HoldsOn in Eq. 4.2 is defined within infer by the follow-
ing Prolog code:
infer( holds_on( Predicate, span(Fs, Fe) ), Context ) :-
infer( holds_at( Predicate, Fs), Context ),
Previous is Fs -1,
\+( infer( holds_at( Predicate, Previous ), Context ) ),
end_of_holds_on_span( Predicate, Fs, Fe, Context ).
end_of_holds_on_span(Predicate, Fs, Fe, Context ) :- !,
Next is Fs + 1,
( infer(holds_at( Predicate, Next), Context ) ->
end_of_holds_on_span( Predicate, Next, Fe, Context ) ;
Fe = Fs ),
!.
The variable Context is intialised and updated by the system, and rep-
resents a form of contextual information available to the predicate defini-
tion. Currently, it is a term embedding a list with details about the anno-
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tation set under examination (i.e. an annotationset term such as the one
illustrated in Listing 6.2), the precisification (see Sec. 4.5) and the frame
span of the current vignette:
inference_context( [annotationset=A, precisification=P, framespan=S ] )
Precisifications
Precisifications are represented as a contextual element rather than a pa-
rameter of a particular predicate, for ease of implementation. Each pre-
cisification is essentially a list of thresholds and their values. For ex-
ample, precisification P = {(T, t)} is represented in the code by the list
[ T = t ].
An initial precisification is initialised by the system and contains the
necessary thresholds for the inference of the implemented definitions. The
fragment below shows an example of a default_precisification fact
which initialises such precisification:
default_precisification( [ movement_detection_window = 10,
towards_min_speed = 0.2,
closer_min_speed = 0.2,
holding_pos_top_height = 0.3,
holding_pos_bottom_height = 1.0,
holding_pos_left_width = -0.5,
holding_pos_right_width = 1.5,
hold_rel_pos_height_tolerance = 0.1,
hold_rel_pos_width_tolerance = 0.2,
merge_threshold = 15,
filter_threshold = 30 ] ).
The precisification thresholds listed above are to be found in definitions
appearing later in this section.
6.2.1 Ontology Grounding
Primitive properties of objects are grounded by ProVision on the contents
of the annotationset term asserted by the system after parsing the Viper
XML annotation data (see example in Listing 6.2). The term in fact lists
objects and their bounding boxes, corresponding to their spatial extension.
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Given that spatial points are represented by the list of coordinates
[X,Y] and spatial areas by the term bbox, the following fragment defines
the primitive properties p_point and p_extension of abstract objects Point
and Area (see pag. 72):
p_point( Point, [X, Y] ) :-
Point = [ X, Y ].
p_extension( Area, bbox(H,W,X,Y) ) :-
Area = bbox(H,W,X,Y).
The code above is rather trivial given the simple representation chosen for
points and areas, but it allows for generality and modularity should the
representation be extended in the future.
The properties expressing the centroid and position of a spatial area
(see pag. 74) are defined in the fragment below:
position(Area, Point) :-
centroid(Area, Point).
centroid(Area, [Cx, Cy] ) :-
p_extension(Area, bbox(H,W,X,Y) ) :-
Cx is X + W/2,
Cy is Y + H/2.
In this implementation, an object of type ConcreteObject corresponds
to a tracked object in the annotation data, and its primitive spatial property
is p_extension (see pag. 71). This is the only one defined in our implemen-
tation, given that objects are represented by their extension in the form of
bounding boxes. The following fragment grounds the property expressing
that object Ob has extension Area at frame F:
infer( holds_at( p_extension(Ob, Area), F), Context) :-
ensure_ground_object(Ob, Context), ground(F), !
obatval( Ob, bounding_box_list, BBlist),
member( T1-T2 : [H,W,X,Y], BBlist ),
T1 =< F, F =< T2,
Area = bbox(H,W,X,Y).
The definition above ensures object Ob is grounded in the current context
as a term of the form tracklet(+L) as in the code in Listing 6.2. The list of
bounding boxes is extracted from the object and the requested bounding
box at frame F is searched within the list and unified with Area.
In the code above, predicate obatval( +Ob, +Key, -Value), also ap-
pearing in definitions to be found later on, unifies Value with the right
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hand side of the term [ Key = Value ] member of the associative list Ob.
Given the primitive property expressing extension of generic objects
above, the property position(o ∈ ConcreteObject, p ∈ Point)@t can be in-
ferred by the system (see pag. 78):
infer( holds_at( position(Ob, Point), F), Context) :-
infer( holds_at( p_extension(Ob, Area), F), Context),
position(Area, Point).
The grounding of primitive properties briefly outlined in the previous
definitions allows for the inference of higher level properties. For example,
the property distance for points and generic objects can be inferred:
distance(Point1, Point2, Dist) :-
p_point(Point1, Coords1),
p_point(Point2, Coords2),
euclid_distance(Coords1, Coords2, Dist).
euclid_distance( [X1, Y1], [X2, Y2], Dist) :-
Dist is sqrt( (X1 - X2) * (X1 - X2) + (Y1 - Y2) * (Y1 - Y2) ).
infer( holds_at( distance(Ob1, Ob2, Dist) , F), Context) :-
infer( holds_at( position(Ob1, Point1), F), Context),
infer( holds_at( position(Ob2, Point2), F), Context),
distance( Point1, Point2, Dist).
6.2.2 The Verb Approach
The verb approach has been modelled in Sec. 5.2.1 by defining fluents
getCloserTo and moveTowards. The definitions of these fluents need some
modifications for their implementation in ProVision.
Eq. 5.31 defines the fluent getCloserTo(o1, o2)@t by expressing that there
exists an interval [ts, te] surrounding t over which the distance between o1
and o2 decreases at each subsequent time point. Eq. 5.32 defines fluent
moveTowards(o1, o2)@t in a similar fashion.
In order to infer whether the fluents hold in the ontology implementa-
tion described so far, the interval [ts, te] surrounding t has to be precisely
individuated. Additionally, negligible reductions in distance between o1
and o2 should not determine an occurrence of Approach, as these generally
do not constitute significant occurrences of the verb and may signify noise
or unrelated movement that may appear from the data.
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For this reason, precisification P is added as a parameter to the defini-
tions. P contains thresholds (Tw, w) and (Ts, s) respectively specifying the
size of the detection window (i.e. the interval [ts, te] surrounding t) and the
minimum speed at which o1 has to be getting closer or moving towards o2
over this window in order for the predicates to hold at time t. The revised
definitions are below:
getCloserTo[P](o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ (Tw, w), (Ts, s) ∈ P ∃ ts, te, ds, de[t− ts = te − t = w
∧ distance((o1, o2), ds)@ts ∧ distance((o1, o2), de)@te ∧
ds − de
te − ts > s (6.1)
moveTowards[P](o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ (Tw, w), (Ts, s) ∈ P ∃ ts, te, p1s, p2s, p1e [t− ts = te − t = w
∧ position(o1, p1s)@ts ∧ position(o2, p2s)@ts ∧ position(o1, p1e)@te
∧distance((p1s, p2s), ds) ∧ distance((p1e, p2s), de) ∧ ds − dete − ts > s (6.2)
The implementation in Prolog requires a predicate to establish the de-
tection window given the threshold in the precisification. The following
predicate unifies WinStart and WinEnd with the start and end frame of the
detection window at frame F (the predicate obatval extracts the value of
a threshold from precisification list P):
detection_window( move, P, F, WinStart, WinEnd) :-
obatval(P, movement_detection_window, Win),
WinStart is max( 1, F - Win),
WinEnd is F + Win.
The infer clause for predicate getCloserTo ensures objects Ob1 and
Ob2 are grounded and distinct, calculates the detection window, infers
the distance between Ob1 and Ob2 at the start and end of the window
and checks whether the average speed of Ob1 is greater than the value of
threshold closer_min_speed over the window:
infer( holds_at( getCloserTo( Ob1, Ob2), F), Context ) :-
ensure_ground_object( Ob1, Context ),
ensure_ground_object( Ob2, Context ),
\+( Ob1 = Ob2 ),
ensure_ground_frame( F, Context ),
obatval( Context, precisification, P ),
detection_window( move, P, F, WinStart, WinEnd),
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infer( holds_at( distance(Ob1, Ob2, DistStart), WinStart ), Context ),
infer( holds_at( distance(Ob1, Ob2, DistEnd), WinEnd ), Context ),
ClosingSpeed is (DistStart - DistEnd) / (WinEnd - WinStart),
obatval( P, closer_min_speed, MinSpeed ),
ClosingSpeed > MinSpeed.
Similarly, the infer clause for predicate moveTowards ensures objects
are ground and checks whether the average speed at which Ob1 has been
moving towards the initial position of Ob2 is greater than the value of
threshold towards_min_speed:
infer( holds_at( moveTowards( Ob1, Ob2), F), Context ) :-
ensure_ground_object( Ob1, Context ),
ensure_ground_object( Ob2, Context ),
\+( Ob1 = Ob2 ),
ensure_ground_frame( F, Context ),
obatval( Context, precisification, P ),
detection_window( move, P, F, WinStart, WinEnd),
infer( holds_at( distance(Ob1, Ob2, DistStart), WinStart), Context ),
infer( holds_at( position(Ob1, Point1End), WinEnd ), Context ),
infer( holds_at( position(Ob2, Point2start), WinStart ), Context ),
distance( Point1End, Point2Start, DistEnd ),
SpeedTowards is (DistStart - DistEnd) / (WinEnd - WinStart),
obatval( P, towards_min_speed, MinSpeed ),
SpeedTowards > MinSpeed.
The occurrence of the event Approach is inferred by simpy inferring
whether the two fluents hold over the interval Span:
infer( occurs( approach( Ob1, Ob2 ), Span ), Context ) :-
infer( holds_on( moveTowards( Ob1, Ob2), Span), Context ),
infer( holds_on( getCloserTo( Ob1, Ob2), Span), Context ).
6.2.3 The Verb Hold
The general meaning of Hold is that a person is carrying or supporting an
object with his/her hands, with the position being mostly stationary, even
though there are occasions where, for example, a person may be walk-
ing and holding an object at the same time. The verb has been modelled
in Sec. 5.4.6 using the primitive p_hands that specifies the position of the
hands of an object of type Person. However, given the coarse-grained na-
ture of the data available for ontology grounding, and the fact the hand
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position is not specified, the position of a subject’s hands cannot be ex-
tracted precisely.
In the implementation of Hold for event recognition purposes the defi-
nition for hold(o1, o2)@t has been rewritten by referring to a holding position,
representing the location an object o2 is most likely to be at when held by
o1 at time t:
holdingPosition[P](o1, o2)@t ≡
∃ (Th, th), (Bh, bh), (Lw, lw), (Rw, rw), (Tol, tol) ∈ P, a1, a2, A1, A2,
ptl1 , p
tl
2 , h1, h2, w1, w2[extension(o1, a1)@t ∧ extension(o2, a2)@t ∧
p_area(a1, A1) ∧ p_topleft(A1, ptl1 ) ∧ p_width(A1, w1) ∧
p_height(A1, h1) ∧ pos_x(ptl1 , x1) ∧ pos_y(ptl1 , y1) ∧
p_area(a2, A2) ∧ p_topleft(A2, ptl2 ) ∧ p_width(A2, w2) ∧
p_height(A2, h2) ∧ pos_x(ptl2 , x2) ∧ pos_y(ptl2 , y2) ∧
[(y2 + h2)− (y1 + bh · h1)] < tol · h2 ∧
[(y1 + th · h1)− y2] < tol · h2 ∧
[(x1 + lw · w1)− x2] < tol · w2 ∧
[(x2 + w2)− (x1 + rw · w1)] < tol · w2] (6.3)
The precisification thresholds Th and Bh determine the top- and bottom-
most y-coordinates of the holding position shaded in the illustration in
Fig. 6.2. Thresholds Lw and Rw determine the left- and right-most x-
coordinates. Threshold Tol is a tolerance value used to allow for positions
that fall outside this area to be still classified as holding positions.
The definitions inferring an occurrence of event Hold on this formali-
sation have been implemented in ProVision with the code below:
infer( holds_at( holdingPosition(Ob1, Ob2), F), Context) :-
obatval(Context, precisification, P),
obatval(P, holding_pos_top_height, T_H),
obatval(P, holding_pos_bottom_height, B_H),
obatval(P, holding_pos_left_width, L_W),
obatval(P, holding_pos_right_width, R_W),
obatval(P, hold_rel_pos_height_tolerance, TolH),
obatval(P, hold_rel_pos_width_tolerance, TolW),
infer( holds_at( p_extension(Ob1, Area1), F), Context),
infer( holds_at( p_extension(Ob2, Area2), F), Context),
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x1 + lw · w1 x1 + rw · w1
y1 + th · h1
y1 + bh · h1
x
y
o1
o2
Figure 6.2: Implementation of Hold – Estimation of a ‘holding position’
p_extension(Area1, bbox(H1, W1, X1, Y1)),
p_extension(Area2, bbox(H2, W2, X2, Y2)),
( ( Y2 + H2 ) - ( Y1 + (B_H * H1) ) ) < ( TolH * H2 ),
( ( Y1 + (T_H * H1) ) - Y2 ) < ( TolH * H2 ),
( ( X1 + ( L_W * W1 ) ) - X2 ) < ( TolW * W2 ),
( ( X2 + W2) - (X1 + ( R_W * W1 ) ) ) < ( TolW * W2 ).
infer( holds_at( hold(Ob1, Ob2), F), Context) :-
ensure_ground_object(Ob1, Context),
ensure_ground_object(Ob2, Context),
type( Ob1, ’Person’),
type( Ob2, ’Other’),
ensure_ground_frame(F, Context),
infer( holds_at( holdingPosition(Ob1, Ob2), F), Context)
infer( occurs( hold(Ob1, Ob2), Span), Context) :-
infer( holds_on( hold(Ob1, Ob2), Span), Context).
6.2.4 Occurrence Smoothing
When testing the event recognition system with the standard definition
for the constructs HoldsAt and HoldsOn, in several occasions several short
isolated occurrences were produced, probably due to the fact that some
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Figure 6.3: Merging and filtering fluents and event occurrences
vignette annotations, or some actual objects in the video, do not move
particularly fluidly.
This problem can be overcome by enhancing HoldsAt, HoldsOn and
Occurs in order to extend the truth-value of a particular fluent or event
over small temporal gaps, likely to form part of a long occurrence span,
and falsify short isolated occurences, likley to constitute spurious ones.
This idea of occurrence smoothing is illustrated in Fig. 6.3.
The first stage, corresponding to the transition between Fig. 6.3(a) and
Fig. 6.3(b) is performed by the new constructs HoldsAtM and OccursM. The
former establishes that fluent f holds at time point t if t is part of a wider
interval [t1, t2] with duration smaller than precisification threshold Tm and
where f holds at t1 and t2. Similarly, the latter joins together separate
occurrences of an event-type e which are separated by an interval with
duration smaller than threshold Te:
HoldsAtM[P]( f , t) ≡
∃ (Tm, tm) ∈ P, t1, t2 ∈ T [t1 6 t 6 t2 ∧
HoldsAt( f , t1) ∧ HoldsAt( f , t2) ∧ t2 − t1 < tm] (6.4)
OccursM[P](e, [ts, te]) ≡
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Occurs(e, [ts, te]) ∨ ∃ (Te, te) ∈ P, t1, t2 ∈ T [(ts < t1 < t2 < te) ∧
Occurs(e, [ts, t1]) ∧ Occurs(e, [t2, te]) ∧ t2 − t1 < tm] (6.5)
The second stage, corresponding to the transition between Fig. 6.3(b)
and Fig. 6.3(c) is performed by the constructs HoldsAtF and OccursF. These
are built on constructs HoldsAtM and OccursM and filter isolated occur-
rences of very little duration. HoldsAtF( f , t) holds if and only if f holds at
time t part of an interval [t1, t2] longer than threshold Tf , and similarly for
OccursF:
HoldsAtF[P]( f , t) ≡
∃(Tf , t f ) ∈ P, t1, t2 ∈ T [t1 6 t 6 t2 ∧ t2 − t1 > t f ∧
∀ t′[(t1 6 t′ 6 t2)→ HoldsAtM( f , t′)]] (6.6)
OccursF[P](e, [ts, te]) ≡
∃(Tf , t f ) ∈ P[OccursM(e, [ts, te]) ∧ te − ts > t f ] (6.7)
The constructs HoldsOverM, HoldsOnM, HoldsOverF and HoldsOnF can
be defined following the same scheme in the definitions for HoldsOver and
HoldsOn in Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2.
The definitions above have been implemented in ProVision, and the
thresholds corresponding to Tm and Tf in the equations above have been
included in the standard precisification illustrated in the code on pag. 140
as thresholds merge_threshold and filter_threshold.
This mechanism of occurrence smoothing has been employed to pro-
duce a list of event occurrences described by verbs Approach and Hold and
obtain the results discussed in the next section.
6.3 Experimental Results
This section outlines the methodology with which the event recognition
system ProVision has been tested given the implementation of the ontol-
ogy in the previous section.
From Sec. 6.1 it can be recalled that hand-annotated vignette annota-
tions include event annotations which state a series of events occurring in
each vignette. These are represented in the annotationset term within the
list event_list shown in Listing 6.2 on pag. 137. These hand-annotated
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Figure 6.4: Evaluation – Frame classification
event occurrences constitute the ground truth used for evaluating the per-
formance of ProVision. The methodology surrounding the production of
such ground truth for evaluation purposes is outside the scope of this
work, and has just been made available for this project. It has been pro-
duced by human observers who watched a subset of vignettes and anno-
tated the events which, in their opinion, believed to be occurring in the
scene.
Each frame F part of an event occurrence recognised by ProVision is
categorised in one of the following sets, also illustrated in Fig. 6.4:
• TP (True Positives): if F is within the span of an inferred event oc-
currence also in the ground truth;
• FP (False Positives): if F is within the span of an inferred event
occurrence not in the ground truth;
• TN (True Negative): if no inferred event occurrences nor occurrences
in the ground truth involve F;
• FN (False Negative): if F is within the span of a ground truth oc-
currence but ProVision produced no inferred occurrence involving
F.
At the end of the frame categorisation, each set is such that |TP| +
|FP| + |TN| + |FN| = T where T is the total number of frames in the
vignette. The measures Prec (Precision), Rec (Recall), Fv (F-value), Mcc
(Matthews Correlation Coefficient) and occurrence rates TP%, FP%, TN%,
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FN% are calculated according to the following formulae:
Prec =
|TP|
|TP|+ |FP| Rec =
|TP|
|TP|+ |FN| Fv = 2 ·
Prec · Rec
Prec+ Rec
Mcc =
(|TP| · |TN|)− (|FP| · |FN|)√
(|TP|+ |FP|)(|TP|+ |FN|)(|TN|+ |FP|)(|TN|+ |FN|)
TP% =
|TPi|
|TPi|+ |FNi| FP
% =
|FPi|
|TNi|+ |FPi|
TN% =
|TNi|
|TNi|+ |FPi| FN
% =
|FNi|
|TPi|+ |FNi|
(6.8)
Values for Prec and Rec range between 0 and 1, whilst values for Mcc
range between −1 and 1. The values for Prec and Rec are set to 1 if the
denominator is 0, values for Mcc are set to 0 if the denominator is 0 [82].
Given that recognition of an occurrence of a particular verb is tested
over a set of n vignettes, an overall system accuracy figure for the recogni-
tion of the verb over the set is obtained by summing the values |TP|, |FP|,
|TN| and |FN| relative to each vignette, thus calculating a global value
for each category. The statistic measures in the formulae above are then
computed on these global values.
6.3.1 Sample Statistics and Baseline Accuracy
Tracked data tends to abund with error and noise; the detection tests dis-
cussed in this section have been carried out on hand-annotated data, as
ProVision is not yet fully capable of managing tracked data effectively.
Tests on verbs Approach and Hold have been run on two particular sets
of vignettes:
• Whole set, or W: all 1302 vignettes in the development dataset.
• Restricted set, or R: only vignettes whose hand-annotated annotation
file reports an occurrence of the event being tested.
The frequency of occurrences of verbs Approach and Hold in the ground
truth annotations are reported in Table 6.1 detailing the sample statistics
and displaying, for each verb and set, the total number of frames across
the vignettes, the number of Positive and Negative frames (i.e. the frames
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Verb Set Vignettes Frames Positives Negatives PosRate NegRate
Approach W 1302 595,110 5,254 589,856 0.88 % 99.12 %
Approach R 70 33,340 5,254 28,086 15.76 % 84.24 %
Hold W 1302 595,110 26,034 569,076 4.37 % 95.63 %
Hold R 98 42,682 26,034 16,648 61.00 % 39.00 %
Table 6.1: Sample statistics
Verb Set Bl Prec Rec Fv Mcc TP% FP% TN% FN%
Approach W A 0.010 0.969 0.020 0.028 96.90 86.69 13.32 3.10
Approach W S 0.016 0.917 0.031 0.077 91.74 50.36 49.64 8.26
Approach W N 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Approach R A 0.159 0.969 0.273 0.023 96.90 95.61 4.39 3.10
Approach R S 0.280 0.917 0.429 0.347 91.74 44.16 55.84 8.26
Approach R N 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Hold W A 0.044 1.000 0.084 0.012 100.00 99.68 0.32 0.00
Hold W S 0.068 0.750 0.125 0.116 75.01 46.71 53.29 24.99
Hold W N 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Hold R A 0.610 1.000 0.758 0.000 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
Hold R S 0.605 0.750 0.670 −0.019 75.01 76.65 23.35 24.99
Hold R N 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Bl: baseline algorithm (All, Some or None);
Set: vignette set (Whole or Restricted).
Table 6.2: Baseline statistics
within or outside the span of a hand-annotated occurrence of the verb)
and their occurrence rates PosRate and NegRate are reported.
Baseline statistics for the recognition of event occurrences, reported in
Table 6.2, have been generated by implementing three very simple baseline
detection algorithms, :
• All: Approach(o1, o2) occurs at every interval where two distinct ob-
jects o1 and o2 are present. Hold(o1, o2) occurs at every interval where
two objects o1 and o2 are present.
• Some: Approach(o1, o2) occurs at every interval where two distinct
objects o1 and o2 are present and o1 is moving. Hold(o1, o2) occurs at
every interval where two distinct objects o1 and o2 are present, o1 is
of type Person and o2 is of type Other.
• None: Approach(o1, o2) and Hold(o1, o2) never occur in any interval.
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6.3.2 Detection Results
The precisification shown on pag. 140 specifies the value of several thresh-
olds essential to the implementation of the definitions for verbs Approach
and Hold. At the current stage, these values are set by default when the
system is initialised even though their automatic inference is envisioned in
future stages. For this reason, recognition tests have been repeated several
times in order to assess the impact of different threshold values on the
recognition accuracy.
For the verb Approach tests have been run with the following threshold
values:
• movement_detection_window = tw ∈ {5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14};
• towards_min_speed = ts ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9};
• closer_min_speed equal to towards_min_speed;
• merge_threshold = δm ∈ {5, 10, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 30, 35, 40};
• filter_threshold = δ f ∈ {5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20,
22, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80}.
For the verb Hold tests have been run with the following threshold
values:
• holding_pos_top_height = tt ∈ {0.25, 0.35, 0.45};
• holding_pos_bottom_heigh = tb ∈ {0.85, 1.00, 1.15};
• holding_pos_left_width = tl ∈ {−0.1,−0.25,−0.5};
• holding_pos_right_width = tr = 1− tl ;
• hold_rel_pos_height_tolerance = tol ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3};
• hold_rel_pos_width_tolerance equal to the previous values.
After an initial test phase, the set of threshold values has been pro-
gressively reduced, focusing on values yielding the best accuracy results.
Experimental results for the recognition of occurrences of Approach are
reported in Table 6.3, which reports accuracy statistics for increasing val-
ues of threshold δ f . Table 6.4 reports accuracy statistics for occurrences of
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Set tw ts δm δ f Prec Rec Fv Mcc TP% FP% TN% FN%
W 10 0.2 15 30 0.042 0.673 0.079 0.144 67.26 13.64 86.36 32.74
W 10 0.2 15 40 0.047 0.625 0.087 0.149 62.50 11.30 88.70 37.50
W 10 0.2 15 50 0.052 0.575 0.096 0.152 57.46 9.27 90.73 42.54
W 10 0.2 15 60 0.057 0.524 0.103 0.153 52.38 7.69 92.31 47.62
W 10 0.2 15 70 0.060 0.459 0.106 0.147 45.89 6.45 93.55 54.11
W 10 0.2 15 80 0.062 0.417 0.108 0.143 41.66 5.59 94.41 58.34
R 10 0.2 15 30 0.506 0.673 0.578 0.492 67.26 12.27 87.73 32.74
R 10 0.2 15 40 0.507 0.625 0.560 0.471 62.51 11.37 88.63 37.50
R 10 0.2 15 50 0.513 0.575 0.542 0.452 57.46 10.19 89.81 42.54
R 10 0.2 15 60 0.520 0.524 0.522 0.432 52.38 9.03 90.97 47.62
R 10 0.2 15 70 0.520 0.459 0.488 0.400 45.89 7.93 92.07 54.11
R 10 0.2 15 80 0.505 0.417 0.457 0.369 41.66 7.64 92.36 58.34
Table 6.3: Accuracy statistics for the recognition of Approach
Set tt tb tl tol Prec Rec Fv Mcc TP% FP% TN% FN%
W 0.25 0.85 −0.1 0.2 0.153 0.415 0.224 0.196 41.47 10.50 89.50 58.53
W 0.25 1.15 −0.5 0.3 0.096 0.653 0.167 0.166 65.30 28.16 71.84 34.70
W 0.25 0.85 −0.1 0.3 0.145 0.537 0.228 0.217 53.71 14.52 85.48 46.30
W 0.25 0.85 −0.25 0.3 0.142 0.582 0.228 0.225 58.17 16.07 83.93 41.83
R 0.35 0.85 −0.1 0.3 0.830 0.357 0.499 0.269 35.69 11.40 88.60 64.31
R 0.25 1.15 −0.5 0.3 0.727 0.653 0.688 0.264 65.30 38.33 61.67 34.70
R 0.25 1.00 −0.5 0.3 0.740 0.652 0.693 0.287 65.23 35.85 64.15 34.77
R 0.25 0.85 −0.25 0.3 0.811 0.582 0.678 0.363 58.17 21.25 78.75 41.83
Table 6.4: Accuracy statistics for the recognition of Hold
(a) Approach – Restricted set (b) Hold – Restricted set
Figure 6.5: Evaluation – ROC curves
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Hold with different threshold values. The precisification yielding the best
accuracy value for each statistic figure is underlined.
ROC curve graphs showing the overall detection accuracy over differ-
ent precisifications are shown in Fig. 6.5 [25, 45]. Each dot on the graph
represents a couple of TP% and FP% values associated with the event de-
tection results for a specific choice of thresholds. In general, precisifica-
tions yielding high TP% values have the undesirable effect of yielding high
FP% values too; figures showing point concentrations skewed towards top-
most and leftmost areas of the graph denote algorithms with good overall
performances.
6.4 Considerations
Results obtained by the event recognition tests, carried out as explained in
the previous section, show that ProVision recognised 67.26% of true pos-
itive frames (against 12.27% of false positives) for the verb Approach and
65.30% of true positive frames (against 38.33% of false positives) for Hold
across the restricted set of vignettes. These detection rates yield Precision
and Recall figures of 0.506 and 0.673 for Approach and 0.727 and 0.653 for
Hold.
When the whole set of vignettes is considered, true and false positives
rates do not show significant variations, while Precision and Mcc figures
decrease sensibly. This is due to the distribution of event occurrences in
hand-annotated data shown in Table 6.1. In fact, occurrences of Approach
and Hold only involve 0.88% and 4.37% of frames respectively. Given this
occurrence rate, even small FP% values yield high a high absolute number
of false positives, hence the rapid deterioration of Precision, Mcc and Fv
values.
The Mcc figure shows some peculiar behaviour in expressing the ac-
curacy of event recognition for event e performed on a vignette v where
no event of type e is recognised and there is no event annotation for e
in the ground truth. In this situation, given the number of frames f in
vignette v, the recognition statistics would result in a confusion matrix
where |TP| = |FP| = |FN| = 0 and |TN| = f . Computing the accuracy
figures in Eq. 6.8 would have them set at their limit value as the denomi-
nators are 0, thus yielding Prec = Rec = Fv = 0.5 and Mcc = 0.
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A glance at the confusion matrix for the above case may give the im-
pression of a very good or even optimal result, given that nothing has been
recognised and there was nothing to be recognised. However, the accuracy
figures paint a different picture by classifying the result as just ‘average’,
meaning that the system has not scored badly but not even that well. This
may appear slightly unfair but, in some ways, it simply recognises the fact
that such vignette is a trivial example, where the system is just required
to ‘do the bare minimum’.
The issue in our dataset is that there are plenty of such instances, es-
pecially when recognition tests regard the whole set of 1302 vignettes. In
fact, the sample statistics in Table 6.1 show that only 0.88% of frames are
marked with an occurrence of the event Approach in the ground truth, and
4.37% are marked with an occurrence of Hold. The problem is that accu-
racy results for vignettes not involving either event will lower the overall
average score as seen above. And, of course, even a small amount of false
positives recognised in such vignettes will lower scores even further.
By examining the annotation files for some vignettes, it appeared that
sample statistics for Approach are affected by under-reporting and/or in-
consistent reporting of the event in the ground truth. This may have been
caused by the fact that human observers who produced the data may have
interpreted the meaning of each verb slightly or markedly differently. For
example, the event Approach has mostly been marked as a verb with ar-
ity 2 identifying an object moving towards and getting closer to another,
but also as a verb with arity 1 identifying an object approaching the fore-
ground represented by the camera location.
The issue of saliency is very relevant to this particular problem (see
Sec. 3.3). In fact, several examples show that human annotators did not
report occurrences of Approach in the ground truth for scenes where more
salient and semantically richer events dominate the foreground. In such
instances, ProVision would still report an occurrence of the verb, as long as
the implemented definitions for the verb hold for any two objects. How-
ever, these would count as false positives, thus impacting negatively on
the accuracy figures.
This problem in the ground truth could be overcome either by a con-
sistent, reliable re-annotation process, or by a change in perspective in the
evaluation methodology.
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A reliable re-annotation could be produced by specifying a meaning
for each verb as precisely as possible, then having human annotators
marking every occurrence of the verb so described. However, this would
create a biased ground truth as it would orient the annotators towards
adhering to the verb meaning intended by the system developers.
A change in perspective in the evaluation methodology would evalu-
ate the system a posteriori rather than on a hand-annotated ground truth
produced a priori. Such methodology would see a first stage where ProVi-
sion performs event recognition on a set of vignettes, and a second stage
where human annotators are asked whether they think that the events
recognised by the system for a particular vignette actually occur in the
scene. In fact, people may not notice an event not deemed particularly
salient, nevertheless agree with the fact it is happening if asked explicitly.
Both processes (re-annotation and evaluation a posteriori) are relatively
consuming in terms of time and human resources required, and they
would not resolve the issue of saliency. In fact, a system aiming to be
intelligent, such as ProVision, should be able to operate a saliency classifi-
cation similar to the one naturally performed by humans when observing
a scene and focusing on the more prominent events. Such a classification
could be based on a pre-established hierarchy of verbs and a dynamic rea-
soning stage in which different aspects of the scene and objects involved
are considered (positions, movement range, etc.). Incorporating such intel-
ligent behaviour in ProVision would constitute a deciding feature towards
a more reliable event recognition system.
The verb Hold is not affected by under-reporting to the same extent of
Approach. The high false positives detection rate for this verb is rather
caused by the fact that an occurrence of Hold is inherently more difficult
to detect when the position of the two objects is only described by their
bounding boxes, hence the relatively high number of cases where two
objects’ relative positioning is mistaken for an occurrence of Hold. This
could be improved by access to more precise and fine-grained data, or a
better estimation of the position of a person’s hands.
Regarding hand-annotated occurrences of events not recognised by
ProVision, there are several vignettes annotated with an occurrence of
Approach where instances seem particularly difficult to recognise given
the quality of the data and its associated spatial model. For example, vi-
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Figure 6.6: A difficult approach
gnettes where the objects move along the z-axis (i.e. the direction towards
or away from the camera) are challenging as that type of motion is not de-
tected yet. This could be improved by enhancing the spatial model with an
approximation of the z-coordinate either through an analysis on changes
in the size of the bounding boxes, or through more specific algorithms.
An example of a challenging vignette on which our system fails to
recognise a hand-annotated occurrence of Approach is shown in Fig. 6.6,
where two people turn around and approach by ‘bumping’ into each other.
This occurrence is challenging due to a movement along z which, even
with the improvements outlined above, appears very hard to detect: the
distances involved are very small and the subjects are jumping, thus im-
pairing the detection of any significant changes in the boxes’ height.
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Conclusions
The models presented in Chapter 5 demonstrate the escalating complexity
of defining natural language concepts in ontologies. The attempt of defin-
ing a single motion verb, or even a particular meaning of a verb, often
unfolds a variety of sub-concepts, interpretations and sources of ambigu-
ity. The set of verbs on which the methodology and application of this
research has focused is very particular in this respect. Most verbs and re-
lated sub-concepts suffer from vagueness, in particular multiple meanings
(e.g. Approach, Sec. 5.2.1), borderline cases (e.g. near) and deep ambigu-
ity. The interpretation of some concepts may change in different contexts
or among different speakers, such as the characterisation of what distin-
guishes an occurence of Hit and an occurrence of Collide. One may even
question the reason or motivation behind the need to discriminate between
nearly synonymous concepts, such as Lift or Raise which would seem to
describe very similar events. The task of recognising occurrences of these
semantic descriptions on real data adds further issues such as saliency and
uncertainty, mainly due to the imprecise representation of the world in the
data grounding the ontology.
In summary, the main challenge faced during this research on mod-
elling motion verbs and, more generally, spatial concepts has been the
formulation of a formal description identifying the semantic properties
of each concept that can be recognised by observation. Some of these
properties, such as position and distance, admit a reasonably clean, pre-
cise and straightforward formalisation, although they are still subject to
some degree of interpretation. Many higher-level properties, instead, are
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problematic to recognise by grounding inferences on lower-level observ-
able properties. A prime example of such a property is the previously
mentioned degree of intentionality or responsibility of an agent in par-
ticipating in an action for occurrences of Hit and Collide (Sec. 5.4.3 and
5.4.4).
This challenge is constituted by two aspects. The first one involves
addressing the vagueness of predicates with borderline cases. The appli-
cability boundary of these predicates depends on one or several observ-
able properties, and the inclusion of these concepts in formal ontologies
requires the presence of a device able to precisify borderline cases. This
has been addressed with a supervaluationist approach and the parame-
terisation of some definitions in order to specify precisification thresholds.
This approach, however, is a partial solution to the issue of vagueness,
as a new element is introduced, which is the need to design an effective
mechanism for establishing appropriate threshold values given the partic-
ular context of predication. At this stage, such values are set manually
during the experimental stage, in order to isolate the thresholds leading
to the best recognition results. Ideally, an inference system should be able
to automatically infer threshold values relative to a particular context; this
would constitute the natural extension of the formalism developed so far
(see Sec. 7.2 on future work).
The second aspect of the challenge involves issues of uncertainty aris-
ing from imprecision and unreliability in the data on which observable
properties are to be inferred. Despite the primary purpose of this research
being the demonstration of a methodology for the formalisation of vague
concepts in ontologies oriented to practical reasoning tasks, rather than
the advance in techniques for event recognition, nevertheless issues re-
lated to the quality of the data had an influence on verb modelling. In
fact, this process has to strike a compromise between formalising the se-
mantic properties most relevant to the meaning of a verb and formalising
the observable properties most likely to be inferrable given the average
accuracy and granularity of the data available to a reasoning system..
Such compromise is not easy to achieve, as certain characteristics are
inherently hard to detect, such as the frequently mentioned intentionality
of an agent. After all, the representation of the world available to the
event recognition system was only constituted by rectangular bounding
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boxes around some objects. For certain properties, this data simply cannot
provide enough evidence for the recognition of verbs with very specific
meanings defined in terms of very abstract characteristics.
These two aspects of this research challenge determine, as a conse-
quence, that the formalism illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5 may not pos-
sess the elegant characteristics of completeness, generality and consistency
that other theories for knowledge representation and reasoning show. One
may wonder if it is even possible to define what constitutes an acceptable
balance between these desirable characteristics of logical formalisms and
their practical effectiveness in understanding and interpreting real data.
Despite the challenging aspects described above, the verb modelling
process has resulted in the development of the automatic event recogni-
tion system ProVision. The system is capable of inferring certain object
properties from primitives and its ontological core allows for generality as
it can be extended with the specification of further definitions. Although
this process may be inelegant in some of its parts, as the implementation
of definitions in Chapters 4 and 6 requires the consideration of practical,
low-level issues such as errors and granularity, it is effective in the context
of event recognition, and can be improved by further refinements of the
ontological model. Still, much greater advances would be achievable by
operating on more accurate and fine-grained data. Indeed, further devel-
opments of this research are closely related to the improvement in Vision
techniques for video processing, an area outside the scope of this project.
The preliminary results discussed in Chapter 6 for two simple verbs where
ProVision operated on the available data have been encouraging.
In summary, the research has demonstrated the potential applicabil-
ity of formal semantics to the development of an ontology for describing
physical objects and their interactions, and to a concrete reasoning task
such as event recognition. A practical supervaluationist method to ground
vague concepts on observable properties has been outlined, and it has been
stressed that there is a balance between exhaustive and effective semantic
characterisations of concepts. Despite the attractiveness of enriching this
formalism further by specifying very detailed semantic characteristics, this
could in fact run the risk of specifying characteristics of objects and events
whose manifestations may be too challenging to recognise, even on data
constituting a very accurate representation of the world.
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Given the very particular nature of some of the events to be recog-
nised in this task, the main strength of this approach is to provide for
a greater specification of each verb’s semantic characteristics, which may
not be completely understood by Machine Learning techniques. Indeed,
this ontology and its implementation ProVision can integrate a detailed
semantic characterisation of concepts and allow for augmentation of infer-
ence capabilities by broadening the ontology with additional definitions
and deepening it by further specifications and structuring. Moreover, the
methodology underlying this approach has the potential to be generalised
to other domains and automated reasoning tasks involving qualitative
vague concepts.
7.1 Contributions
The research focuses on vagueness in natural language, the methodology
and techniques for the formalisation of vague spatial concepts, processes
and events in ontologies and the application of the resulting formalism to
the task of event recognition.
Specific original contributions are summarised below:
• The analysis and investigation on vagueness in natural language
and issues of context-dependency, carried out in Chapter 3, demon-
strated the usefulness of an epistemic model of vagueness to the
concrete task of reasoning about vague spatial concepts and related
event occurrences. In fact, most concepts have been formalised as-
suming that there exists a crisp boundary separating borderline in-
stances. The applicability of this model is further substantiated by
the formalisation and application of the ontology and the verb mod-
els in Chapters 4 and 5. The investigation on issues of saliency, un-
certainty and granularity provided an insight on the main challenges
in performing reasoning tasks on finite and limited representations
of real-world scenarios.
• The formalisation of the ontology in Chapter 4 applied the principles
of supervaluation semantics to the formalisation of vague concepts,
following from the above considerations on epistemic vagueness.
Vague predicates are formalised through the parameterisation of def-
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initions with precisifications, specifying which observable properties
affect the applicability of concepts. This method does not address
the issue of vagueness entirely, as further work is needed in order
to infer appropriate precisifications within the ontology, however it
provides a practical technique for reasoning with vague concepts.
• The verb models in Chapter 5 provide further insight on the formal-
isation of processes and events in formal ontologies. The result is a
methodolgy that focuses on the semantic characterisation of concepts
in terms of mid-level predicates that can be ground on observable
properties and primitives.
• The implementation of ProVision and the preliminary experimental
results in Chapter 6 connect the three aspects above and demon-
strate the practical applicability of formal ontologies to a reasoning
task such as event recognition from video. Despite the limitations of
the dataset available for our evaluation, it is possible to generalise
the approach that led to this implementation to other domains and
reasoning tasks.
The contribution from Chapter 6 and a selection of the discussions,
analysis and formalisations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have been published
in the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Spatial Cogni-
tion [37]. A contribution focused on the formal analysis of Chapters 4
and 5 has also been published in the proceedings of Commonsense 2013,
11th International Symposium on Logical Formalisations of Commonsense
Reasoning [38].
7.2 Future Work
There are many directions in which the research carried out so far could
move forward. These include developments on the logical formalism,
practical techniques in order to address issues of uncertainty in the data
and the extension of the methodology to a different set of spatial concepts
or to non-spatial domains. The most important aspects that would lead to
an advance of the results presented here are summarised below:
• The approach based on supervaluation semantics and precisification
thresholds can be extended by designing an inference mechanism
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seamlessly precisifying predicate definitions by inferring the value of
thresholds given the current context. This is likely to involve further
reasoning on object properties, past and future events, background
and other relevant information. This would ultimately lead to the
development of an ontology of contextual information guiding the
resolution of ambiguities. It will have to address the limitations con-
stituted by uncertainty in the data and the limited knowledge and
experience of an automatic system.
• The application of Machine Learning techniques would be of partic-
ular interest for the automatic production of event definitions, and
could also provide a mechanism for the aforementioned automatic
inference of precisification thresholds. Techniques basic on Inductive
and Abductive Logic Programming for Event Calculus and Markov
Logic Networks, overviewed in Sec. 2.5, are of particular interest as
they suit the first-order logic nature of the ontological formalism un-
derlying ProVision.
• The development of a Theory of Appearances (Sec. 4.7) would par-
tially address issues of uncertainty arising from the data grounding
the ontology. This module is intended as a refinement of a represen-
tation of the world through the discovery of obscure or unclear in-
formation that this representation may hide. This could lead, for ex-
ample, to the extraction of a three-dimensional representation from a
two-dimensional one, to the detection of phenomenons of occlusion
and to the correction of errors in the data.
• Issues of saliency, discussed in Sec. 3.3 and 6.4, can be addressed by
the development of a semantic hierarchy within the ontology spec-
ifying which observable properties of objects and events are more
relevant within the context of an observed situation. This could
be coupled with an inference mechanism establishing saliency by
identifying prominent objects or events deemed more relevant than
others, for example people in the foreground or complex structured
actions.
• The evaluation strategy for this and other reasoning tasks could be
revised as explained in Sec. 6.4. For example, rather than evaluat-
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ing the performance of the system by assessing whether a computer
agrees with the human interpretation of a concept or complex scene
(a priori), one could consider assessing whether a human agrees with
the interpretation provided by the machine (a posterori). In fact, even
though machines may not assess saliency in the same way humans
do, humans may still agree with their assessment.
• The ontology could be broadened by applying the characterisation
methodology to other spatial or non-spatial domains and similar rea-
soning tasks
• The ontology could be deepened with a further specification of con-
cepts’ semantic characteristics. This particular process is likely to
require more accurate data detailing fine-grained observable prop-
erties of objects, for example obtained through advanced tracking
algorithms extracting people’s features such as body posture and
positioning [104, 115].
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